

JPRS-WER-84-011

31 JANUARY 1984

West Europe Report

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31 January 1984

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CRUISE MISSILES ENLIVEN DEBATE ON 'ZONE,' AIR DEFENSES

Vayrynen: Increases Need for 'Zone'

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Nov 83 p 3

[Article: "Vayrynen: Missile Threat Increases Importance of Zone"]

[Text] In the opinion of Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen (Center Party) the threat posed by cruise missiles to Finland and Sweden increases the timeliness of the proposal regarding a nuclear-free Nordic zone.

On Sunday Vayrynen repeated an already previously stated stand that ground-to-air cruise missiles to be deployed in Western Europe will not directly threaten Finland and Sweden.

On the other hand, cruise missiles that will be possibly deployed from submarines, ships, or aircraft, for example, in the immediate vicinity pose a threat. "We must make every effort to prevent them," stated Vayrynen.

Vayrynen, who spoke at the 25th anniversary seminar of the Paasikivi Society, stated that the conditions have not existed for close mutual negotiations among the Nordic countries regarding the realization of a nuclear-free zone now that the nuclear weapons dispute in Europe has reached an acute phase. He believed that even Norway and Denmark will join these discussions at a later phase on the basis of their readiness in principle.

Chairman Jan-Magnus Jansson (Swedish People's Party) of the Paasikivi Society stated that increased activities in the society speak to the fact that unrest and the posing of more acrimonious questions are noticeable in foreign policy.

Radar To Detect Cruise Missiles

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 28 Nov 83 p 3

[Article: "Finland Developing Radar System Against Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] A new domestic early warning radar system, which will improve our defense against cruise missiles, is being developed in Finland. Colonel Olli Yki-Jarvinen, chief of the Ita-Uusimaa Military District, stated at the 25th

anniversary celebrations of the Mantsala Reserve Non-Commissioned Officer Corps on Sunday that cruise missiles pose a new threat to our security and to the military defense of our country since they can be possibly launched from the Norwegian Sea through Finnish airspace also.

Finland's defense systems must be developed to suit our conditions and to be self-sufficient, stated Yki-Jarvinen. According to him, rapid technical development has resulted in the fact that small countries are becoming ever more dependent on equipment coming from abroad. This, for its part, makes it difficult for small countries to withstand a prolonged crisis.

Inasmuch as cruise missiles should violate Finnish airspace, they will be shot down to the best of our ability according to Yki-Jarvinen. They will not explode when shot down although they will cause considerable destruction in the area.

Conservative Paper Comments

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 1 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Missiles Were No Surprise"]

[Text] The recent forceful debate in the press about the possibility of cruise missiles posing a threat to Finland has confused Finnish citizens. For this reason there is cause to remember that nothing has now happened with respect to cruise missiles that has not been known to the Foreign Ministry and to the defense forces for a long time already.

The issue has only been made timely by the first cruise missiles brought to Europe, which in certain quarters it is believed will possibly travel over Finland also.

The Foreign Ministry rejected this concept parallel with previous military statements. However, at the same time the Foreign Ministry referred to the next generation of cruise missiles, which could become a threat to Finland also.

The deputy speaker of parliament, who for some reason believes that the proposal to create a nuclear-free Nordic zone would collapse with the deployment of cruise missiles, also confused the issue even more. Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen subsequently corrected his understanding in no uncertain terms.

It also appears that there was some uncertainty between the Foreign Ministry and the leadership of the defense forces. The Foreign Ministry has repeatedly emphasized the necessity and urgency of new means of defense and prevention.

There certainly is reason to discuss even cruise missiles, but they are more of a political than a military weapons system. There is always reason to remember that cruise missiles are, above all, a second-generation nuclear

weapon. Thousands of nuclear warheads will have already been exploded before the relatively slow cruise missiles will probably reach an already destroyed world.

Nevertheless, this does not preclude Finland's obligation as an independent state to ensure that our airspace is not violated. It is being said that they have brought geography back to military policy.

The problem is their detection and destruction after their detection. Since it is possible that they can be directed through Finnish airspace from the North Atlantic to the Soviet Union, we should at least have a theoretical preventive capability.

It is the intent to improve this same preventive capability by means of the early warning radar system presently under construction and developed even before the advent of cruise missiles. In addition to this, the already existing radar and defense systems can significantly improve opportunities for preventing the intrusion of cruise missiles. The only thing that is needed is a decision to procure them.

The defense forces have continuously improved air surveillance and in future decisions will certainly strive to develop it further. Increasing credibility, for its part, presupposes certain procurement decisions, in which, however, the nature of the weapons systems themselves must be remembered. They will be exploded only after the world has already been destroyed.

Stalinist Paper Comments

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 1 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Cruise Missiles and Finland"]

[Text] In recent days cruise missiles have been on the tongues of Finnish politicians and soldiers more than perhaps any other weapons system has ever been before.

The undeniable truth -- even though some want to deny it -- is that the new U.S. cruise missiles deployed in England could in a crisis situation violate Finnish airspace.

Naturally, a threat directed at the Soviet Union through Finland and Finnish territory will increase many times over when the USA deploys cruise missiles in warships and submarines as well as on aircraft patrolling the nearby seas.

It is correct to confirm the threat now posed to Finland by cruise missiles, as Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mikko Pesala has done several times.

However, it is incorrect to assume that the deployment of new American missiles would drop the bottom out of the effort to create a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area. Actually, the impetus is to the contrary; the deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe accelerates the need to establish a nuclear-free Nordic zone.

It is just as incorrect to consider Finland's procurement of additional armaments as a fundamental remedy to the threat of cruise missiles. Political actions and Finland's active foreign policy, the conducting of which is required in our country by the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact, should, of course, be given primary importance.

For several years already Finland has been constructing an early warning radar system covering the whole country so that our country's airspace can be subjected to more effective surveillance. Preparations for a defense against cruise missiles does not, however, require an increase in expenditures for armaments since it will be possible to manage with even a smaller defense budget by transferring the emphasis from the development of the Army to the development of air surveillance and the Air Force.

Thus political actions are given primary importance. President Mauno Koivisto stated quite correctly in his UN speech that security will not increase as new weapons and weapons systems are put into use, but by reducing already existing weapons systems.

It seems strange against the backdrop of the president's UN speech that just before the Euro-missile talks were broken off in Geneva Finland refrained from taking a stand in the UN on the kind of results that should have been achieved in these negotiations as far as Finland is concerned.

The refusal to take a stand, burying one's head in the sand, and playing the role of a bystander by appealing to "neutrality" are not now valid. On the contrary, it would have been justified if Finland had demanded security guarantees from the United States that under no conditions would it violate Finnish airspace with its cruise missiles.

Appealing to "neutrality" in a situation in which Finland's national interests are in danger is in conflict not only with the obligations of the YYA Pact but also with our country's security interests.

SKDL Chairman: USSR Talks Unnecessary

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Dec 83 p 9

[Article: "Hentila Rejected YYA Consultations"]

[Text] SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] General Secretary Jorma Hentila on Independence Day rejected the idea of initiating consultations between Finland and the USSR in accordance with the YYA Pact because of the Euro-missile threat.

"Finland's answer to the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe is primarily political and not military," stated Hentila in a speech in Jokiois.

"The demands for a perceptible increase in defense appropriations or the initiation of consultations stipulated by the YYA Pact because of the threat

posed by cruise missiles are misleading, place an emphasis on military actions, and treat new nuclear missiles as if they were a separate entity from that threat which nuclear weapons pose in general."

According to Hentila, the initiation of consultations on the basis of the YYA Pact would place attention on military preparations since the consultations stipulated by the YYA Pact mean a situation in which the threat of a military attack on Finland or on the Soviet Union through Finnish territory has been confirmed.

"Anybody proposing such consultations has not given sufficient deliberation to those consequences which would arise with respect to Northern Europe. The United States would take even greater advantage of the situation and would strengthen its presence in Norway. Such a development in Northern Europe would not be in the interests of either party to the YYA Pact," stated Hentila.

MP Mikko Kuoppa, a member of the Communist minority wing, proposed consultations based on the YYA Pact over the weekend. "Especially now that the threat of using our country's airspace in an attack directed against the Soviet Union has arisen, the manner in which this threat posed by Euro-missiles can be prevented must be deliberated in cooperation with our treaty partner on the basis of the YYA Pact," stated Kuoppa.

10576

CSO: 3617/55

PALME GOVERNMENT ACCUSED OF LACK OF CLARITY IN ARMS STANDS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Unclear Messages"]

[Text] The question of whether the Social Democratic Government is sending a double message in foreign policy has lately been discussed intensively. Mostly it is the prime minister who perpetually returns to it. The question was really raised by Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin's statement last fall in SVENSKA DAGBLADET about a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries, and the place of the Baltic in it. Maj Britt Theorin maintained with great emphasis that a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic area should not include the Baltic.

Naturally that statement attracted attention. The question of the position of the Baltic in relation to such a zone has since the middle of the 70's been controversial. The attitude of the Swedish government had not been specified completely. By her statement Ambassador Theorin took a very clear position.

In an interpellation debate which followed Maj Britt Theorin's statement, the foreign minister could not clarify the government's position concerning the zone and the Baltic.

In the meanwhile Olof Palme stated to LE MONDE that a zone in the Nordic area "should include the Baltic," and Under Secretary Pierre Schori said in a TT [Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå] interview that the Baltic "will be in a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic area."

But that did not end the circus.

In his statement to the Paasikivi Society in June of this year Olof Palme came back to the zone question. There he said that a zone arrangement in the Nordic area must also include obligations concerning freedom from nuclear weapons in the Baltic.

Olof Palme associated himself in this statement with a traditional line on the zone question which can almost be seen as the exact opposite of Maj Britt Theorin's line of October 1982.

Thereafter it was hardly five months before it was time for the next round. Lennart Bodstrom appeared before Finska Metall in Helsinki and said that promises by the nuclear weapon states in connection with a zone arrangement did not need to be made at the same time as the zone agreement is concluded between the Nordic countries. Such promises could be made later by a "supplementary agreement."

Bodstrom thereby came stumbling close to what Maj Britt Theorin said to SVENSKA DAGBLADET one year earlier. In the tape recorded interview she spoke about a "supplementary treaty."

The question about the Baltic is not just a partial question of the larger question of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic area. It is a question which concerns whether the Soviet Union and the United States will in some way enter as contracting parties. It is also a question which concerns whether the zone will only place limitations on the Western powers, or if the Soviet Union will also be forced to make promises. If the zone also includes the Baltic, directly or indirectly, that puts extensive limitations on the Soviet Union.

The question about a double message came up in the discussion following the report of the Antisubmarine Commission.

In a noted TV interview in Finland at the end of May this year, Lennart Bodstrom claimed that the security-political situation in the Nordic area had not changed.

The interview took place only a few days before Olof Palme made his Passikivi statement. There the prime minister confirmed that great power interest in Northern Europe has become larger and more audacious. He later added, "It is true that both great power blocs' increased interest in Northern Europe is mainly connected to the global struggle for power, with the development of the strategic balance and of naval forces in our area. But their dispositions also involve our own situation. In Sweden we have in an obvious way experienced military activity in the Baltic increasing in scope and intensity."

In September the defense minister completed the analysis which the prime minister had introduced in the Paasikivi statement. The submarine violations were a "reflection of the great powers' increasing strategic interest in the Nordic area." According to Thunborg the Nordic area is no longer an area aside. It is probable that Sweden would be involved earlier than what was previously thought, should a great power conflict break out in Europe.

Again separate messages from the government. Bodstrom said one thing, Palme and Thunborg another.

Both of these examples show that the government's message was to some extent double. On the other hand the examples are not sufficient to show that the government intends in the future to send double messages in its foreign and security policies. The government's policy should be described in other terms, to which we will return. The explanation can also be sought for the government's split messages in the nuclear weapon-free zone and the security-political situation. The reason why the government has advanced a double message on both of these questions has other explanations than that they are trying to do so.

9287

CSO: 3650/92

MINISTER EXPLAINS DIFFERING UN VOTES ON GRENADA, AFGHANISTAN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Dec 83 p 25

[Article by Anna Paljakka: "Vayrynen Explains UN Moves"]

[Text] The situation in which the setting of a UN vote takes place is most essential in the opinion of Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen when one compares Finland's attitude toward Grenada and Afghanistan.

Vayrynen says that Finland has carried out a consistent policy. It is only a question of situations in which a manuscript cannot be compiled for the management of foreign policy.

The situation surrounding the vote with respect to Afghanistan revealed a clear superpower dispute. On the other hand, conventional alliances became divided with respect to Grenada.

A mere vote does not reveal Finland's stand in the opinion of Vayrynen, but an explanation of a vote is also needed. In Vayrynen's opinion the texts of the resolutions on Grenada as well as Afghanistan are to be considered exceedingly mild. Thus in voting for the text concerning Grenada Finland did not "condemn" the armed intervention on the island at all, but it was a question of "profound regret".

Foreign Minister Vayrynen reported on the events of the 38th session of the UN General Assembly on Monday in Helsinki.

CSCE Only Bright Spot

Vayrynen saw the continuation of the CSCE process as the only bright spot in the world situation, in which peaceful means have been ignored and conflicting parties have resorted to the use of force. On the other hand, all countries recognize the necessity of strengthening the UN in this difficult situation.

The start of the UN General Assembly was overshadowed by the Korean aircraft drama, the course of the session was characterized by several territorial conflicts, and the negotiations to limit arms, which broke off toward the end of autumn, ultimately brought a new cold war to the world organization.

Even taking these factors into consideration the session was conducted in a satisfactory manner in the opinion of Vayrynen.

Finland Changed Its Stand

The UN General Assembly began more prestigiously than usual since the leaders of 35 states or governments were present.

The speech on behalf of Finland was delivered by President Mauno Koivisto. The themes of this speech, concern about the growing danger of nuclear war and the acceleration of the arms race as well as the necessity of continuing negotiations, were continued in connection with the statements on disarmament.

At that time it was confirmed, among other things, that Finland has the right on the basis of its complete non-nuclear status to hope that nuclear weapons will not be used against it. Binding and all-inclusive guarantees would work the best for the security needs of non-nuclear states.

Finland changed its position when a vote was taken on a resolution concerning the so-called first-use ban proposed by Europe's socialist countries. In it an appeal is made to the nuclear states that they would give an assurance that they will refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and China have given such an assurance.

Finland voted for this resolution this year even though it abstained last year.

This change means that Finland is making its nuclear arms policy consistent according to Vayrynen. Inconsistency in this question has been a subject of concern for a long time, he stated.

Finland must oppose the use of all nuclear weapons, this is already the consequence of our understanding of the nature of nuclear weaponry, emphasizes Vayrynen.

It is not, however, a question of a moral change in his opinion. If such is the thinking, then it is question of willful interpretation, states Vayrynen.

Concern About UN Role

The subject of concern in many of the speeches delivered at the UN was the failure of the world organization in important areas of its operations, in questions of peace and security. This issue was also treated in the speech delivered on Finland's behalf.

Last summer the Nordic countries presented concrete means for making UN activities more effective. Among them the strengthening of the position of the Security Council, which makes binding decisions, was given primary attention.

The discussion on the initiative is proceeding at its own pace, it was not discussed at this General Assembly. Similar views have also been reached in the UN's own circles.

The initiative of the Nordic countries has already had an effect in peace-keeping arrangements according to Vayrynen. It was a question of a larger Security Council behind binding peacekeeping measures.

Vayrynen discussed the position of the temporary UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, which in his opinion does not correspond to the actual tasks. The Security Council should define the mandate of Unifil, states Vayrynen. The question concerns the largest UN operation currently being implemented, which includes 500 Finns.

Only about ten of the 146 issues discussed at the UN General Assembly were touched upon in the press conference. They were the subject of thousands of speeches in six committees over a period of 3 months. The final blow of the gavel is expected in the near future.

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CSO: 3617/59

CONSTELLATION OF FORCES IN CP RIVAL GROUPS UNDERGOING CHANGE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 Dec 83 p 12

[Article: "Stalinists Supporting Kajanoja"]

[Text] A new majority made up of Chairman Jouko Kajanoja and his supporters in the majority faction as well as the Taistoite minority is forming in the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. Such an alliance began to come about in the SKP Politburo, in which preparations for the SKP congress next spring were discussed.

The Politburo determines the practical policy of the SKP and it meets every week. The subject of the vote taken on Wednesday was whether the members of the two party sections suspended from the Lapland District Organization can participate in the vote in which representatives will be elected to the SKP's 20th Congress.

In the Politburo the majority was still made up of General Secretary Arvo Aalto, Arvo Kemppainen, Helja Tammisalo, Aarno Aitamurto, and Aarne Saarinen.

Chairman Jouko Kajanoja, Tutta Tallgren representing the SKP's Taistoites as well as Veikko Alho and Marjatta Stenius of the minority faction remained in the minority.

The fact that the Politburo had a reduced attendance at the meeting is significant from the point of view of the power relationships in the SKP. If Taisto Sinisalo as well as Seppo Toiviainen had been in attendance, the Saari-
nenite Communists would have been in the minority for the first time. Kajanoja and his followers and the Taistoites supporting them would have ascended to a position of predominance.

Kajanoja Against Organization Section

The SKP's Politburo decision is connected with the preparations for the Communist Party's forthcoming congress. The congress will determine whether Kajanoja will be able to retain his position as chairman of the SKP.

Chairman Kajanoja proposed in the Politburo that the members of the two party sections suspended from the Lapland District Organization be allowed to take

part in the vote in which the representatives of the Lapland District Organization to the congress will be determined.

According to the interpretation of the SKP's organization section, those suspended do not have the right to vote since they were suspended from the district even if not from the party. The organization section considered that what is decisive is that each district organization may elect one representative to the congress for each 100 members of each primary organization according to the decision of the congress.

The problems of the SKP's Lapland District originate from the events before last spring's parliamentary elections. The conflicts between the district organization's majority and minority resulted in the fact that MP Esko-Juhani Tennila was not placed on the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] list of candidates. However, Taistoite Tennila was elected to parliament from a so-called wild list by nearly 15,000 votes.

After the elections the SKP's Lapland District suspended two party sections which had supported Tennila, but the party sections were allowed to remain in the SKP.

TIEDONANTAJA Accuses

On Thursday TIEDONANTAJA, the organ of the Taistoite minority Communists, visibly published the results of the vote taken on Wednesday in the Politburo.

Taistoite Vice-Chairman Veikko Alho of the SKP considered that the Politburo had violated party regulations and impeded the preparations for the congress.

Alho estimated that the intent was only to strengthen the undemocratic procedures of the so-called axing-policy line in Helsinki and Lapland. Alho demanded that the issue be discussed again in the Politburo.

A membership vote of Communists in itself, in the Lapland district, for example, would not change the power relationships between the majority and the minority in any direction. The arrangement is sufficiently rigid on both sides.

Among the SKP districts nine are under majority control and eight are under minority control.

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CSO: 3617/59

PRESS AGREEMENT FAILS TO END DIATRIBES BETWEEN CP PAPERS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 Dec 83 p 9

[Editorial Commenc.]

[Text] The decision by the Communists to establish YHTEISTYÖ as an organ of the party's Central Committee has not eliminated the row being raised in the movement around the newspapers. The apparent modest success of YHTEISTYÖ among the readers is giving impetus to the interpretations of the party's majority KANSAN UUTiset and minority TIEDONANTAJA as to what the Central Committee decision actually means.

Managing Editor Seppo Siivonen of KANSAN UUTiset has declared that every People's Democrat knows what the minority's proposed "Strengthening of TIEDONANTAJA", the establishment of TYÖVAEN-POHJANMAA, "Restoration of HAMEEN YHTEISTYÖ", and the aspirations of the minority with respect to YHTEISTYÖ mean.

Siivonen is asking from where the funds will come in a time when KANSAN UUTiset, NY TID, and all provincial papers are being cut back due to a lack of funds.

According to Siivonen, it seems that on the basis of its advance publication YHTEISTYÖ will not be able to redeem the expectations set forth by a majority seeking cooperation.

Siivonen interprets TIEDONANTAJA's former Chief Editor Urho Jokinen's idea to mean that YHTEISTYÖ must in the opinion of the minority be made into their organ.

Aalto Impeding Press Work

According to a lead article in TIEDONANTAJA, YHTEISTYÖ is being subjected to a boycott by the majority and even its content is being weakened by the printing of interviews with General Secretary Arvo Aalto, in which he wants a return to the government. According to the paper, Aalto's proposals are breaking down the conditions of the press solution.

"As far as KANSAN UUTiset is concerned, no positive development has taken place. To the contrary, the editorial policy of KANSAN UUTiset has become

even more tactless if this is possible. This has also been confirmed in the SKP Politburo. However, the press decision presupposes a definite change with respect to the composition of the editorial staff and policy of KANSAN UUTISET. If KANSAN UUTISET continues on the present course, the press solution will not be accomplished," predicts TIEDONANTAJA.

TIEDONANTAJA also accuses the Tampere paper HAMEEN YHTEISTYÖ of peculiar interpretations of the newspaper's normalization agreement.

"He who has calculated that the press solution is the same as the splintered and watered down press solution combined with the intent to halt the publication of TIEDONANTAJA has either understood nothing about the press decision or is consciously pursuing a path contrary to the party," thunders TIEDONANTAJA.

10576

CSO: 3617/59

SECRET MESSAGES FROM CPSU TO CENTER PARTY CAUSING CONCERN

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 27 Nov 83 p 6

[Article: "Silence of Center Party's Foreign Policy Experts Causing Concern"]

[Text] Representatives of the Soviet Communist Party have expressed their concern to a Center Party delegation about the situation in Finland becoming more complex since President Urho Kekkonen's resignation particularly with respect to activities of the Center Party. Such a conclusion was drawn since many Center Party members who have served with distinction in foreign policy have now withdrawn from active participation.

The Soviet assessments are contained in a memorandum attached to the records of the Center Party's Executive Committee, which were compiled from the Center Party delegation's recent visit to the Soviet Union. The memorandum was made public by MTV's channel 10 news.

No Comment

The Center Party leadership does not want to comment on the memorandum even though Chairman Paavo Vayrynen as well as Party Secretary Seppo Kaariainen, who headed the delegation, confirmed the existence of the memorandum.

The Executive Committee has given the understanding that there is nothing new in the memorandum. As they have for many years already, representatives of the CPSU have expressed concern about the decline in support for the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] and the Center Party and the increase in support for the Conservative Party.

No Nuclear Weapons in Finland

According to MTV news, Deputy Chief Vitaliy Shaposhnikov of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee presented the assessment that the Conservative Party could bring about the demise of the Center Party. The CPSU representative was also concerned that the same kind of political polarization as in Sweden would occur as the SKP and the Center Party become weaker. The CPSU views such development with disfavor.

Also it was confirmed in the memorandum according to MTV news that the Soviet Union has no intention of importing nuclear weapons to Finland.

10576

CSO: 3617/56

PRESS RILED OVER LATEST KOIVISTO CALL FOR DISCUSSION RESTRAINT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Jan 84 p 2

[Commentary by Olof Santesson: "A Dissatisfied Koivisto"]

[Text] Finland's president is not exactly pleased with the press--and vice versa. This was hardly the expected result of the freer climate of debate which came in with Mauno Koivisto, and which it was thought that he wanted.

In a newspaper interview at the New Year, the president of the republic again criticized the mass media; although counter criticism is now stronger than before.

Seen schematically, Koivisto is irritated that the mass media does not discuss things in the way he hopes they will, but on the contrary they debate about things that he does not expect to be debated.

But how could the powers in an open society expect to have full control over debate?

It is certain that experienced and wise leaders in other Nordic countries have found it both unprofitable and damaging for their own causes to make sweeping criticisms of the mass media.

Perhaps presidents are something special?

American and French heads of state almost never escape deep conflicts with journalists; if Kekkonen did that, it was mostly because he most often frightened his opponents into timidity.

Furthermore Koivisto has never really grown into the party political role.

The same personality and amateur touch which made him Finland's most popular politician is playing tricks on him now that on his present high level he is trying to learn to live with the mass media.

In fact one can understand if the Finnish president sometimes feels a certain fatigue over what he considers as mass media slackness, petty nit-

picking and inability to admit mistakes. But to speak of journalists as a "flock of lemmings" as soon as one of them takes up a question is purely indiscretion by the president.

What the debate is about, among other things, is a changed Finnish voting pattern in the UN--for example in the case of Grenada to criticize one of the superpowers (United States) for the sake of being different--and wording used by the president, which caused surprise.

The discussion around such questions is very legitimate. The reaction of the press to the comment concerning the flock of lemmings is completely understandable.

It was especially painful when Koivisto maintained about a Norwegian journalist that as an outsider "he can not get involved in our domestic discussions as he does."

Certainly we outsiders can be accused of being too gentle towards Finland--for known geographical and historical reasons.

What had the Norwegian said?

He repeated the fact that officials of the Finnish Foreign Ministry came out and exp'ained that the president was not directly aiming at the Swedish Antisubmarine Commission when last spring he maintained that "much...on closer inspection" was not clarified about the submarine events!

"Hereafter I will be sure that nobody explains my thinking--not even myself!" This Mauno Koivisto's angry and somewhat comical summation.

This statement brought a reaction from the guru of the Finnish press, HUFVUDSTADSBLADET's chief editor Jan-Magnus Jansson:

"If the press can not comment about politicians, then there will be no political debate."

Political reporters in Finland will obviously improve the situation by opening a regular channel of discussion with the president. Even chief editors now lack such a thing.

But is that wise? Too close connections can cause damage, both for the debate and for the completely necessary image that Finland strives for an independent and free press.

The solution is not to sit on each other's knees. As long as Mauno Koivisto continues to ponder deeply over politics, as he has done for decades, he will himself give rise to debate and demands for explanation.

And irritation--he must both live with it and choke it down in his important job of president.

9287

CSO: 3650/92

POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF EURICO DE MELO ON SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 29 Nov 83 p 2

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice: "The Journey Through the Desert"]

[Text] The shadow of Engineer Eurico de Melo was present at the meeting of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] National Congress in an almost obsessive fashion. The weekend was furthermore marked by a kind of return to the political footlights of the Northern Leader as a chance coincidence with the disclosure of the first political barometer of SEMANARIO which credited him with a rather low probable performance level in the short-term discharge of his political responsibilities.

This reappearance began with his presence during the solidarity dinner with Conceicao Monteiro where he launched a powerful attack against the leadership of the PSD parliamentary delegation which, more or less implicitly, contained a more general criticism of the state of affairs in the party. According to the mass media--and I was unable to confirm this--this was followed by lunch with General Eanes which will not be the first one and which the northern politician unequivocally declared as not signifying any change in his attitude toward the president of the republic whom he considers to be his political adversary. Finally, he was not present in the Berna Hotel in Lisbon but he nevertheless provided an opportunity for having himself declared as being outside the PSD although the official position on that score might be different; he only had to wait briefly for the development of certain events, specifically because he did not in any way want to jeopardize a coalition which, although not beyond his own personal commitment, would probably not have been accepted by the PSD 6 months ago.

Eurico de Melo is not just any politician if we subject his civic actions to a merely factual analysis. He has the complete confidence of Sa Carneiro and his minister of internal administration and that should be enough to prove the above statement. But if, to this, we add that he would have been the prime minister whom Sa Carneiro would have picked if he had survived in Camarate and if Ramalho Eanes had won the presidential elections, as it happened, and if we recall what we said earlier about his participation in the formation of the coalition, then I believe that nobody can doubt that he would have been confirmed as vice chairman of the PSD.

Eurico de Melo is not an excessively cautious politician in his actions and above all he is not a man who opted for political professionalization. That he is not cautious--something which I consider to be a positive feature --for example emerges from the letter which he wrote with Cavaco Silva to Balsemao a year and a half ago. At that time I did not support that letter because of a tactical disagreement and not because of a disagreement with its content. That he does not hesitate to run risks therefore springs from his decision in favor of the coalition with the PS [Socialist Party] at a point when the exact opposite would have been personally easy for him. And the fact that he does not want professionalization springs from the circumstance that he continues his life as a businessman who devotes only a part of his interests to political action.

This being so, the status of Eurico de Melo in the PSD is bound to be that of a moral figure who spreads his action out and determines his course of action much more in the light of basic reasons than out of mere considerations of political opportunity, a man who always says what he feels when essential things are in a state of crisis, without assigning much importance to the risk of winding up isolated or being the target of attacks. From a moral figure we expect less in the way of his being right than being present with his voice and his protest whenever he feels that something unbearable is happening or, on the other hand, his backing may be given whenever he feels in his conscience that dramatic options are indispensable.

This will always be so but it is extremely difficult to express it in concrete terms. As a matter of fact, a party such as the PSD has little sympathy for occasional actions and for an attitude of silence while, on the other hand, difficulties within the coalition make this statement problematical. Eurico de Melo is in the process of running a high political risk which may possibly pay off. But for the time being his attitude is difficult to understand and a development in the direction of a return [to the party] is indeed becoming a problem for him.

Two assumptions may obtain: Either the reasons which persuade Eurico de Melo to move away will not be confirmed and then there will be a debate as to whether his attitude was due to the changes in direction, in view of the fact that, on the level of the PSD Political Commission, nobody seems to recognize that there is something that has to be changed, or everything will be confirmed and then Eurico de Melo, to get back in, will have to do so by demolishing the current political leadership and the coalition or, as an alternative, he will have to declare that he is not going back and that he does not want to have anything to do with that PSD.

In the light of this I believe that I must conclude that Eurico de Melo is going through a period which can lead him to political self-annihilation or to a return to political action in terms which will be very different from those of the past which will impose upon him a more constant effort. Nothing will be the same for him in the future. He will either die politically or he will be forced to fly higher, as it were; one might even say that his political future is now more dependent on the failure of the current political leadership and of the coalition than on a change in the internal life of these two political realities.

He will either die or survive. And he will be able to survive in a different and difficult form. He will have to make his return contingent upon a profound change in the style and determination of the PSD which will go through a radical change in the relationship of forces inside it. In this case, Eurico de Melo will bet on supporting the alternative which is about to take shape in this National Council although he would not play a dominant role in sponsoring this move. In that case, he might return some day. That would not happen immediately but it could be a very strong move when it comes.

Only time will tell what will happen and whether he knows how to use time well--and whether he knows how to make the right decision.

5058

CSO: 8142/0472B

AVEROF PLEDGES CHANGE IN EURO-ELECTION CANDIDATES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 17 Dec 83 pp 1, 3

[Text] A radical change in the election slates of the New Democracy for the coming parliamentary elections as well as in the ticket for the Euro-elections of June 1984 was hinted at yesterday by the leader of the official opposition, E. Averof. In speaking yesterday to the Administrative Committee of the ND, Averof talked at length about the subject of such changes, and in citing as an example the use of "new blood" in many party posts, he stressed:

"This change will emerge entirely from the rolls of deputies and from the positions taken by the new people when we come into power. This revitalization is not merely a matter of age, because there are people advanced in years who are younger than some young people, and vice versa."

In interpreting this statement, political observers were emphasizing that:

1. Averof is now reconsidering his earlier position that in drawing up the electoral slates he will commit himself to taking into account the order in which all the present deputies achieved their victories in the 1981 elections. It is recalled that this view had been criticized by many deputies and party figures who are now raising the demand for a change, and that it has been characterized as a "serious mistake" by the former premier, G. Rallis (in his book "Khoris prokatalipsi gia to paron and to mellon" ["Without Prejudice to the Present and Future"]).

2. This revitalization will not have age as its exclusive criterion, but instead the sort of political presence which should be befitting to the image of the party which is spokesman for "the middle-class camp."

The Speech

During yesterday's session of the ND Administrative Committee, Averof analyzed the country's political situation and emphasized the failure of the government in all sectors. He gave special emphasis to foreign policy, pointing to tactical mistakes by the government on the national issue of Cyprus.

Next Averof gave an account of the organizational efforts of the party and expressed his satisfaction with the results which have been achieved up to now. "It may be that in certain sectors we have not yet reached the point we wished for, but when judged on the whole the effort has been entirely fruitful," he said.

Another issue touched on by Averof was the New Democracy's platform now under preparation, and he said that he hopes to make public an outline of this sometime next month.

Unity Comes First

At this point Averof referred to the issue of revitalization, and next he said that "with unity and resolve, and in full awareness of our duty, we are confronting the difficult situation which has been created for the Greek people by the PASOK government."

"I fear," he stressed, "that the times we are passing through are calamitous. And this requires an intensification of our efforts and dictates unity, which I assure you we have. God help us if these were to be lacking in a large party such as ours."

Next Averof referred to the preparation for the Euro-elections and briefed the members of the Administrative Committee on the important work which has been done so far in this sector.

More specifically concerning the arrangements for the representatives who will be employed in the electoral districts, he said that a systematic operation has begun with the help of deputies and public figures which is aimed at providing four representatives for each electoral district.

Finally, the leader of the party spoke highly of the young people. "Our adversaries," he stressed, "are trying to slander our youth precisely for this superb activity on its part. But these slanders always get nowhere."

Immediately after Averof, the following also spoke: P. Khatzinikolaou, K. Sapsalis, I. Palaiokrassas, D. Khatzidimitriou, I. Stathopoulos, D. Psilos, V. Matzoris, G. Stefanakis, E. Theodorikas, K. Safarikas, A. Tsaldaris, Z. Khatzidimitriou, P. Diamandakos, P. Vagias, and the women Lena Giannakopoulou and Fani Palli-Petralia.

Upon a proposal by its members, the Administrative Committee unanimously authorized the leader of the party to award a commendation to the party's youth for its organizational activity and for its democratic struggles.

12114

CSO: 3521/123

PREVIEW OF PASOK-KKE RELATIONS IN 1984

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 4 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by Giannis Roumbatis]

[Text] The course of relations between PASOK and the KKE in roughly the last 10 months leads to the conclusion that: For the KKE there are certain limits beyond which it is not disposed to go in the criticism which it levels against the government.

And if we assume that the policy of the KKE up to now permits us to have certain expectations, we can say that the KKE will be following the line of "measured criticism" in the coming year as well.

Of course, this does not mean that the KKE and PASOK have relations like those of "cooperating parties." On the contrary, in their relations there are areas of aggravation and areas of cooperation in actual practice.

It follows from the various announcements of the KKE Central Committee, the debates in the Chamber of Deputies, and the publications in the KKE's news organ that despite the fact that it is opposed to the general orientation of the government's policy, the KKE is not refusing to support "the positive measures" of the government.

Thus, in recent months there has been an informal "cooperation" between PASOK and the KKE, mainly on activities of the peace movement, on the student movement (with support for the legislation on education), and up to a point in the trade-union area, with joint initiatives by PASKE [Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement] and ESAK-S [United Antidictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating] (which are associated with PASOK and the KKE respectively).

However, the emphasis in these "cooperative efforts" should be given to the word "informal." Each instance of cooperation was not so much a product of decisions at the leadership level of the two parties, but more the result of objective developments in the sectors where such cooperation was observed.

The KKE maintains that these cooperative efforts are necessary, but it leaves no doubt that it believes that they would be more substantial if they happened on a "basis of equality" and on the foundation of a joint program. However, the two parties do have a common objective, which is the excluding of those who have led the labor movement above all to the situation in which PASOK found it after the 1981 elections.

One point of aggravation in the relations between the two parties can be considered to be the dissimilar positions which PASOK and the KKE have held on two issues:

The first was the preconditions for proclaiming a strike in the public sector (Article 4 of the bill on socializations).

And the second was the agreement on the American bases in Greece.

In the new year, the course of relations between PASOK and the KKE will depend to a large degree on four issues above all.

Firstly, on the way that the congress of the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] will be conducted this month. Already a certain dialogue is taking place among the progressive factions. But there are problems with the insistence by the ESAK-S that any cooperation must take place on the basis of a program emphasizing the position of the labor movement on the economic and income policy of the government.

Secondly, on the course of the Cyprus problem and the likely consequences its developments could have on the more general foreign policy of the government.

(The KKE believes that the United States will try to exploit the Cyprus problem as a lever for exerting pressure to obtain trade-offs from the Greek government. In a press conference which the general secretary of the KKE, Kharilaos Florakis, gave to correspondents of the foreign press on 23 November, he said that in the KKE "not the slightest doubt remains that the imperialists will do whatever they can to bring Greece's foreign policy in line with the policy of Reagan.")

Thirdly, on the way in which the offensive from the Right will be dealt with by the two parties.

Fourthly, on the form finally taken by the electoral law which will be in effect in the next elections.

In any case, even if the KKE increases its criticism against PASOK, even if it raises the pitch of this criticism, there are certain limits beyond which the KKE does not seem disposed to proceed.

These limits are defined mainly by three parameters. Firstly, any differences which might exist at the leadership level must not be passed

down to the rank and file, where this disagreement would become a rift and would make it impossible to cooperate on issues for which in the past there was such cooperation--within the bounds which have been described already. Secondly, the gaps which exist between PASOK and the KKE must not become chasms which would compel one or the other party to head in the direction of a confrontation with the entirety of the policy of its "adversary." Finally, any criticism which is made must not be such as to benefit the Right.

12114

CS0: 3521/123

ND FORMS SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] The New Democracy Party (ND) has established a special committee which will direct its election campaign for the elections next June for the European Parliament. This matter was discussed during the session of the political council of the ND which met yesterday under the chairmanship of E. Averof. The deputy Mikh. Papakonstandinou was appointed the chairman of this committee.

According to press reports, this committee will become active immediately, and it is expected that within the week its first meeting will be held under the chairmanship of Averof. During this meeting the responsibilities and the manner of operation of the committee will be discussed and defined in conjunction with the development of corresponding activities both by the Parliamentary Group (KO) and by the party machinery.

According to statements made by E. Averof at the recent meeting of the KO of the ND (that he will accept suggestions on changing the ticket for the Eurodeputies, but that he himself will retain the responsibility for drawing it up), it is conjectured that with respect to this matter, the special committee:

Will constitute the collective organ serving to gather together the views which will be formulated about the ND's Euro-ticket, and following its own analysis it will submit a specific recommendation to the chairman of the party.

As for its other responsibilities, this committee will assume the general political management of the election campaign aimed at the Euro-elections, with responsibilities comparable to those assumed by the corresponding committee which was in operation for the municipal elections.

It is also conjectured that this committee will have the responsibility for relations between the ND and the European Union of Popular Parties, for the general coordination at the European level of the election-campaign movements of the parties in this union.

The ND Announcement

The following announcement was issued concerning the formation of the special committee for the election campaign by the New Democracy:

"By a decision of the chairman of the ND, E. Averof, and following a recommendation by the political council of the party, a committee is being established under the chairmanship of Mikh. Papakonstandinou for organizing the Euro-elections.

"The appointees as members of this committee are G. Souflias, S. Kouvelas, Sot. Khatzigakis, Them. Sofoulis, St. Dimas, Vas. Manginas, a representative from ONNED [Youth Organization of the New Democracy], and a representative from the Feminist Issues Division.

"The general secretary of the Parliamentary Group, I. Palaiokrassas, and the general director of the party, G. Matthaoudakis, will also participate in the activities of this committee for the purpose of coordinating its work with the KO and the party machinery respectively."

12114

CSO: 3521/123

BACKGROUNDS, VIEWS OF NEWLY APPOINTED NOMARCHS

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 11 Nov 83 p 11

[Interview with Aleka Markogiannaki, Sofia Kharitidou, and Artemis Karassa, nomarchs of Khios, Kefalonia, and Florina, respectively, by Vaso Vasiladioti; date and place not specified; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in bold-face]

[Text] /Three women, Aleka Markogiannaki, Sofia Kharitidou, and Artemis Karassa, are being added to the list of the female nomarchs who have been assigned to various regions of Greece. Another victory for women, not so much because they are increasing their percentage of participation in positions, the remaining staff positions of the government mechanism, as much as because the successful presence of women is being confirmed even in sectors that up to recently were considered dominated by men.

The successful management of the female nomarchs in discharging their duties has demonstrated yet again that it is not sex upon which the success of this management depends.

Female nomarchs such as Elisavet Papazoi in the Kyklades, Khrysoula Kharisiou in Voiotia, Maria Arseni in Pieria, Angeliki Synodinou in the Dodekanisa, Efi Mitosi in Zakynthos, and Aglaia Stafyla in the region of Eastern Attiki are considered to be not only successful in their roles, but in a sufficient number of cases more successful than their male colleagues. This is pointed out in the rating ranges noted in every sector.

Let us see, however, in the short discussion we had with them, who these new female nomarchs are and what they have to say.

[Question] /Do you believe that the increase in the percentage of women who are heads of Greece's nomes is yet another step toward furthering the equality of the two sexes?/

[Answer] Aleka Markogiannaki: I think that it is not a matter of quantity. The number is less significant than the fact that there is confidence in the woman's capabilities.

And this is a real proof of equality, equality in action and equal opportunities for women and men. For years I strove like a man. I do not think that any particularity should exist because I am a woman.

[Answer] Artemis Karassa: The assignment of other women to the job demonstrates above all that the first women nomarchs were successful.

[Answer] Sofia Kharitidou: The fact that I am a woman has no special significance. Nor does it mean that because we are women we will place particular weight on certain sectors. Personally, what interests me is furthering the whole program of the government.

[Answer] Artemis Karassa: I would say that what interests me and what I would like to do is to give special attention and care to creating day-care centers to assist women, mothers who want to work outside of their homes.

[Question] /Do you think that the failure of one female nomarch counts double in relation to her male colleagues?/

[Answer] Aleka Markogiannaki: The woman has no right to fail, because doubt about our sex is always lying in ambush. It would not simply be a person who was unsuccessful in some position, but for certain the cost will count to the detriment of the woman, of all the women. Because of this greater vigilance and a great deal of work is required of us to succeed completely in our jobs.

[Question] /In your opinions, how much has the equality of the two sexes been furthered on all levels?/

[Answer] Al. Markogiannaki: Beyond whatever legislation and changes which have occurred, I believe that the mentality of men and women will have to change on this subject.

[Answer] Sofia Kharitidou: For equality to be achieved I believe that a great deal must still be done on the level of raising the consciousness of men and women on their equal roles in society. Institutional changes certainly also help to change the way people think, beyond the fact that they further equality. Both men and women, however, must be made widely familiar with the positive effects which equality has within society. I believe that there still has to be a great struggle on the part of women to gain the position which belongs to them, because equality is not given as a gift, it is won.

[Answer] Artemis Karassa: Positive steps have taken place on the level of institutional measures and constitute an optimistic message about gaining the objective of equality. It is just that deeply rooted prejudices must be left behind, something which must occur through education and television. Only in this way will the old models be abolished.

Aleka Markogiannaki-Khioti, who has been assigned to the nome of Khios, was born in 1943 in Palaiokhora, Kania. She is a literature professor, a member of the municipal council in the deme of Kania from 1979 to the present, and a candidate for mayor in the municipal elections just past. She is also a

member of the Pan-Cretan Committee for the Struggle Against Foreign Bases and a member of the DS [Administrative Council] of the Khandia Intellectual Center and of the Crete Theatre Society.

Sofia Kharitidou, who has been assigned to the nome of Kefalonia, is a crafts-person. She was born in 1937 in Salonica where in 1981 she was also first runner-up for deputy on the PASOK slate. She was chairman of the Salonica branch of the Union of Greek Women [EGE] for 4 years and is currently a member of its administrative committee. She is a member of the social support committee of Council Number 1 of the Salonica region. She knows English and French and is married with four children.

Artemis Karassa, a teacher, has been assigned to the nome of Florina. She was born in 1943 in Ligopsa, Ioannina and in 1981 was a candidate for deputy on the PASOK slate in the deme of Ioannina. She is chairman of the EGE branch and became a member of the municipal council of the deme of Ioannina in the municipal elections of 1982.

The three of them, as they told "E," are determined to work hard in order to offer whatever is possible to the places they are going. Their appointments, like those of all new nomarchs, will take place immediately after the presidential order is signed by the president of Greece, after a recommendation by the minister of the interior as defined by the law. Until then they will be made familiar with the job by the old nomarchs who continue to remain in their positions.

11587

CSO: 3521/107

PCP 10TH CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS: NEWLY ELECTED CONGRESS OFFICIALS

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 18 Dec 83 p 3

[Text] Initiating the proceedings of the 10th Congress of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], held in Porto from 15 to 18 December 1983, the delegates elected the organs of the congress. The nominations presented were all unanimously approved by acclamation.

Presidential Table

Alvaro Cunhal, Angelo Veloso, Antonio Dias Lourenco, Antonio Gervasio, Carlos Brito. Carlos Costa, Dinis Miranda, Domingos Abrantes, Fernando Blanqui Teixeira, Jaime Felix, Jaime Serra. Joaquim Gomes, Jorge Araujo, Jose Casanova, Jose Vitoriano, Octavio Pato, Raimundo Narciso, Sergio Vilarigues, members of the Commission [portion of text missing], members of the Central Committee.

Alfredo Cardoso, industrial worker, member of the committee for union activity of the Directorate of the Regional Organization of Minho; Alfredo Zarco Graca, employee, member of the executive of the Municipal Commission of Vila Real de Santo Antonio; Ana Benedita Ramos Caro, farm worker, party official, member of the General Directorate of the Regional Organization of Alentejo and [portion of text missing] attorney, member of the Commission of Local Governments of the Directorate of the Regional Organization of Porto; Antonio Manuel Mendes, worker, member of the District Commission of Evora; Antonio Paiva da Luz, fisherman, member of the Municipal Commission of Peniche; Antonio Tremoco Brito, metalworker, member of the Municipal Commission of Amadora; Carlos Duarte da Silva, economist, cooperant in the People's Republic of Angola; Carlos Manuel Fraiao, intellectual, member of the Directorate of the Regional Organization of Beira and of the Secretariat of the District Commission of Viseu; Dalia Assuncao Machado, worker, member of the Secretariat of the Covina party cell; Daniel dos Reis Branco, technical engineer, member of the executive of the Municipal Commission of Vila Franca de Xira; Dionisio Moises Simoes, farm worker, member of the Municipal Commission of Coruche and of the General Directorate of the Regional Organization of Santarem; Domingos Afonso, farmer, member of the Municipal Commission of Boticas; Elias Pimental Costa, small farmer, member of the Municipal Commission of Vila Franca do Campo (Sao Miguel); Eugenia Amador, civil servant, member of the Municipal Commission of Sines; Fernando Cid Simoes, radiotelegrapher, member of the executive of the Directorate of the Public Sector of the Regional Organization of Lisbon; Henrique Lemos,

worker, member of the General Directorate of the Regional Organization of Porto and the Committee for Major Services; Hernani de Oliveira, metalworker, member of the Secretariat of the International Organ of the Union Sector of the Regional Organization of Setubal; Ines Afonseca, small farmer and hunter, member of the Directorate of the Organization of the Autonomous Region of Madeira; Isais dos Santos, metalworker, member of the Municipal Commission of Sao Joao da Madeira; Jacinto de Matos, farm worker, member of the party cell of the "Unidos Venceremos" Agricultural Cooperative of Santiago do Cacem; Jose Castanheiro, worker, party functionary, member of the Executive Directorate of the Regional Organization of Algarve; Jose Eduardo Macedo, employee, member of the General Directorate of the Regional Organization of Porto and of the Porto Local Committee; Jose Silva, employee, party functionary, member of the District Commission of Viana do Castelo; Jose Timoteo, worker, party functionary, member of an organ of the union sector of the Regional Organization of Lisbon; Maria Olinda da Nunes, worker, member of the Secretariat of the Central party cell and of the Executive Directorate of Olivais of the Local Committee of Lisbon; Natalia dos Santos Silva, bank employee, member of the secretariat of the party cell of the National Overseas Bank; Raul de Jesus Ferreira, glass worker, member of the Union Organ of the Regional Organization of Leiria; Rogerio Fernandes, university professor, member of the Directorate of the Organization of Professors of the Intellectual Sector of the Regional Organization of Lisbon; Teresa Duarte, university student, member of the Executive Commission of the Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Youth; Vitor Fernandes, employee, party functionary, member of the Executive Secretariat of the Directorate of the Regional Organization of Santarem

Congress Secretariat

Albano Nunes, Angelo Veloso, Aurelio Santos, Domingos Abrantes, Edgar Correia, Fernando Blanqui Teixeira, Jore Araujo, Marilia Cabral.

Editorial Committee

Alvaro Cunhal, Albano Nunes, Carlos Brito, Carlos Carvalhas, Domingos Abrantes, Fernando Blanqui Teixeira, Luis Sa, Margarida Tengarrinha, Vitor Dias.

Election Verification Committee

Antonio Dias Lourenco, Americo Leal, Rosa Dias, Rosa Rabiais

Electoral Committee

Carlos Costa, Joaquim Gomes, Octavio Pato, Sergio Vilarigues

PCP 10TH CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS: FOREIGN DELEGATIONS ATTENDING

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 18 Dec 83 pp 3,8

[Text] On the first day of the proceedings [of the 10th Congress of the Portuguese Communist Party], countless organizations and individuals were guests of the PCP at the Palacio de Cristao.

In addition to representatives of such parties as the MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/ Democratic Electoral Commission] and the "Greens," and such organizations as the Portuguese-USSR Association, URAP [expansion unknown] and MURPI [United Movement of Retired Persons, Pensioners and the Elderly], there were representatives of the Presidency of the Republic attending the proceedings.

The Porto Municipal Chamber and the Movement for Reconstruction of the Vizela Council were represented, among other local government bodies.

Also attending were countless union representatives, from the CGTP/ National Intersindical [General Federation of Portuguese Workers/ National Intersindical], the USL [Union Federation of Lisbon], the Federation of Printers, the Hotel Workers Federation, the Aveiro Union Federation, the Porto Union Federation, the Textile Federation, the Braga Union Federation, the Railway Federation, the Civil Service Federation, the Highway Federation, the Telecommunications Union, the Civil Construction Federation, the Trade Federation, the Electric Industry Federation, the CIL (Lisbon Industrial Union), the secretariats of the UCP's of Santarem and Evora.

Also attending the first day of proceedings of the 10th PCP Congress were the ambassadors accredited in Lisbon from the following countries: USSR, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, the Democratic Republic of Korea, Cape Verde and Iraq.

Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, India, China, Libya and France (through its consul-general in Porto) were represented at the Crystal Palace by members of their respective diplomatic corps.

Foreign Delegations

Popular Democratic Party of Afghanistan: Said Amir Zarra, member of the Central Committee.

- Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED]: Hermann Axen, member of the Political Bureau and of the Central Committee Secretariat.
- Communist Party of Germany [KPD]: Hermann Gautier, vice president.
- MPLA-Labor Party: Ruth Neto, member of the Central Committee, secretary general of the OMA [Organization of Angolan Women].
- Austrian Communist Party: Irma Schwager, member of the Political Bureau.
- Belgian Communist Party: Robert Dusart, member of the Political Bureau.
- Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin: Harry Flichbeil, member of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee Secretariat.
- Brazilian Communist Party: Giocondo Dias, secretary of the central committee.
- Bulgarian Communist Party: Dimitar Stanichev, secretary of the central committee.
- PAICV - Cape Verde: Joaquim Pedro Silva, member of the Secretariat of the National Council.
- Communist Party of Chile: Volodia Teitelboim, member of the Political Bureau.
- Czechoslovak Communist Party: Polednik Indrik, secretary of the central committee.
- Congolese Labor Party: Monambemba Marins, minister of agriculture.
- Korean Workers Party: Hwang Zang Yop, secretary of the central committee.
- Cuban Communist Party: Antonio Perez Herrero, alternate member of the Political Bureau and of the Central Committee Secretariat.
- Communist Party of Denmark: Ib Nordlund, secretary of the central committee.
- Dominican Communist Party: Carlos Julio Baez, member of the Central Committee.
- Spanish Communist Party: F. Herrera.
- U.S. Communist Party: Simon Gerson
- COPTE [?Commission for Organizing the Working People of Ethiopia]: Awgichew Kefyalew, member of the Central Committee.
- Communist Party of Finland: Seppo Tolvainen, member of the Political Bureau.
- French Communist Party: Philip Herzog, member of the Political Bureau.
- Communist Party of Great Britain: Sharma, member of the Political Committee
- Greek Communist Party: Antonis Abatielos, member of the Political Bureau.

- Communist Party of Guadeloupe: Deputy Moutonssamy.
- Guatemalan Workers Party: Reginaldo Soto, member of the Central Committee.
- PAIGC-Guinea-Bissau: Nicandro Barreto, member of the Central Committee
- Popular Progressive Party of Guyana: Donald Ramotar, member of the Political Bureau.
- Dutch Communist Party: A. Deboer, member of the Central Committee.
- Socialist Workers Party of Hungary: Miklos Ovari, member of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee Secretariat.
- Yemeni Socialist Party: Abdul Ghani Abdul Kader, member of the Political bureau and the Central Committee Secertariat.
- Iraqi Communist Party: Majel Mussa.
- Israeli Communist Party: Jamal Mousa, member of the Political Bureau.
- Italian Communist Party: Piero Fassino, member of the Directorate and Secretariat of the Federation of Turin.
- Jordanian Communist Party: Ali Hassan Salih, representative of the JCP on the REVISTA INTERNACIONAL.
- Communist Party of Japan: Yasuo Ogata, member of the Central Committee.
- League of Communists of Yugoslavia: H. Pozderak, member of the Presidency.
- Lebanese Communist Party: Nandim Abdul Samad, member of the Political Bureau.
- Progressive and Socialist Party of Morocco: Simon Levy, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the central committee.
- Unified Socialist Party of Mexico: Adolfo Sanchez Rebolledo, Political Commission.
- FRELIMO Party: Aurelio Manave, member of the Central Committee and first secretary of Gaza Province.
- Popular Revolutionary Party of Mongolia: Pamdavanguyn Damdin, secretary of the central committee.
- SWAPO-Namibia: Shihepo, member of the Central Committee and assistant secretary of foreign relations.
- Sandanista Front for the National Liberation of Nicaragua: Hernan Estrada, chief of the European Section of the International Relations Department.
- Communist Party of Norway: Karo Andre Nilsen, member of the Central Committee.

--PLO: Abu-Jafar, director of the political department.

--Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]: Josef Czyrek, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the central committee.

--Romanian Communist Party: Ion Coman, member of the Political Committee Executive and secretary of the central committee.

--Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and Communist Party of El Salvador: Mario Aguinada Carranza, member of the party Political Commission and the Unified Revolutionary Directorate of the Front.

--BAAS Party of Syria: Fawwaz Suyyagh, member of the National Directorate.

--Syrian Communist Party: Youssef Faissal, assistant secretary general.

--Party of the Left--the Communists of Sweden: Jhan Lennroth, member of the Central Committee.

--Swiss Workers Party: Aniuska Weil, member of the Central Committee.

--South African Communist Party: Brian Bunting, member of the Central Committee, director of the African communist newspaper.

--FRETILIN [Revolutionary Front for East Timor Independence]: Roque Rodrigues, member of the Political Directorate of FRETILIN and ambassador in the People's Republic of Angola.

--PSU: Mikail Gorbachev, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the central committee.

--Communist Party of Uruguay: Eduardo Vieira, member of the Political Bureau.

--Communist Party of Venezuela: Radames Larazabal, member of the Political Bureau and of the National Secretariat.

--Vietnam Communist Party: Hong Ha, member of the Central Committee and director of "Nhan Dan," the central organ of the party.

--REVISTA INTERNACIONAL: Yuriy Skilarov, director.

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CSO: 3542/20

POLL FINDS WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION WITH PALME POLICIES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Dec 83 p 7

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] There is an almost equal balance between voters who have confidence in the Social Democratic government's policies and those who do not. That was shown in the fourth DN/IMU [DAGENS NYHETER/Institute for Market Analysis] "confidence survey." Some 47.4 percent of the electorate had confidence in the Palme government's administration of the nation and 47.5 percent expressed the opposite opinion.

The results revealed a sharp decline in the government's popularity since the last survey in June. The number of voters who have confidence in the Palme government declined by 12 percentage points to 47.4 percent during this period. At the same time, those who expressed a lack of confidence rose by 8 percentage points to 47.5 percent. Undecided voters rose from 1.5 to 5.2 percent.

It is very probable that the "affairs" in the fall and the so-called fraud debates contributed to the decline of the popularity of the Palme government in the public opinion polls. The decline in confidence was fairly evenly divided between the nonsocialist and socialist voter sympathizers.

This is the fourth confidence survey DN/IMU has conducted since last winter. In the three earlier surveys, 50-60 percent of the voters expressed confidence in the policies of the Social Democratic government.

The confidence survey was conducted simultaneously with the latest voter barometer, which was reported on in yesterday's edition of DN. Therefore the survey results can be compared with the voter barometer figures for both blocs and for the various parties in Riksdag.

Many Nonsocialists

In the voter barometer, the nonsocialist parties received 49.5 percent of voter support and the socialist parties received 44 percent. That means that many nonsocialist voters still have confidence in the Palme government.

The survey covered 874 voters who were interviewed in the period from 14 November to 7 December. The voters were asked the following question:

"Do you have a great deal of confidence or very little confidence in the current government?"

The voters were then asked to differentiate their responses by giving a number from minus 3 to plus 3. Minus 3 indicated a high level of no confidence and plus 3 indicated a high level of confidence.

In March/April, 55 percent of the voters had confidence in the government, in April/May the figure was 58.5 percent, in May/June it was 59 percent, while the figure now is 47.4 percent.

<u>Results</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Nóv</u>
Plus 3	10.0	13.8
Plus 2	18.2	22.6
Plus 1	19.2	22.6
Total	47.4	59.0
Minus 1	13.9	12.4
Minus 2	16.5	16.5
Minus 3	17.1	10.6
Total	47.5	39.5

The most tangible difference is that the number of voters with a high level of no confidence in the government's policies rose from 10.6 to 17.1 percent (minus 3).

All Voters

The decline in confidence in government policy cuts straight through the entire electorate. Within the socialist bloc, the number of voters expressing confidence in the government fell from 91 percent in June to 82 percent in December. At the same time the number expressing lack of confidence rose from 7 to 15 percent.

Within the Social Democratic Party, the number expressing confidence in the government declined from 92 to 84 percent while the number expressing lack of confidence increased from 6 to 11 percent.

Among the nonsocialist parties, the number expressing confidence in the government fell from 26 percent in June to 17 percent in December, while the number who expressed lack of confidence rose from 72 to 76 percent. Among Conservative voters, 10 percent had confidence in the government, while the figures for the Liberal and Center parties were 30 and 23 percent respectively.

By weighing each degree of confidence (-3 to +3) against the number of voters, a mean weighted value of confidence in the government can be calculated.



Confidence in the way the Palme government is running the country declined sharply during the fall. The fourth DN/IMU "confidence survey" shows that there is an even balance between voters who have confidence in the policies pursued by the Social Democratic government and those who do not. In June, 59 percent of the voters thought the Palme government was doing a good job, but the December figure is now down to 47.4 percent. At the same time, the number of voters lacking confidence in the Palme government rose by 8 percentage points to 47.5 percent.

Key:

1. High level of confidence

2. Little confidence

Confidence Index

Within the entire electorate, the "confidence index" in the government has declined to a minus level during the fall. In April the figure was plus 0.18, in May and June it was 0.31 but in December it was minus 0.16.

Within the socialist bloc, the confidence index in April was plus 1.62, in May it was plus 1.70, in June plus 1.79 and in December plus 1.37.

Within the nonsocialist bloc, the confidence index was minus 1.27 in April, minus 1.15 in April and May [as published] and now in December it is minus 1.48.

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CSO: 3650/93

GROUP OF YOUNG CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERS GAINING ATTENTION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 24 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Ake Ekdahl]

[Text] The young Conservative whippersnappers have taken command. The words are those of Prime Minister Olof Palme.

Most recently on a radio program about security policy, he pointed to the new generation of politicians in the Conservative Party who have thrown the old cultural conservatism overboard and cultivate neoliberalism in its place.

Similar groups of politicians of the same age and inclination are more or less visible in other parties too. With varying degrees of success they have participated at all times in shaping party policies.

Through the years the Conservative Party has had other young lions who wanted to change the course of Swedish security policy.

Now the party leaders--in Palme's opinion--do not have the power to hold them back. Perhaps the reason is that the chief whippersnapper himself, Ulf Adelsohn, is party chairman.

Although not otherwise similar, the Liberal Party had a corresponding Stockholm gang of hungry young politicians in the 1960's.

They were called the "straw hats" after an election joke. The last remaining straw hat is Ola Ullsten, now on his way out of politics.

In the 1960's the Social Democrats had a Lund group with Ingvar Carlsson, Leif Andersson, Olle Svenning, Dieter Strand, Jorn Svensson and Ake Mauritsson, who pushed the party into a new track. In Uppsala there was a different academic clique in the Laboremus student society with Birgitta Dahl, Anne-Greta Leijon and Lena Hjelm-Wallen.

All names that can now be found in the government, on Social Democratic newspaper staffs or in prominent positions in society.

Youth Group

Today we can see a youth group within the Social Democratic parliamentary group. They call themselves RUS. Riksdagen's Young Social Democrats.

They are a group of 30-year-olds who grew up in SSU [Swedish Social Democratic Youth League] and who strongly oppose the government and older Social Democrats on the combat plane, the IDB [International Development Bank], aid, equality of the sexes and issues affecting young people.

Mona Sahlin, Monica Andersson, Anna Lindh from Stockholm, Soren Haggroth in Kiruna, Margareta Hemmingssoni of Vasteras and Varmlander Margot Wallstrom are the core members of RUS.

Pulled Out the Rug

Within the Center Party there is a discreet and informal discussion club that takes care of lobbying. Compared to the young Conservatives and RUS, this is a well-disciplined association of mainly old SLU [Swedish Rural Youth Association] members who spontaneously get along well and get together on political discussions.

It is now known that it was this group that pulled the rug out from under Anders Dahlgren when the Center meeting in a dramatic personal election named Olof Johansson deputy party chairman and thus made him the leading party leadership candidate after Thorbjorn Falldin.

Gosta Andersson from Nybro, Arne Fransson from Smaland, Borje Hornlund from Skelleftea and Per-Ola Eriksson from Gammelstad in Norrbotten, Olof Johansson and Par Granstedt are some members of the group.

The most prominent Conservative whippersnapper recently has been Carl Bildt, with his very own security policy affair, who has served as a main character in a number of other affairs. Like the others, Per Unckel of Soderkoping, Olof Ehrenkrona, Georg Danell, Gunnar Hokmark and Gote Jonsson of Huskvarna, he was raised in old Gosta Bohman's greenhouse.

Anders Bjorck of Jonkoping, the veteran young lion in Riksdag, should probably also be counted among this flock.

It is quite obvious that membership in a group of this type can increase one's chances of ending up in clover in national politics. The current value of political issues also determines the fortunes of a politician.

In Clover

When the nuclear power battle was raging at its worst, energy politicians were the ones who were in clover. Today this issue has been replaced by the economy.

It goes without saying that others have lost their momentum and fallen by the wayside. The market value of a national politician changes quickly and mercilessly.

Liberal Jon-Erik Wikstrom is an example of a very unusual comeback. He was ruthlessly dumped by the party's highest decision-making body, the national congress, less than a year ago. Today he is back as the party's highest spokesman in parliament until party chairman Bengt Westerberg is elected.

Things have gone the other way for the two party leadership candidates, Ingemar Eliasson and Birgit Friggebo, in the opinion of several members of Riksdag DAGENS NYHETER talked to.

Margaretha af Ugglas of the Conservative Party has also learned that there are risks involved in being chosen as a likely party leader, only to drop into oblivion.

Taking the Helm

When the young Social Democrats storm ahead, the older ones have a hard time keeping pace. Group leader Lilly Hanssonanses does not have the natural control over the parliamentary group that her predecessor, Hans Gustafsson, had. Frida Berglund of Lulea had to put up with Labor Minister Leijon taking over the helm in the Labor Market Committee when the difficult issue of the youth law had to be maneuvered through Riksdag.

The Center Party is facing a changing of the guard that could be very striking. The day Thorbjorn Falldin decides to return to farming, everyone in the old cabinet minister circle will be too old to take over. With the exception of second vice-chairman Olof Johansson.

After the nuclear power conflict, he has deliberately stressed the next big social issue, the computer age. He makes regular trips around the country and talks with party people. But it will be with considerable reservations that the Center people in Riksdag name him the next leader of the Center Party.

Favorable conditions for a member of Riksdag involve being frequently sought after as a speaker, getting new tasks and having the ear of the party leadership. Margo Ingvardsson of VPK [Left Party-Communists] has experienced such favorable conditions. She is very new in parliament but she has considerable political experience on the Stockholm County Council and has been rapidly pushed forward as the new VPK politician on social issues, a post of honor in that party.

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CSO: 3650/93

CONSERVATIVES GAIN POST-WAR RECORD FOR SUPPORT IN POLLS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 24 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Claes-Goran Kjellander]

[Text] The Social Democrats have stabilized around 41 percent. The Conservatives hit a record in the SVENSKA DAGBLADET/SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] survey. Both middle parties declined.

These were the results of the year's last SVENSKA DAGBLADET/SIFO poll. The nonsocialist bloc had a total of 51.0 percent compared to 46.5 for the Social Democrats and VPK [Left Party-Communists].

SIFO provided the following figures:

Social Democrats, 41.0 (unchanged); Conservatives, 30.0 (+2.0); Center Party, 11.5 (-1.5); Liberal Party, 9.5 (-1.0); VPK, 5.5 (+0.0 [as published]); other parties 2.5 (unchanged).

After the previous month's sharp rise in the number of undecided voters, December's survey gave more normal results. Now 4.5 percent did not have a definite party preference compared to 7.0 in November.

Interviewed 962 People

The survey was conducted between 23 November and 13 December. Ove Rainer had announced that he would not take the post of justice minister before the survey began.

The first article in SvD [SVENSKA DAGBLADET] on Anders Ferm's talk with Arbatov was published on 5 December and Olof Palme's TV appearance with respect to this issue occurred on 9 December.

The survey consisted of 962 interviews. As usual, the question asked was, "What party do you think is the best one today?" A selection of people was made among eligible voters between the ages of 18 and 70. Starting with the next survey, the SvD/SIFO selection will be expanded to people between the ages of 18 and 74.

It is interesting that the Social Democrats remained at 41 percent despite the reduction in the number of undecided voters. This gives more substance to the party's figure. The party's long-term trend level is 41.9 percent.

VPK continues to lie at 5.0 or 5.5 percent. This is now the 13th time in a row that the party has been at this level.

Center Decline Reliable

The only statistically "reliable" change involves the decline for the Center Party. In three surveys the party has now declined from 15 to 11.5 percent. The decline began when Ola Ullsten announced that he would step down as leader of the Liberal Party.

There was speculation then as to whether the at times more tranquil Center Party would get squeezed between Adelson's Conservatives and Westerberg's Liberals. The SvD/SIFO poll does not refute such speculations. That the Center Party declined rapidly appears from the fact that the party's level in the long-term trend in November was 13.7 percent.

The Liberal Party is now experiencing a leveling off after the party doubled its share of party sympathizers in 3 months. But the party still remains clearly above its long-term trend level. This was 7.6 percent in the last survey.

Many will certainly be surprised that the Conservatives hit their record high from March at 30.0 percent. Even with the reservations that must always be made concerning the figure from a single month, it can be noted that in spite of a moderate return of supporters to the Liberal Party the Conservative Party seems to be maintaining its hold on nonsocialist voters.

There is still a 9-point difference between the Conservatives and the two middle parties. If this relationship remains the same during the next few months it can hardly fail to affect the climate of cooperation among the three parties in the spring session of Riksdag.

A review of the year's SvD/SIFO polls shows the following:

The Social Democrats and VPK held onto their majority through August. In September the nonsocialist parties gained a slight superiority which was later consolidated in October due to the Social Democratic losses and Liberal gains.

The Social Democrats started off the year at less than 46 percent and had their lowest rating--4 percent [as published]--in October.

The Conservatives have had between 29 and 30 percent support in eight out of the year's 10 surveys. The lowest figure came in November, 28.0 percent.

The Center Party started out at 12 percent and later rose to 15 percent in September. The last figure of the year was the lowest.

The Liberal Party registered 4 or 4.5 percent all through the spring. After the announcement that there would be a change in party leadership, the figure rose quickly, with 10.5 percent in November as the highest figure.

And VPK--as we said, the party is so stable at its level of 5.0 to 5.5 percent that it seems almost unnecessary to report the figures.

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CSO: 3650/93

PAPER COMMENTS ON POLL SHOWING RENEWED CONSERVATIVE ADVANCE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 24 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Christmas Present for the Conservatives"]

[Text] The talk of the imminent demise of the Conservatives seems considerably exaggerated in view of today's SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] survey. The party has reached its highest level ever in modern times, the advance is statistically reliable and the party leader clearly heads a group inspiring more confidence than the prime minister. After the recent turbulence in foreign policy it must feel good for the Conservative leadership to get this kind of Christmas present during the holiday recess.

It appears that the Conservatives have now clearly established a trend above their election results. That is more than one can say of the party's major opponents, the Social Democrats. Despite the talk of a market boom and good times, the party has been pushed down toward the magic 40-percent mark. And there is beginning to be a lack of room in which to act for the government that for each week it gets closer to election day is practically forced to busy itself with a string of new "affairs" and defensive issues.

These affairs are external phenomena. They have little impact on the party pattern in the short term. But taken as a whole and in the long run, they make it harder for the Social Democrats to regain the marginal voters who will determine the 1985 election.

But the government party has one trump card that the other parties lack: government power. Even though, judging from the confidence statistics, the prime minister is a bigger asset for his opponents than for his own party, he can with his indisputable ability to demonstrate power regain the initiative in the general debate.

The only question is how much the doubtful voters appreciate being disturbed by the prime minister on a daily and regular basis through the mass media's leadership fixation. The risk with all the affairs and the endless explanations and theorizing following in their wake is that they will create

a feeling of weariness with politics in general that is more likely to lead to resignation with the way things are than to a desire to revolt.

That is a possible explanation for the decline of the smaller nonsocialist parties. During the survey period, Palme and Adelson have been the major opponents on the scene, the ones who were visible in the fund confrontation and in foreign policy disputes. They find it easier to mobilize than the smaller parties do.

As far as the Liberal Party is concerned, the Westerberg effect seems to be waning. The shift in party leaders provided a wealth of positive publicity, but now more normal trials await the party in everyday political life. And Westerberg will have to do his fighting from a position outside of Riksdag.

The Center Party has once more lost ground and the slipping long-term trend ought to worry Center strategists. The party runs an obvious risk of getting lost in the shuffle when the Conservatives and Liberals sound off at the government on specific issues. Moving closer to the Social Democrats in the hope of picking up discontented voters from that party could turn out to be an unsuccessful tactic.

At the same time, the shifts in this eventful political fall have occurred within a fairly stable party pattern. During the last quarter, the three nonsocialist parties as a group have held a clear unchanged superiority over the socialist bloc, a shift in public opinion that took place in the summer after the spring fraud debate and was consolidated during the early fall fund debate.

It takes time before topical political skirmishing sinks into public opinion. This permeation process bodes well for the future if the nonsocialists are able to form a credible government alternative on their own and at the same time make use of the government's mistakes. Good luck in the future!

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CSO: 3650/93

CHALLENGES FACING KURDS UNDER NEW GOVERNMENT

Paris LE MONDE in French 9, 10 Dec 83

[Article by Jean-Pierre Clerc: "The Third Test of the Turkish Kurds"]

[9 Dec 83 pp 1, 4]

[Text] I. Ankara vs X

After 3 years and 3 months of a military regime, Turkey returned officially on Tuesday, 6 December, to a civilian government, with the appointment of Mr Turgut Ozal as prime minister. However, the army is "supervising:" General Evren is president of the republic, the former chiefs of staff of the three armed branches sit with him on a "presidential council," and martial law remains in effect throughout the country. It is being implemented particularly harshly where the Turkish Kurds are concerned.

Diyebrakir--"One day this city will be the capital of our Kurdistan." As we walk along the crowded and very "oriental" streets of Diyebrakir, the young man hesitates, and then adds: "But this may not be for 1,000 years."

This stubborn assertion of the difference, born of the conviction that the phenomenon is not about to be recognized--this is what the foreign traveler finds more or less everywhere in this corner deep in Turkey. But there is also the cautioning touch on one's forearm, and the suddenly lowered voice: "But do not forget, sir, 'Kurdistan' is a word you must never utter. Unless you are fond of Turkish prisons..."

Such is the terrible unspoken thing in the country of Ataturk. In a cruel play on words, one might call it "the new Eastern question!" More than 10 percent, and probably nearer 20 percent, of the men and women living east of a line from Arzurum in the north to Gaziantep in the south* are being denied a basic right: that of enjoying their real identity, and more specifically speaking their language, Kurdish, without suffering serious reprisals.

* It is often admitted that there are at least 5 and perhaps 8 million Kurds in Turkey, out of a total population of 48 million. Counting their "brothers" in Iran, Iraq, Syria, the USSR and Lebanon, there would be 10 to 18 million Kurds in the Near East.

The "Kurdish question" is, officially, denied. The most vehement in this denial are without a doubt the interlocutors claiming affiliation with the democratic left, whose Jacobinism (called "Kemalism" here, in reference to Kemal Ataturk, the father of the republic) is a constant source of amazement.

The following, for example, is the analysis of one of the close collaborators of Mr Ecevit, the former social democratic prime minister: "There is no Kurdish problem. There is simply, in the East, a more difficult economic situation, because of the lack of industry there. In addition, the thinking there is still imbued with feudalism. There has been inadequate schooling, such that the poorest Kurdish-speaking people have not yet become aware of the exploitation of which they are the victims. Now this is caused by the rich local lords, not the central government." This attitude in the progressive Turkish circles is almost as simple as that in the government sector, where "the Kurdish problem basically does not exist. It is but a lever used by the political parties." However, this foreign affairs official concluded: "One can always fish in troubled waters."

Diyerbakir! This is the largest city in eastern Anatolia, with its 250,000 residents. One could not imagine that there is in Turkey one place where the military presence is more obsessive than elsewhere. The smallest public building in Ankara, as well as in the smallest locality, is guarded by gendarmes or military police, not to mention the constant street patrols. In Diyerbakir, however, this martial ostentation comes close to occupation!

Arriving from the capital city, a thousand kilometers to the west, the daily commercial airliner comes to rest in the midst of tens of carefully aligned fighter planes and bombers. Along the road to the city, the taxi passes barracks, military vehicle parks and military parade grounds. The first imposing building the traveler glimpses before being swallowed up by the ancient black basalt ramparts of the city on the banks of the Tigris is the officers' mess. On top of the Mountain Tower (formerly the Armenian Tower!) standing guard over one of the four gates of the city, a purple banner bears a quotation from Ataturk, which says in essence "From Diyerbakir to Istanbul, from Thrace to Van, there are only Turks."

If one wants to find interlocutors, former addresses are of little use: the militants are in prison, or under surveillance. But here a terrible obstacle becomes an asset: those who do not speak Turkish here are viewed with great favor! And it suffices to ask "Do you also speak Kurdish?" to establish a firm, comfortable and sympathetic bond.

A History, a Territory, a Language

And thus one begins to glimpse what "Kurdishness" might be, at least in that group educated enough to speak a foreign language. A minimum of caution is necessary, however. For example, the word "Kurd" itself will be systematically replaced by the term "X" in order not to awaken the attention of passers-by or other customers in a bar. There will be no mention of "isms" (socialism, communism, but also "machismo"). Certain proper names (Ecevit, Khomeiny, the Soviet Union) will be avoided by circumlocution. "It is possible that we give in too much to fear, but there are treacherous individuals

everywhere," this intellectual told us in his deliciously antiquated French. And he added some advice: "Wherever you go, say little!"

"Kurdishness" is first of all a keen awareness of a specific cultural background. "We are the descendants of the Medes, those Indo-Europeans who, in the 7th century before Christ, defeated the Neo-Syrian Empire," a doctor in Ourfa, one of the oldest cities in the world, within the territory of Mesopotamia, told us proudly. Another interlocutor in Adiyaman, a modest city which spreads at the foot of the Taurus Mountains, recalled another glorious era in Turkish administration, that of Saladin, who became sultan of Egypt and Syria at the end of the 12th century, and who won Jerusalem back from the Crusaders. He added: "We have always lived in these mountains. On the other hand, as far as I know, there were never Turks here before the forced migrations of the population which occurred toward the end of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the republican era."

A history, a territory, and also, of course, a language. It enrages our interlocutors to know that many Turks dispute this reality. This language, which is related to Persian and the Pashto spoken by the Afghans, has almost never, it is true, been written in Turkey. The Kurds have a harsh history to recount concerning this peasant society isolated in its mountains, and constantly subject to the control of one or another of the empires which have fought over these uncertain border lines between Mesopotamia on the south, the Iranian Plateau on the east, and Anatolia on the west. However, they recall the very vivid poetic tradition of their language, which is also the source of songs which, all things considered, are deeper rooted in this corner of the earth than the rather sentimental composite music in the Arab tradition which one hears today throughout the Near East, from Istanbul to Cairo.

Push Toward "Turkishness"

The Turkish governments have all, each in its own fashion, tried to eliminate the "evil" at its roots. The Ottoman Empire, with a religious more than a national basis, apparently had less of a problem with these Muslims, Sunnites, like the empire itself, than with other alien populations. "The sick man of Europe" did however, toward the end, become clearly more nervous. Sultan Abdul Amid, at the end of the 19th century, undertook to subdue this turbulent region by sending columns of Turks, following in the footsteps of his soldiers, to settle in the villages of the Kurds--and the Armenians as well! This was the first test of eastern Anatolia.

The republic, born of a national Turkish upsurge, proved much harsher still. Ataturk was merciless toward the 1925 uprising by Seikh Sait. Whole villages were deported to central Anatolia. Curiously, however, despite the new test imposed upon them, the Kurds do not retain an evil memory of the "father of the Turks." "My father told me that he was terrible, but he recognized a worthy opponent in us," the young professor in Adiyaman told us.

In 1924, Turkish was declared the only official language for the entire territory of the new republic. Thus it became compulsory, in particular in the

schools, the barracks and administrative units. The young generations of Kurds were to be exposed in that same area, toward the 1930s, to public education, universal conscription, "offices" and Turks. Their general view was that this meant progress: there was quite a rush toward all these indications of "Turkishness."

The Marxist Alliance

With the establishment of the multiparty system in 1946, the picture changed subtly. The doctor in Ourfa explained: "Ataturk did not hesitate, in the name of reformism and secularity, to hang the agas and the Sheiks--the feudal lords and religious figures, the immemorial leaders of the Kurdish communities--if necessary. Beginning in 1950, on the contrary, the conservative governments began to negotiate with these powerful individuals with a view to winning the votes of the peasants in their villages, through them."

The situation began to deteriorate for the Kurds towards the middle of the 1970s. One of our interlocutors, a lawyer in Diyerbakir, explained. "The decade between 1970 and 1980 saw the greatest radicalization in Turkish history. Obviously, we experienced the same seething phenomenon in our region. At the beginning, Kurdish national claims were not an issue in the establishment of groups of more radical secondary and university students at all. They attacked the rich landowners, because they regarded them as the exploiters. It must be recognized that in the early years, until about 1979, their activities won the sympathy of the humbler population strata and the local intelligentsia."

He continued. "Then the movement became 'more Kurdish.' Some groups, perhaps the majority, came to believe that the economic and social problems in our regions could be more effectively solved within the context of a political framework: a Kurdish state. Two phenomena served to create this awakened awareness. First of all, an understanding of the past, which came about in great part through foreign works. And secondly, the extreme left wing in Turkey made deliberate use of the issue of Kurdish nationalism."

Desirous of changing the state of affairs in Turkey, the young Marxist revolutionaries believed they could find a substantial ally in a nationalist movement the goal of which would be also to eliminate Turkish domination. The two forces lent each other mutual support. The extreme left wing in Turkey "popularized" the Kurdish cause. And the separatists took on more than their share of the violent actions throughout the territory as a whole, extending as far as the large cities in the West, to which tens of thousands of Kurds had gone since the 1950s in search of better opportunities. The Turkish workers' party, which was procommunist, and the communist party itself were among the first to fly to the aid of the "cause."

In the second half of the 1970s, the separatist movement acquired such breadth, this lawyer went on to tell us, that the agas took note of it. Some, in order to maintain all possible future paths, provided the nationalists with subsidies--"so true it is that in a feudal system, none can develop without the sponsorship of the lords!" Others sent their own armed hands

against the separatists. "The deaths which followed were added to those caused by the clashes among rival groups. It saddens me to tell you that all of the Kurds assassinated during these years were killed by other Kurds, not by the Turks."

Within this context, what could Mr Ecevit, the leader of the social democratic PRP, which alternated in power with the conservative Demirel, do? Mr Ecevit had both an acute awareness of the existence of a "Eastern problem" and a desire not to leave a monopoly on the votes in this region to the conservatives. He tolerated the use of the Kurdish language in the administration here and there. He also allowed the press to discuss the problem openly. While previously there had been only "mountain Turks," it was now admitted that there were, quite simply, Kurds.

On the other hand, Mr Ecevit seemed to fear he would be accused of being a lukewarm nationalist, in particular by the military, the haughty guardians of "Kemalist" orthodoxy. It was doubtless this concern which led him to exclude Kurdish candidates from his slate in the 1977 legislative elections.

Mr Ecevit thought he could resolve these ambiguities by pursuing a policy of accelerated economic development in the eastern sector. He "pushed" equipment credit for the region. And, in an unprecedented action, he visited the province of Hakkari, the most neglected in the country within the area of the three Kurdistans--Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi. But, caught up in the spiraling violence which swept the country too, he was forced to declare a state of emergency at the end of 1978 over a sizeable portion of the territory, including the Kurdish-speaking zones.

[10 Dec 83 p 7]

[Text] A People "Under the Boot"

The military coup d'etat on 12 September 1980 was in large part directed against the Kurds. The eastern part of Turkey was in fact the scene of extremely acute separatist agitation (LE MONDE, 9 December).

Diyerbakir--When the armed forces overthrew Mr Demirel on 12 September 1980, they had already "worked on" the Kurdish question extensively. Their intelligence service, the MIT, had accumulated information on the various separatist groups. In the weeks which followed General Evren's coup d'etat there were extensive casts of the net in the large cities such as Diyerbakir and in all the localities where activism had been high. A number of Kurdish villages, particularly those on the Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian frontiers, were searched systematically, sometimes with despicable brutality. This is one of the episodes evoked in a scene in the film "Yol" by Y. Guney.

The purpose of the military effort was to recover weapons, which in fact abounded throughout the region. In the Kurdish territory, the rifle is both a manly symbol and a useful tool, not only for hunting but also to settle matters of honor, and even to intimidate those salesmen or travelers held

for ransom. In addition, the political situation in Iran and Iraq had resulted in very substantial traffic in the direction of the Kurdish-speaking areas in these two countries. Now the Turkish authorities have always been very attentive to the threat of the spread of agitation between their "minority" and those in the neighboring countries. Finally, the eastern part of the country shares a boundary with the Soviet Union, and the Turkish armed forces, one of the pillars of NATO, are naturally vigilant where these very "sensitive" territorial boundaries are concerned.

In Diyerbakir, a symbol city, pending the day when it becomes the capital for which the Kurds pray, the military authorities showed particular harshness. Both suspects and the condemned (more than 1,000 death sentences were demanded) were thrown into the modern prison built some 10 kilometers to the south of the city. There are more than 2500 individuals living there today, according to the statements of witnesses, under unspeakable conditions. There was a hunger strike almost a month long in September. According to statements made by witnesses in Diyerbakir, the result of this movement was a slight improvement in the living conditions of the inmates.

Diyerbakir is "under the boot." "Carrying an identity card giving this city as one's origin is a sign of infamy in Turkey today. In any case, it leads to absurd harassment," a hotel keeper told us. More of a campaign is being waged against the Kurdish language throughout this country than ever before in the past. A teacher tells the story of three young people who, after drinking a little too much raki (an anise-flavored liquor) in a restaurant, asked to have a cassette of Kurdish music played. They were taken to task by a Turkish customer, and the next day they were arrested. This episode got them a month in prison. (The state of emergency allows 45 days of administrative detention.)

No Slogans!

A young teacher recalls another painful time for some Kurds: military service. Primary school is normally the time during which all children learn the Turkish language. However, in the vast rural areas in eastern Turkey, few parents respect the compulsory schooling rule. Thus, for many young Kurds, the barracks is their first and very harsh contact with the Turks.

In this third great test of the Kurds, following the persecution by Abdul Amid and the repression by Ataturk, each individual here wonders about the future. If the concept of an independent Kurdistan was fashionable toward the end of the 1970s, it now seems entirely absurd. "We cannot utilize slogans like that," a doctor says. "We are crushed by the Turkish military force. Some of our best young people are in prison serving sentences decades long. For the separatist movement, this means a return to zero."

The countries involved help each other. Last spring, we saw Ankara launch an operation in Iraq, with Baghdad's explicit approval, with a view to subduing the Kurdish irregulars in the mountainous zone north of Zevka.

For the majority of our interlocutors, the important thing is to win recognition of cultural identity from Ankara--the right to speak their language,

to listen to their music, to celebrate their festivals, such as the nowrouz, obviously of Zoroastrian origin, during which the peasants light great bonfires on the hilltops to celebrate the new year, a practice which at present brings them endless harassment.

A few of our interlocutors willingly go farther. They demand autonomy for their economic affairs. "We have all of the country's oil here. We have the chromium, one of the main sources of foreign exchange for Turkey, and with the Euphrates, we have the capacity to supply the entire Near East with electricity. And look at this cesspool!" said a young engineer in a town on the Iraqi frontier, pointing to the mudholes serving his small locality as streets. "Isn't that colonialism?" he asked in conclusion.

But via what political route should the cause be advanced? An Istanbul doctor born in Diyerbakir said that "the era of armed struggle was a tragic, perhaps inevitable, error. It is necessary now to create a movement with a very broad popular base, the demands of which should pertain first of all to what the people care about most: recognition of their cultural identity."

Ancient Shepherds

In these final months of 1983, the Kurds are bracing themselves against the most serious storm they have experienced in half a century. Should one really say Kurds? Certainly not! For the majority of them, the onslaught of the Turkish armed forces has hardly changed a situation dating from time immemorial, more characterized by the domination of the local authorities than that of the central power, whatever it might be.

This is the case first of all for the women, in principle less subject to the patriarchal system than those elsewhere in the Near East, but nonetheless isolated enough to have been protected from any direct contact with the state system. This is also the case, for the greater part of their lives, for the majority of the men living in the rural sector--which is to say the vast majority of them. For them, the aga remains the necessary interpreter if they are to make contact with government officials, departments and offices. This is also the source of a great part of the local lord's power.

The aga, of his own accord, opts for more paternalistic than aggressively dominant behavior, as we saw in the Adiyaman region. A doctor explained. "There is a proud tradition of the race which says that the lord must not humiliate those dependent on him. He risks his life if he does! And so he uses trickery. He also knows how to use the petty favors involved: a contribution in money when a daughter is married or when an infant is ill, the little gifts in kind, nothing at all really, but seeming like manna from heaven when provided at a crucial moment."

We visited Kurdish villages in the region of Nemrud Dagı, the mountain on the top of which Antiochus, the king of Commagene, had a fantastic sanctuary dominated by statues of Greco-Persian inspiration built 2,000 years ago. There, between the Taurus Mountains and the Euphrates, there are grassy foothills almost bare of trees. Ochre rocks dot fields of grey earth.

Shepherds offer an ancient silhouette, dressed now in foreign dufflecoats of felt, leading their herds of goats and sheep through the wheat and barley stubble.

The villages are collections of huts built of unmortared stone, with flat roofs, sometimes whitewashed. In the winter, the people and the livestock provide each other with warmth in the cramped space. The laundry, scarlet in color, dries on the roofs. In fact, red garments are highly valued by the women throughout the region. But there could be no question of venturing into these corners of the territory without the approval of the aga.

A Cartesian Aga

Talk with an actual aga is fascinating. For however "feudal" he may have remained in his relationship with "his" peasants, he is nonetheless most often a 20th-century man. Take, for example, Mustafa, the owner of four villages near the Iraqi frontier. He explains that his line dates back to the head of a clan, of which one nomad tribe in the principality of Hakkari was once the legendary symbol. He has completed serious studies in agronomy in Ankara, and has traveled in Europe many times. He speaks adequate English. He has revolutionized the method of cultivation in the region by introducing irrigation spray systems for the cotton and lentil fields. He undertook to install a collection system for solar energy for domestic use.

Mustafa is a power. In a vilayet (department) with about 150,000 voters, he controls, he assured us, 5,000--a little more than 3 percent! "My villagers total only 500 persons. But there are their relatives, their friends, and above all, the enemies of the enemies!" During the last legislation elections, he only won 11 votes out of 500 in four villages against the Anavatan, Mr Ozal's conservative party, which won on 6 November. A good prince, Mutafa added: "I could perfectly well find out who the 11 were. But, naturally, I will not try!" Naturally!

He said further: "In the department, there are about 40 of us major electors. I imagine the system surprises you. But you must realize that our villagers derive an advantage from it too. Our elected officials will be committed to benefitting their region, by speeding up the building of roads, dispensaries and schools."

There remains a last question: Can this situation last very long? During a brief stay in the Kurdish region, it seemed to us that exasperation had reached its peak. If there is not a rapid reduction of pressure, favored if possible by the establishment of a civilian government in Ankara, violent reactions are to be feared. No one imagines, however, that they could lead to political upsets in favor of the Kurds. But they could give rise to phenomena characterized by bloody repression of such scope that Turkey would find itself again, as it did after 1876, after 1915 and after 1928, accused by the other nations.

Whatever happens in the east in the near future, clear thinkers in Turkey are quite convinced that the Kurdish problem will continue for a long time to

poison political life in the whole of the country. It would not be possible, in fact, to keep a whole segment of the population of a country under the yoke without the manifestation of evil effects on the national level. The Turkish army is a heavy machine which put itself in motion in 1980 in great part to contain the bubbling ferment in the Kurdish zones. In the process, it has already trampled heavily upon the democratic system of the country.

The conclusion of one Turkish journalist in Ankara is the following: "The Kurdish problem is a cancer. One which is metastesizing."

5157

CSO: 3519/148

DILIPAK WARNS OF U.S. ENTRAPMENT OF OZAL GOVERNMENT

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 15 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by Abdurrahman Dilipak]

[Text] Quite soon a new government will be installed ... Innumerable problems are awaiting the government ... It is not clear whether they will be able to overcome these problems. However, we may point out that even the supporters of the party are reluctant to take optimistic positions.

By the start of 1984, the members of the new government would be sitting in their offices and would have issued their first statements ... And in the meantime, a number of overseas visits would have been arranged with their ministerial counterparts. Economic issues, foreign policy issues, bilateral relations, etc., etc. ...

Ozal would have to pass two tests during the first days of his government. I suppose the first of these is related to the Incirlik base. Despite being an engineer, Ozal has a tendency to give priority to economic issues (much like an economist) and to evaluate foreign policy issues within the market economy framework. Yet, I doubt whether he will be able to handle the economic issues immediately ... Furthermore, economic issues are not of a kind that can be resolved overnight. Even if they start by selling bridges, selling sports arenas, we know that even these things do take time. And there are also those issues where there are mountains of difference between words and reality.

Turkey has difficulties in foreign policy, as serious as its economic problems, if not more ... Whether it is Cyprus, Middle East developments, Israel's schemes over Turkey, or the fait accompli plans of the U.S., these are vital matters, more important than hunger. These are matters related to our national security and our right to exist in the face of a probable war.

Will Ulusu government's fait accompli over Incirlik be accepted by the Ozal government? Reagan seems hopeful on this score. Bestowing "messages of mutual understanding and cooperation" on Ozal by the U.S., in great haste,

before the cabinet had been announced, when Ozal had not even taken up his duties as prime minister, is somewhat suspect. Wouldn't anybody ask 'how come this amity'? ... They would indeed. Ozal has to take all these balances and conditions into account. He has to take note of Turkey's economic, political, historical, and social realities. The power struggle that started at the Lions clubs, Rotary clubs, has reached a new, historical stage now. Those conditions, powers and balances which have brought him into power are expecting new obligations from him.

Reagan's support should not appear as a ray of hope to the Motherlanders. From the first day on, Reagan wants to see Ozal as a reliable ally of U.S. policy. He is applying psychological pressure to achieve this. In fact, there are those who smell a dose of threat behind this sympathetic policy of Reagan.

Ozal's attitude regarding Incirlik, the decision of the Motherland government which has a parliamentary majority, and further developments on this issue will give reliable clues to this matter.

If Ozal falls into Reagan's trap, then, inevitably, he will be subjected to new demands and fait accomplis by the U.S. And it is not only the U.S., Israel is waiting on the line ... Look, what the Jewish chargé d'affaires (even him) is saying without any feeling of shame? Are we going to ignore these for the sake of a three cents-worth of credit? The maintenance of our relations with Israel may be a question of cost/benefit for some, yet I wonder which kind of calculus will be used in protecting our national security, our national values, our national honor?

12466
CS0: 3554/103

ILICAK URGES WELL-DEFINED EXERCISE OF POWER

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 15 Dec 83 pp 1, 10

[Editorial by Nazli Ilıcak]

[Text] We want to see that the stones fall into place ... That everyone should know the limits of their authority and their responsibility so that the balance between power centers does not deteriorate into strife.

Together we have lived through the difficulties arising from contentions over authority. We have witnessed the instance of a Constitutional Court issuing an amnesty in contravention of the parliament. We have seen the instance of the High Court of Appeal keeping the director of TRT in office despite parliament's "unconditional annulment and rejection" of the related governmental directive. These scuffles over authority had the unfortunate effect of drawing the higher courts into the polemics of political life. At long last, the 1982 Constitution altered the way members of higher courts are appointed, while narrowing and delineating their authority in an unambiguous manner.

In order to avoid the difficulties that would arise in the event of a new scuffle over authority, we should see to it that stones are falling into place, beginning today ...

The Power of the Executive

In the parliamentary regime the power of the executive is conceived as having two 'heads':

- 1 - Head of state (the monarch or the president)
- 2 - Prime Minister.

The relations between the two heads of the executive organ are determined by the rules of the parliamentary system.

As in all the other parliamentary systems, the president is deemed unaccountable by the 1982 Constitution. "To declare this unaccountability openly means that the president is kept away from activities that require accountability. This is because authority can only be used by those who are accountable. Enabling the head of state to use those kinds of authority which require accountability, after having agreed that he is unaccountable, would come to mean that no one can be held accountable for the management of state activities. Therefore, authority resides in the prime minister and the council of ministers who are politically accountable to the legislative organ. It is for this reason that (with the exception of circumstances clearly specified in the Constitution) presidential directives are signed by the prime minister and the ministers concerned, who would not be signing the directives unless they would be met with the approval of the legislative power."

The above words are taken from a book by Prof. Orhan Aldikacti (Professor of Constitutional Law) titled "The Presidency in Modern Democracies."

We have asked him whether these principles are valid in the 1982 Constitution. "They are valid", came the answer. According to Aldikacti, the head of state may examine the list of names (on the council of ministers), yet he may only express his views, make his concerns known, but cannot insist on a change in the list. The term "appointment" carries an entirely symbolic meaning.

We have read the writings of another professor of constitutional law, Mumtaz Soysal, on the question of the unaccountability of the presidency. Here is what Soysal says: "The unaccountability of the president indicates not the limitless nature of his power, but on the contrary, that his prerogatives lack power and are symbolical."

Nonpartisanship and the Function of Arbitration

Apart from some clearly specified exceptions, the prerogatives which appear to belong to the head of state are used by the council of ministers thus resulting in his abstention from political activity. This nonpartisan status makes it possible for him to arbitrate between the majority and minority in the Assembly whenever a conflict arises.

In the parliamentary system, the most important function of the presidency is arbitration. Effective arbitration would be possible if he avoids confrontations with certain groups by remaining outside politics. This is the reason for our insistence on the issue of authority. By putting the stones in their place now, we might be preventing certain disagreements in the future and thus preserving the symbolic weight of the presidency.

The Turkish practice has always closely conformed to the principle of parliamentarianism. Cevdet Sunay rejected Urguplu's cabinet list during the 12 March period, that is, during an extraordinary period. Moreover, Urguplu was not the leader of a majority party but a nonpartisan individual without support in the Assembly. The situation is vastly different today. Ozal is heading a party with a majority in the Assembly. He is the one who will be accountable to the Assembly and who will be demanding a vote of confidence

from the Assembly with his list. When the issue is seen from this perspective, it is in accordance with the parliamentary mechanism that the ministers are appointed without any changes.

12466

CSO: 3554/102

OYMEN ASSESSES COURSE OF TURKISH-COE RELATIONS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 11 Dec 83 p 2

[Article by Altan Oymen]

[Text] How shall the relations between the Council of Europe and Turkey proceed from now on?

During the last fall session, the Council had seemingly adopted a policy of not accepting delegates from the parliament to be formed after the November 6 elections. The draft proposal which was prepared by the Austrian Conservative Steiner was based upon the charter of the Council. It was adopted as the Council's resolution by a large majority.

The resolution contained a couple of flexible clauses which (as Steiner had also made clear) seemed to leave open the "possibility of reviewing the situation" after the elections.

A new tendency gaining ground in the Political Commission of the Council gives the impression that a change of attitude may be under way deriving support from such flexible expressions.

This new approach is the right one.

It is right firstly because the main justification for the Steiner proposal was that there were doubts concerning the representative quality of the parliament in view of the limited participation of political parties in the elections.

The inference derived from the election results is such that, these doubts are not the "burning issue" of the day as far as the Turkish public is concerned. It can also be said that political life is no longer circumscribed by the activities of those political parties who have been able to enter the parliament. Other parties are preparing to take part in local elections. Moreover, new parties are being founded.

What this means is that the present parliamentary system is viewed, not only by parties within the parliament but also by those that have remained outside it, as an acceptable arrangement, or an "atmosphere conducive to political activity." The major political groupings which could not enter the parliament or those who did not make the attempt to do so are now saying: "Yes, I will be playing on this turf, too!", albeit with reservations and criticisms.

While things are moving in this direction, that is, while even the hardliners within the Turkish parliamentary parties seem to have dropped their arguments against certain arrangements and measures, the Council of Europe's persistence in making a "case" out of this, clinging to the old doubts of the September-October period cannot be considered as entirely logical.

The parliamentary delegates are indeed accountable to the principles inherent in the charter of the Council. All Council-member countries are expected to engage in discussions with a view to ensuring compliance to these principles and to come up with resolutions in accordance with the Council procedures.

But given the present state of affairs in Turkey, what benefit can the Council (while engaged in discussions and searching for solutions) hope to derive from excluding the representatives of the present Turkish parliament?

Just the contrary: they will be in a better position to reach sound judgments and results by listening to them, telling them certain things; that is, by providing the means of dialogue, communication and mutual influence which, after all, can be considered as the raison d'etre of the Council itself.

Whether we like it or not, the legislators of Turkey today are the 399 parliamentarians sitting in the parliament. The proper way to start establishing relations with the political and state life of Turkey is through these parliamentarians. This is true for the Council of Europe as well as those politicians who are outside the parliament preparing for tomorrow.

I am not writing these words simply as a Journalist who has closely followed the proceedings of the Council of Europe for a number of years, but also as a former parliamentarian who once served as a delegate there. Had my pre-occupation been my own political fortunes, I would have entertained different feelings. But I suppose, to be realistic, it is necessary for the Council of Europe as it is for our own country, to try such an option.

Turkey is a European country. And Europe is a continent that encompasses Turkey.

The restoration of the relations which were loosened due to certain specific circumstances is the duty of all those who value the Council of Europe and its principles, and those who want to see those principles realized in all their implications.

TURKMEN INTERVIEWED ON FOREIGN POLICY, TERRORISM

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 1 Dec 83 p 4

[Interview with former Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen, by foreign affairs correspondent Mehmet Ali Birand; date and place not specified]

[Text] Birand: Would you rather have a career diplomat or a politician as foreign minister?

Turkmen: It would be better if a politician was selected as minister. For one thing, he would have a stronger position in the parliament. He would enjoy greater political support. Furthermore, foreign policy and domestic politics are intimately related to one another. A politician would be better placed to evaluate such implications. Naturally, this is a matter of preference. Are we to attach more importance to experience or to the political weight of the minister?

Birand: Were you the formulator of foreign policy within the Uluşu government?

Turkmen: No, I was the executor. The formulator was the President.

Birand: Did you have any problems with the National Security Council (NSC)? Could you see the President whenever you wanted to? Was the President receptive to your advice?

Turkmen: I did not have any problems with the NSC. Naturally, in some instances I had to work hard to gain acceptance for my views. Some of my views did not receive approval. In certain instances it later became clear that they should indeed have been rejected. But these are normal things. They come with the territory, so to speak. Generally speaking, however, I could say that my advice has been received with approval.

Birand: You are viewed as one of the most successful ministers of the Uluşu government. You are one of those rare '12 September' ministers who has been widely acclaimed in the press, almost to the point of urging that you should not be replaced. Why?

Turkmen: I suppose in Turkey flamboyant foreign ministers are liked not as much as commonly supposed. Turkish people expect a stable foreign policy. Also, people who use every opportunity to speak to the press are not met with much approval. These might well be the reasons ...

Birand: Turkey has gone through quite a problematic period in its relations with Western Europe. What was the principle that you applied during this period?

Turkmen: It was pragmatism. There are principles of course, but in the application of these principles pragmatism is necessary. It is also necessary to take some risks. Secondly, in foreign policy - contrary to widely held opinion - it is necessary to be open and sincere. I suppose the foreign policy of the Uluşu government brought credibility to Turkey during this period.

Birand: What kind of difficulties did you encounter in your relations with Western Europe? What was the foremost difficulty?

Turkmen: I have never exaggerated our problems with Western Europe. I was of the opinion that our relations with the European Council could be managed properly. That is how things turned out in the end. Our biggest problem with regard to the European Council has been our press. You have attributed more importance to the Council than is required. It was made into a big issue. Actually, it was not such an important matter. The European Council is an institution that commands our respect. However, it cannot be said that it is among the foremost global institutions. I have always been careful to maintain our relations with the Council. I have also kept a sense of proportion.

Birand: Has Turkey encountered a serious difficulty in its relations with Western Europe during this period?

Turkmen: A number of elements got mixed up with normal reactions expected after the suspension of democracy in Turkey. For one thing, Greece got into the act. Upon entering the Common Market, it tried to use this organization against us. Then a number of Turkish political extremists went to Europe, starting to organize activities against Turkey and trying to provoke the governments of those countries against us. Armenian terrorism continued. With all these elements combined we had to go through periods of considerable strain. There were changes in governments. France had a change of government. Though we had some difficulties with the Giscard d'Estaing government, at least the regime in Turkey was not turned into a problem. I remember well, during my first visit to the European Council we had received the utmost sympathy from France. Thereafter, with a socialist government in power, there were additional strains in our relations with France, strains resulting from a combination of factors. On the other hand, we received great support and understanding from the Reagan administration. And this was our strong card. In this period, we developed our relations with the Islamic countries to an unprecedented scale. By following a careful policy vis-à-vis the socialist countries we have been able to overcome many disagreements.

I might add that a successful foreign policy is contingent upon internal stability and strength of national character.

Birand: Are you saying that Turkey has not been isolated?

Turkmen: Quite so. Turkey has not been isolated. It is true that our relations with Western Europe have fallen below normal levels, yet we have not been isolated.

Birand: Has the balance in our foreign policy been upset as a result of this? I mean the declining relations with Europe while they are on the increase with America ...

Turkmen: Which countries, which relations are important to us? The United States is important, Federal Germany is important. Britain is important.

Birand: Yes, but Turkey has been denounced practically in every European organisation. Is it possible to minimise this? Relations with governments are important, but haven't these organisations tarnished the external image of the country?

Turkmen: Yes, but don't forget that these are mostly transitory. Why should we be the ones to take the decisions of the European Council and the European Parliament seriously, when no one seems to do so?

Birand: This means that for you, relations with governments are more important than those with parliaments and other official organisations ...

Turkmen: But I can't say the same thing for the American Congress.

Birand: You told me that you were disillusioned with the attitude of the EEC ...

Turkmen: Yes, EEC was expected to give us the benefit of the doubt, have some faith in us, give us some time. They haven't done it. Of course, Greece played a role in this

Birand: Should we insist on becoming a full member of the EEC simply because of the Greek factor?

Turkmen: No. If it were only Greece we could manage it. Now Spain and Portugal are also entering. In a while, all NATO members excepting Norway will be EEC members. That would mean Turkey staying out on its own.

Birand: Does it make you feel uncomfortable that this would leave the strategic relation as our only link to the West?

Turkmen: Yes, that would leave us with the strategic link only. In the long run, I would not view that as sound.

Is There a Possibility of War with Greece?

Birand: There has been an increase in tensions in our relations with Greece, particularly after the developments in Cyprus. Do you foresee a flare-up between the two countries if tensions increase at their present rate?

Turkmen: It is difficult to estimate the limits to which Greece is prepared to take this matter. The relations had been stalled for some time. In actual fact problems were not being solved at all. Previously, although dialogue could not be established, our relations were somewhat more careful and oriented towards milder attitudes. Thus it is difficult to see where their interest lies in creating disagreements. I would think that creating a crisis would be harmful to them.

Birand: Can Turkey reach an agreement with Papandreu?

Turkmen: What we can expect to do with Papandreu is to soften our relations to some degree. Apart from that, I don't think we can resolve our long-standing differences. I would hope that I would be proven wrong.

Birand: Could you have reached agreement with the Averof government?

Turkmen: I could not say whether agreement would have been possible with another government. We did have some experience with them. At least there was a process of negotiation, a dialogue. I can't say that solutions were forthcoming, but something had been started. And that is a factor which helps soften relations. Nowadays we have no dialogue whatsoever.

What Have You Been Able to Do with regard to the American Problem?

Birand: I would imagine that, during your ministry, the one issue that demanded more of your time than any other was the Armenian problem and, related to this, the Turco-French relations. These relations have become increasingly hostile. Will it go on like this? Shouldn't somebody put an end to it?

Turkmen: It should be admitted that there is an element of hostility in the attitude of the French government vis-à-vis Turkey. Armenian propaganda, Armenian terrorism is largely responsible for this. As long as Paris maintains this attitude, it is inconceivable that our relations should revert back to normal. In light of France's attitude there remains no further step for Turkey to take. France's attitude is not logical. They behave as if they do not particularly care whether their relations with Turkey improve or not. For reasons of domestic politics they cannot take a stand against Armenian propaganda or campaign. They express reactions from time to time and that is only when their own people are hurt. Furthermore, the socialist government has automatical prior judgements, unfortunately. When all those factors are combined the unfortunate result is that Turco-French relations have sunk to an all-time low, to a level never seen in any period of our history.

Birand: Does Greece support Armenian terrorism?

Turkmen: I don't know, but the number of Armenian declarations made in Athens has risen. Moreover, we receive news from time to time that Armenians have established branches in Southern Cyprus.

Birand: In Turkey, there have always been claims that effective measures will be taken against Armenian terrorism. After all your experience, will you be able to tell me this: What can Turkey do against Armenian terrorism?

Turkmen: We have been successful to some extent. We have established international cooperation. Armenians cannot move about freely like they used to do. Many of them are in prison, many are awaiting trial. Security measures have been increased.

Birand: Yet it doesn't stop. It seems that this is not sufficient.

Turkmen: It doesn't stop. However, I am not one of those who stand on the opposite end maintaining that terrorism will stop if the historical issue is brought out into the open. The historical clarification campaign has some value in so far as it increases the reaction against terrorism, but that is all.

Birand: Increasingly, many circles, whether inside or friends of Turkey outside, maintain that it is time Ankara changed its approach to the Armenian problem. What do you say?

Turkmen: I say it is not necessary at all. We spent a good deal of time on this. It was our former secretary-general Kamran Gurun who organized and speeded up the activities which were to shed light on history thus countering the Armenian propaganda. I do not favor dialogue with the Armenians in any shape or form. History is accessible. Historical documents are accessible. These can be examined and a conclusion can be reached. We have not engaged in any negotiation to try and resolve a point of historical discussion, nor is it right that we should do so.

Birand: What harm can there be?

Turkmen: It would come to mean that we agree to a determination of responsibility in such a fashion. No historical evaluation can be hundred percent correct. Historical evaluations are to some degree subjective. Even historical events are open to discussion.

Birand: You do not share the opinion of those who maintain that through the establishment of an unofficial dialogue with the Armenians coupled with the initiation of a jointly conducted scientific research project, moderate Armenians might come to oppose terrorism and that terrorism, though it may not stop entirely, might slow down as a result ...

Turkmen: I do not expect moderate Armenians opposing anything in any way.

Birand: Does Turkey possess concrete data about who really are behind the Armenian terrorism?

Turkmen: It is never entirely clear how international terrorism gets its support. That is because it is the secret services that are involved not governments. Therefore, it is not easy to point the finger at a government. In the case of Armenian terrorism, simple provocation by certain states would not be sufficient. There is an activity which has been initiated, quite autonomously, by Armenians in Lebanon and in America. I don't see why we should insist on linking these activities to one or another state. We can only guess.

Birand: What is the role of the Armenians in America?

Turkmen: Monetary support comes from there.

Birand: Israel has an ambiguous attitude in this respect. Didn't they enter the Armenian nests during the invasion of Lebanon? Have they passed on any information to us?

Turkmen: The Israelis have not passed on any information concerning the Armenians. The Armenian quarter in Beirut is under the control of the Phalangists (those who cooperate with the Israelis). They have given us some information about Turkish terrorists there.

Birand: What should be the foreign policy priorities of the incoming government?

Turkmen: In my opinion it should give prime consideration to relations with America. The reinforcement of relations with America should receive attention. Apart from that, relations with Federal Germany is of utmost priority. We have managed to establish quite a good dialogue with Germany lately. It is imperative that this should continue. Relations with Arab countries should be given priority. It is also necessary to maintain the current careful policy vis-à-vis the socialist governments. In bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, I believe in the value of stability and in giving emphasis to good neighborly relations.

Birand: What do you mean by closer relations with America? Should we be accepting more obligations?

Turkmen: No. It cannot be said that we are in consensus with America over Middle East policy. Our policy vis-à-vis the Arab countries requires that we do not follow America's trail. However, it is necessary that we develop our relations with America within NATO, and in the area of economic relations e.g. trade, investment, banking and so on.

Birand: What do you intend to do now?

Turkmen: I will be taking a rest, since I shall soon be working in Geneva. We don't want to upset the new minister do we! But, I need to slow down a bit for a while.

Birand: Are you glad that you have been minister?

Turkmen: Very much so.

Birand: Have you enjoyed it?

Turkmen: I enjoyed it.

Birand: Haven't you felt any unease?

Turkmen: Of course I did. Don't forget, everytime one talks to a journalist it is like an examination. And I say this in all sincerity, the most difficult aspect of this ministry is relations with the press. That is because it is very easy to say something wrong. It takes more time to correct it later on.

Birand: Is this your advice to the incoming minister?

Turkmen: I wouldn't be so presumptuous as to hand down advice to the new minister, particularly as he will be my boss.

Birand: Thank you and congratulations for your successful tenure as minister.

12466
CSO: 3554/94

REACTION OF EEC OFFICIALS TO 'PRAGMATIC' OZAL

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Dec 83 p 11

[Text] "Hon. Ozal is an extremely realistic statesman. We will be very happy to negotiate the EEC dossier with him" ... "His most important quality is pragmatism."

These words are on the lips of the high-ranking bureaucrats of the EEC Commission. Not long ago, actually last year, the same bureaucrats would have regarded Ozal as something of a question mark. For instance, there would have been those who talked of Ozal's 'Islamism'. The number of those who thought Ozal would tear Turkey away from the EEC and shift its orientation towards the Middle East was far from negligible.

However, when we paid a call to the EEC Commission in Brussels last week, we observed that Ozal's 'image' and the feelings toward him had been totally transformed. Everyone was praising Ozal. It was as if the whole EEC Commission had suddenly turned 'Ozalist'.

Ozal's remarks in previous years - critical of the EEC, implying that for Turkey the EEC was expendable as a market - had all been forgotten. When we reminded Ozal's anti-EEC remarks, a high-ranking EEC official told us the following: "Yes, we remember those statements. However, in private conversations he was also assuring us that an orientation towards the Middle Eastern market does not necessarily mean abandoning the EEC market altogether."

The EEC Commission would like to negotiate the Turkish dossier with Ozal. At the very least, they believe that the road to negotiations should be opened. The statements (issued to CUMHURIYET) by Pierre Duchateau, Commission's director responsible for relations with the non-EEC European countries, reflects such an attitude. However, there are those who believe that Wilhelm Hafferkamp, the EEC Vice-President in charge of external relations, does not hold similar views and that he subscribes to a 'harder' line. This is attributed to his being open to the influence of the unions in view of his appointment to the vice-presidency from the contingent of the German Social Democrats.

The EEC has officially linked the normalisation of its relations with Turkey (which has been pretty 'cool' during the last three years) to certain conditions. Specifically, there is an anticipation of a 'betterment' in the state of human rights. The declaration of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC), immediately after the elections, appears to be the major obstacle to the normalisation process. It can even be argued that expectations concerning the Cyprus issue have superseded the human rights issue in this regard.

'The connection between the Cyprus issue and Turkey's relations with the EEC' has been explained to us by a high-ranking diplomat of an important EEC country as follows: "Greece is a full member of the Community nowadays. Therefore, it has a voice in decisions concerning Community's relations with Turkey. In order to open the Turkish dossier and move toward normalisation, Greece's approval is needed in the political wing of the EEC. However, Greece is angry with Turkey over the declaration of independence in Cyprus. Therefore, the Turkish side should be giving some concessions in Cyprus thus softening Greece's reaction."

This view is reiterated in Western capitals quite often in recent days. In a string of capitals from Washington to Bonn, from London to the EEC Commission, almost acting in unison, there is a demand that Turkey should make sure territorial concessions are given in Cyprus. The proposals package announced immediately after the declaration of independence by Rauf Denktas, the president of the TRNC, is regarded as being not 'sufficiently' clear and 'inadequate'.

The conclusion: When Ozal opens the EEC dossier the first thing he will encounter will be the Cyprus problem.

However, while persuasive exchanges concerning territorial concessions in Cyprus are going on and human rights are an ever-present concern, the EEC has its own reasons why it should want to sit with Turkey at the negotiation table, as soon as possible. First, there is the free circulation of Turkish workers. The second is the demand that Turkey's export of cotton fibres and textiles (which has been 'wreaking havoc' in the Community market) be tied to certain limits. A reason which may well be as important as the foregoing is that, despite everything, the Community is reluctant to exclude Turkey; that it cannot forego the Turkish market.

In conclusion, the future course of Turkey-EEC relations (which has become something of a puzzle due to political, cultural and a sequence of other factors) will gain clarity as the Ozal government determines its EEC policy and starts discussions with the Community.

12466
CSO: 3554/102

DOMESTICALLY MADE EARLY WARNING RADAR AIDS AIR SURVEILLANCE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 1 Dec 83 p 10

[Article: "New Flight Control Systems at Three Airports"]

[Text] The surveillance of Finnish airspace will be made more efficient with flight control systems purchased from England in addition to an early warning radar network being developed in Finland. The airports at Kauhava, Kuopio, and Tampere will receive the new equipment after a couple years.

The transaction concerning the Watchman-radar is valued at approximately 40 million markkaa. Reciprocal purchases from Finland have also been discussed in this same connection, Vinka aircraft and cooperation in the area of radar, among other things, being the subject of discussion.

The English multinational large electronics firm Plessey, which specializes in the manufacture of radar, among other things, is selling Finland three flight control systems, whose range is approximately 200 kilometers. In addition, Finland has apparently put in an order for an additional procurement of four similar systems.

Plessey has also developed a close-range radar with a range of approximately 80 kilometers, which is suited for the surveillance of cruise missiles, among other things. A weapons system which will automatically shoot down a target flying at a low altitude can be attached to the close-range radar.

An attempt has been made to fund the flight control systems being procured from England by reciprocal purchases in the manner of the Hawk jet aircraft.

Jobs for Valmet and Nokia

As far as is known the Finns have established as one of their goals the stimulation of the declining aircraft industry in Kuorevesi by means of Vinka transactions. The initiation of cooperation between Nokia and Plessey has been considered as another possibility. Nokia would receive know-how from the English in the repair of radar during times of crisis as well as subcontracts from Plessey's international contracts.

The Difficult Vinka

For years already the Finns have attempted to market abroad the Vinka, which is designed as a basic training aircraft for the Finnish Air Force. The urgency is great since operations at Valmet's Kuorevesi Plant are once again threatening to dry up with respect to the manufacture of new equipment.

It has been said that the Vinka was already obsolete when it was first developed. Similar and less expensive aircraft are plentiful on the world's aircraft markets.

Businessman Matti Huhanantti, who has been negotiating with Valmet for the export of Vinka aircraft to Egypt for a long time already, has been operating in the background in London for the purpose of promoting reciprocal purchases. Huhanantti has announced that he has acquired for himself the position of sole representative of Plessey in Finland. So far the negotiations in Egypt have not produced any results.

Huhanantti has specialized in the conduct of trade in the Near East where he has numerous contacts. Valmet has adopted a cautious attitude toward him since no concrete results have been achieved from his transactions in spite of several attempts.

Huhanantti has been in close cooperation with former minister Olavi J. Mattila.

10576

CSO: 3617/56

ARMY TO PURCHASE SISU ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 Dec 82 p 9

[Article: "Armored Personnel Carriers for Peacekeeping Forces Also"]

[Text] The Army's purchase of armored personnel carriers was given the final blessing in the government on Wednesday. The Defense Ministry was given the authority to order a total of 50 armored personnel carriers for the defense forces from the state owned Sisu-Auto Company. The vehicles will be delivered in 1984--1986.

The foundation for the procurement was laid 2 years ago already when prototypes were ordered from Sisu as well as Valmet. Sisu's vehicle is based on its off-the-road truck and Valmet's prototype is based on its forest tractor. Both alternatives were tested for about a year.

The armored personnel carriers will be used for transporting anti-tank troops, among others. They will also be supplied to Finnish peacekeeping troops if parliament approves the appropriations for such a procurement in this year's second supplementary budget. The plan is to order nine armored personnel carriers for the peacekeeping troops, of which six will be paid for by the UN.

The Vammaskoski Plant, which built the armored body of the prototypes, has participated in the developmental work of the armored personnel carriers. The State Council assumes that Sisu-Auto will contract for subcontracts from the plant corresponding at least to the value of the armored body. In this way an attempt will be made to improve the poor employment situation at the plant.

The value of the transaction will be approximately 40--50 million markkaa. The funds for this procurement will come from the authorization for such an order contained in the 1982 budget, which is related to the improvement of transport equipment for the Army and also to the generation of jobs in domestic industries.



The Sisu armored personnel carrier weighs 12,500 kilos and it can accommodate 16 men in addition to the driver and the commander.
Its speed is more than 100 kilometers per hour.

10576

CSO: 3617/59

BRIEFS

HAWKS FOR LAPLAND UNIT--At the start of the new year, the Lapland Wing will give up its Fouga Magister planes and as of next year, the air force will only fly Draken and Hawk planes in the north. There are now a total of 30 of the latest jet fighter planes in the air force, and the latest plane in the series was completed at the Valmet plant in Kuroevesi before the end of the year. The Hawk planes are stationed in the Lapland Wing in Rovaniemi. They have been the main stock at the Satakunta Wing in Pori for a year already and the Hawk planes at the Karjala Wing in Kuopio have training readiness. [Text] [Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1700 GMT 28 Dec 83 LD]

CSO: 3617/68

CHANGES ENVISAGED IN ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 10 Dec 83 p 2

/Text/ According to all information and indications, the government intends to make changes in the armed forces leadership shortly. According to reliable information, the KYSEA /Government Council for National Defense/ that is scheduled to convene shortly under the chairmanship of Mr Papandreou will probably decide on the following changes:

- The retirement of Admiral Degiannis, chief of the GEETHA /National Defense General Staff/, and his replacement by Air Force Lt Gen Nik. Kouris, currently chief of the GEA /Air Force General Staff/. The latter is in the 22nd class on the promotion roster and would be promoted to full general.
- The retirement of Lieutenant General Panagoulis, chief of the CES /Army General Staff/, and his replacement by Lt Gen Vas. Kourfakas, currently commander of the 1st Army. Taking over as commander of the 1st Army would be Lt Gen Anast. Soundias, currently commander of the 3rd Army.
- Air Force Lt Gen Giannis Khatziris, in the 26th class on the promotion roster, commander of the Tactical Air Force, known for his experience, character and high standards, is said to be the new chief of the GEA.
- Air Force Lt Gen Giannis Dimakogiannis, deputy chief of the GEETHA in the 26th class on the promotion roster, who has served in the air force for 30 years, is /also/ said to be among those to be selected as the next chief of the GEA.
- Air Force Maj Gen An. Karadimas, commander of the DAE /Air Force Training Command/, in the 26th class on the promotion roster, is said to be retiring.
- Air Force Maj Gen Giannis Marinakis, deputy chief of the GEA, is reportedly being considered promoted to lieutenant general and become head of the National Defense School.
- Air Force Maj Gen Dim. Apostolakis, at the head of the 28th class on the promotion roster, commander of the Air Force Materiel Command. Even though his name has also come up with regard to the GEA leadership, there is information that he will become chief of the TAD /Tactical Air Force/.

- Air Force Maj Gen Sot. Kondogiannis, second in the 28th class on the promotion roster, head of the GEETHA Operations Branch. An unquestionably worthy officer, he proved himself worthy in his long career. He is said to be retiring.
- Air Force Maj Gen V. Tsaousis, third in the 28th class on the promotion roster, commander of the ATAD /expansion unknown/. His experience in training makes him the most suitable for the position of head of the DAE.
- Air Force Maj Gen Khar. Angelopoulos, in the 28th class on the promotion roster, air force inspector general. He is said to be retiring.
- Brig Gen Io. Gavriilidis, head of the SPA /Intelligence and Security Council/, is said to be retiring.
- Brig Gen N. Stappas, in the 29th class on the promotion roster, head of the GEA Operations Branch. He is reportedly to be promoted to air force major general and become GEA deputy chief.
- Brig Gen Sp. Zezas, in the 28th class on the promotion roster, served on the GEETHA. He is said to be retiring.
- Brig Gen Ilias Tzamouranis, in the 29th class on the promotion roster, head of the GEA Personnel Branch. If he is promoted to air force major general his most likely position will be air force inspector general.
- Brig Gen Kon. Papakyriakos, in the 29th class on the promotion roster, DAE staff officer. A graduate of the Greek University and the holder of a master's degree from American University. It is reported that he will be promoted to air force major general.
- Brig Gen Al. Mamanis, in the 29th class on the promotion roster, head of the ATAD Defense Operations Branch. He is reportedly to be promoted to air force major general for the position of GEETHA Air Force as published/.
- Brig Gen And. Anastasiou, in the 29th class on the promotion roster, commander of the 142nd PAE /expansion unknown/. He is reportedly to be promoted for the position of ATAD staff officer.
- Brig Gen Takis Papageorgiou, in the 29th class on the promotion roster, serves at Tatoi Airport.
- Brig Gen Nik. Makaroundis, in the 29th class on the promotion roster, deputy commander of the Crete Firing Range. He is said to be retiring.
- Brig Gen Al. Zarafonitis, commander of the 111th PM /expansion unknown/. He is said to be retiring.
- Brig Gen Leonidas Salonitis, commander of the GEA Air Defense Command. He is said to be retiring.

- Brig Gen N. Papadopoulos, at the head of the 30th class on the promotion roster, commander of the GEA Maintenance Branch. He is remaining in his position.
- Brig Gen Ilias Psomas, in the 30th class on the promotion roster, head of the ATAD Operations Branch. He is being promoted to the GEA Operations Command.
- Brig Gen Georgios Kakaris, in the 30th class on the promotion roster, serves on the GEETHA. He is said to be retiring.
- Brig Gen Georgios Kaklis, in the 30th class on the promotion roster, serves in the NATA command in Naples. He is remaining in his position.
- Brig Gen Georgios Mavrakis, in the 30th class on the promotion roster, head of the Pilots School. He is remaining in his position.

5671

CSO: 3521/132

MEETING HELD FOR DEMOCRATIZATION OF ARMED FORCES

Athens TA NEA in Greek 12 Nov 83 p 5

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Constitutional protection of the right of soldiers to refuse in case of an unconstitutional order, participation in political life and activity, representation of the soldiers on the councils or courts-martial, Council of Deputies control over the military mechanism.

These elements are considered essential for the genuine democratization of the army, and they were noted 11 November 1983 in the Polytechnic auditorium in a discussion on the subject: "Polytechnic--Democracy--Armed Forces."

The following participated in the expression of ideas, which was organized by KEED (Movement for the Democratization of the Armed Forces): EMP [Greek Metsovion Polytechnic School] Professor /M. Nikolinakos/; KEED president, retired Brig Gen /S. Sermakezis/; dismissed major, Vice President of the KEED Central Committee /K. Seirinidis/; and psychiatrist-municipal council member /Th. Karakatsanis/.

The speakers held in common the view that the organization of the military mechanism is antidemocratic by definition and, as Mr Nikolinakis specifically stressed, "as a result unnoticed it threatens democracy the moment it is appointed democracy's protector."

The speaker next reminded the audience of "Allende's error and the historical moment in his country when its undemocratic army helped the edifice of change to collapse."

The speakers asked: "Does the political will of the government suffice to make the army democratic? Has there been a purge in the army? Is democracy being supported by words or by actions?"

How will we ever forget that dramatic period which split our youth into two camps during the Polytechnic demonstrations, the progressive youth on one side and the youth attacking with weapons on the other? The flesh on both sides belongs to our people's flesh.

The representatives of the Movement for the Democratization of the Armed Forces ended by saying that it is necessary to restructure the mechanism of the army in order to allow those doing military service to retain their social consciences. Only thus will the alarming phenomenon of suicides in the army cease and the democracy of Greece be truly protected.

11587

CSO: 3521/106

NEW SUBMARINE COMMISSION REPORT INCREASES INDIGNATION

Palme Government Responding Ambiguously

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Soviet Answer"]

[Text] In just five sentences the submarine defense commission dismissed the possibility of using diplomatic means and protests to deal with the submarine intrusions. Through these same five sentences, the commission also rejected the very foundation on which this country's prime minister has built his security policy. The commission even described its conclusions in this respect as "simple and unavoidable." Only military measures could protect us from additional intrusions, according to the commission.

Olof Palme must see the report from the submarine defense commission as a slap in the face--partly because of the manner in which it is written, but primarily because of the reality the report revealed.

The Palme commission, which completed its work in the spring of 1982 and whose recommendations Olof Palme gradually began to convert into official Swedish policy with his notorious "corridor speech," had introduced joint security" as an alternative to mutual deterrence. The arms buildup was to be limited step by step through negotiations and forums for dealing with international conflicts were to be expanded and strengthened.

For Olof Palme, especially, one important ingredient in this concept of joint security always has been increasing confidence between the two superpowers. To paraphrase Palme somewhat loosely, an ever-rising spiral of steadily increasing mistrust would be changed into a downward spiral of reduced mistrust and increasing confidence.

This concept contains not even a clue as to how relations between the superpowers should be developed. But it does contain the implicit assumption that both superpowers are reliable and that the fundamental prerequisites for confidence are present.

With its submarine intrusions, the Soviet Union is undermining the basic principles of the Palme commission and, thus, of Palme's security policy. The

Soviet Union has denied the obvious intrusions and continues with new violations, despite assurances that this will not occur.

The Soviet Union has shown emphatically that no one, not even the most prominent disciple of confidence on the international scene, can depend on the Soviet Union.

As indicated by interviews with Olof Palme, as well as by contacts between Anders Ferm and Georgij Arbatov as revealed by SVENSKA DAGBLADET last Monday, Olof Palme and his government have not yet given up. Considerable efforts have been made to influence the Soviet Union. Olof Palme has not reconsidered his basic view of security policy. But if the submarine intrusions continue, then eventually Palme must abandon his belief that international security can be based on the concept of joint security. The assumption that he outlined himself, namely that a state of mutual trust could replace mutual deterrence, is now disappearing.

Confusion will be an inherent part of Olof Palme's policy as the foundation for this policy gradually erodes. Most significantly, this policy will appear incomprehensible to others, in the light of submarine intrusions which constantly contradict this policy and its possibilities.

Matters will become even worse, of course, when this policy is interpreted by Lennart Bodstrom and Maj Britt Theorin--individuals who lack Olof Palme's relatively stable foundation of insight and knowledge of international politics. At that time, even more confusion will be spread by a policy that is confusing enough to begin with.

Unavoidably, critical examination of this security policy will result in anger. When the lack of talent surrounding Palme is revealed, any confidence in his policy that still remains will be damaged and will erode more rapidly than otherwise would have been the case.

Basically, however, examination and criticism of this policy will lead to anger because bitter reality is already picking this policy apart. The messenger who brings this news to the attention of the general public will not become a favorite of the prime minister.

Party Leaders: 'Proof' Incomplete

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The government and the opposition have reached agreement on dealing with the submarine report. This was indicated on Tuesday morning when Prime Minister Olof Palme and Commander in Chief Lennart Ljung briefed the party leaders on the contents of the new report.

The talks lasted about 1 hour and, in response to repeated questions, the commander in chief answered that, based on the available material, he could

not point to any particular nation as being responsible for the submarine intrusions.

The party leaders were briefed in advance on the statement later made by Defense Minister Anders Thunborg.

The party leaders believed that this statement was a sufficient measure in the current situation.

According to STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN, Conservative Party leader Ulf Adelsohn indicated on Tuesday that the submarines intruding in Swedish territorial waters were Soviet vessels.

Proof Required

Adelsohn is reported to have said that Olof Palme and Thorbjorn Falldin required 100-percent proof, while he chose to use his imagination.

Even on his way to the talks with the government, however, Adelsohn claimed he had been misquoted.

After the talks, Falldin told DAGENS NYHETER that there was no room for imagination in security policy.

Prime Minister Olof Palme told DAGENS NYHETER after the negotiations that, for his part, he had the impression that there was agreement in parliament over how to deal with the new submarine report.

Latest Traces in Stockholm Archipelago

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Dec 83 p 6

[Article: "Three Sites near Stockholm"]

[Text] Traces of foreign minisubs photographed by the navy are from the vicinity of Sandhamn in the outer Stockholm Archipelago. Sources within the military staffs told this to TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA.

There also are troops in the broad waterway west of Sandhamn whose task it is to protect the waterways to Stockholm with mines.

An internal military report also said that submarine intrusions in the Stockholm Archipelago had occurred in three regions: Norrtalje, Sandhamn, and Dalarna-Nynashamn.

Sources told TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA that the foreign submarines had penetrated far into the Stockholm Archipelago.

Defense Minister Pledges Renewed Effort

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The political signal to the rest of the world is that Sweden will continue to hunt submarines until we have become masters in our own house. This was stated by Defense Minister Anders Thunborg when the new submarine report was presented.

No diplomatic protest will be made, since the nationality of the submarines could not be determined with sufficient certainty.

One submarine went aground near Karlskrona and the investigation by the submarine commission revealed a set of circumstantial evidence indicating that the intruding submarines were soviet vessels.

The new report on this fall's intrusions did not contain sufficient evidence to determine which nation was responsible for the intrusions, Thunborg stressed.

"The statement sends a clear signal that Sweden intends to safeguard its neutrality. Our policy of neutrality requires that foreign countries respect it and that we must be masters in our own house. For this reason, we will never accept or become accustomed to continued submarine incursions."

"We also are increasing our antisub capabilities as much as possible in order to become masters in our own house," Thunborg continued.

"This is our main political thrust and it has to do with our policy of neutrality. We will continue to work arduously until we can state with certainty that no submarines are intruding into our waters."

Party Leaders Know

Thunborg gave the following response when asked if another submarine commission might be appointed at a later date to examine the commander in chief's reports:

"Not at present, but we will see later on."

"We are keeping the party leaders informed continually. A special parliamentary committee is working with the next defense budget and parliament may take up the matter in the future."

Thunborg stressed in his statement that, according to the commander in chief, there had been at least three clear cases of submarine intrusions last fall.

Extremely Serious

The report also made several other observations. It did not rule out the possibility that Swedish waters could again be violated in the future.

The government takes an extremely serious view of this new report on submarine incursions, according to Thunborg. "It is our duty and our resolute intention to maintain our territorial integrity with all available means."

The statement continues:

"We cannot tolerate violations of our territory. We must never 'become accustomed' to violations of Swedish territory by foreign submarines."

"The purpose of our neutrality is to keep Sweden out of future wars. This means that the rest of the world must be totally convinced that, even in times of peace, Sweden has both the will and the capacity to defend its territory."

"At the same time, however, we must realize that antisub measures are extremely difficult and that it takes time to build up the technical resources and the expertise that are required," Thunborg's statement concluded.

Liberal Paper Backs Moderation

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial by Olof Santesson: "Constant Incursions"]

[Text] Our goal still is to be masters in our own house! Defense Minister Anders Thunborg repeated this again and again when last fall's second submarine report from the commander in chief was made public. Thus, the goal has not yet been reached, even though both military and political measures have been taken--the most sensational of which was the note to the Soviet Union last spring. At least three clear cases of submarine intrusions have been noted since August.

As in September, the commander in chief maintained that the nationality of the intruding submarines could not be determined. Last time he was criticized for this by several Conservatives, who obviously wanted him to say that the submarines involved were Soviet vessels. But, of course, the caution of the commander in chief is highly justified. Since Horsfjarden, the Swedish military has been unable to gather equally convincing evidence.

According to the commander in chief, 47 cases last summer and 16 cases last fall could be explained only by the assumption that foreign submarines had been present. Those who previously doubted the discovery of caterpillar tracks on the seabed by the military must now reconsider their position, after the commander in chief announced that "extensive, new, and easily recognizable" tracks of this type had been found.

It is a positive sign, of course, that the commander in chief believes it is possible that the lower number of reported sightings in the late fall "could mean that the number of intrusions actually has declined." This line of reasoning certainly cannot be accused of being alarmist.

The main problem faced by the military still is the difficulty of guarding our coasts more effectively. But since the head of the navy now claims to be satisfied with testing (finally!) of the new, slightly overly hyped weapons for this purpose, we may now perhaps hope that Sweden's antisub capabilities finally have begun to increase. Of course, the goal is to keep them away, not sink them!

There is no reason to exaggerate the submarine problem--it is serious enough as it is. Nevertheless, some Conservatives and others have criticized Sweden's low diplomatic profile and failure to protest continued submarine incursions at international forums. This criticism is justified. Both Prime Minister Palme and Foreign Minister Bodstrom should deal with this problem in their major speeches.

One particular problem is that the military kept such a low profile this fall. Many people must have been surprised by the news that the incursions had continued! There must be a more reasonable balance in which we could be given information on what actually has occurred without creating a sensation.

Conservative Paper Urges Tougher Stand

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 21 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Soviets' Price"]

[Text] Despite the sharp protest following the submarine defense commission's report, the Soviet Union apparently is continuing to violate systematically our waters, with a clear and distinct tendency to observe our military facilities and exercises. This shows that Swedish policy has failed. Neither foreign policy nor defense policy measures have successfully stopped these violations.

If we are to maintain credibility for our alliance-free policies in times of peace for the purpose of maintaining neutrality in times of war, then these continued violations must affect our policies.

If everything remains the same, it will send a clear signal to both East and West.

At yesterday's press conference, the defense minister stressed the importance of our military defense as a direct means of defending against violations and as an indirect means of sending a signal indicating that these violations will not be tolerated.

The problem, however, is that the defense policy signals are not as clear as the defense minister would like for them to be. Compared to the 1982 defense plan (which, in reality, was a disarmament plan), the military has lost on the order of 7.5 billion kronor for the 5-year period!

In the timetable submitted by the commander in chief to the government at the end of last month, he described the effects of the present defense policy as follows: "The resources presently allocated by the government for the armed forces will mean that the process of erosion described previously in a preliminary manner will be greatly accelerated."

In the preliminary timetable presented at the end of September the commander in chief stated that "the changes we are compelled to make may be of such magnitude and such rapidity that they will have serious consequences for the credibility of our defense both at home and abroad."

The foreign policy signals, which the prime minister said last spring were more important than the defense policy signals, are difficult to make out. Swedish policies continue to be inspired by the Palme commission. Despite the continuing violations, these policies are characterized by the belief that joint security is the way to reach the Kremlin's heart.

It is reasonable to ask what foreign policy signals have been sent following the violations. When asked that yesterday, government representative Anders Thunborg answered by listing only military signals. The answer to the question about foreign policy signals would have to be that there have been none as a result of the violations that occurred last summer and fall!

But why would the Soviet Union halt its systematic violation of Swedish territorial waters when both the military and foreign policy signals now being sent speak the language they now speak? Why would the Soviet Union interpret accelerated disarmament as a strong response to accelerated violations? Why would the Soviet Union interpret compliance with the Bahr note and discussions about a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries as a strong foreign policy signal?

Of course, the Soviet Union has carefully considered the arguments for and against continued violations. The decision to continue them has been made, taking into account the military and political price involved in these violations. In the considerations preceding the decision to continue the incursions, general statements made by Swedish representatives have had very little significance. These considerations will be affected only if the political and military price becomes too high.

We can increase the political price by making the Soviet Union bear the burden for the violations. This may be accomplished by holding a free and open debate in this country about the Soviet Union--a debate that would be heard not only by our own citizens, but also by people in other countries.

We can increase the military price by beefing up our submarine defenses and our military in general.

Our defense policy and our domestic debate may be based on the knowledge that it is the Soviet Union that is violating our waters. We need no formal evidence to convince ourselves of this fact. Then we may wait until formal evidence is available before making formal protests to the Soviet ambassador. We can rest assured that it is not protests that are of primary importance. We know that, in order for these violations to cease, the Soviet Union must pay the price for continuing systematic violation of Swedish territorial waters.

It is time to demand that price.

9336

CSO: 3650/89

PAPER REPORTS SOVIET ARTICLE: SOLDIERS TAUGHT 'ANTISOVIETISM'

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Jan 84 p 42

[Article by Per Luthander, DAGENS NYHETER Moscow correspondent: "Moscow Paper Says Swedish Soldiers Learn Antisovietism"]

[Text] Swedish soldiers are educated in antisovietism in a country which never misses an opportunity to remind of its neutrality. At the same time Sweden is delivering detailed maps to the United States, necessary for the navigation systems of cruise missiles. These claims were made by two writers in Wednesday's issue of the Soviet Youth newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

The article deals with the training at the Swedish Army's Interpreter School at Uppsala, and is illustrated with a bloothirsty picture of an examination taken from the West German weekly STERN.

The article, written by D. Kiseljov and S. Maslov, has the title "Russian Lessons in the Swedish Manner, or Something About Neutrality and Generals."

The article says that the instructors at the interpreter school first train their students in the Russian language, and later go to lessons in boxing ears, followed by new language lessons, etc.

"Is that a new way of knocking in language ability?" is the ironic question, followed by the answer, "No, in the interpreter school they are training specialists in interrogation. They are learning how to speak Russian--with the enemy. Or more correctly, with so-called potential opponents," said the article.

Sadists in the Army

In fact there are many professional sadists who speak Russian in the Swedish Army, according to the article. The drills which are held resemble torture, they say, and they quote the soldiers who spoke to EXPRESSEN.

They also cite a named Swedish diver who told VARNPLIKTSNYTT how he was attacked in his sleep and dragged to a fearful inquest.

It was not a dream, but a nightmare, said KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and emphasized that this case deserved extra attention.

It began in a spirit of cheap and fantastic stories about "Soviet submarines" which the Swedish nonsocialist press untiringly pursued in the muddy waters of antisovietism, it said.

A visit to the Swedish interpreter school can be compared with a military inquisition, which is also to educate them who still do not believe in the "Soviet threat," according to the newspaper article.

But remember that this takes place in a country which constantly states its neutrality and which always is treated with respect by the Soviet Union.

Therefore, according to the paper, one must draw the surprising conclusion: "Does Swedish neutrality really exist?"

They refer to the American Minister of Defense Caspar Weinberger's controversial statement in 1981 that he does not consider Sweden to be neutral and that the United States is interested in a strong Swedish defense.

At that time the United States did not apologize, and that can also be connected with the actions of certain Swedish military circles, said the newspaper, and it pointed among other things to systematic Swedish contacts with the American military.

Let us examine the facts, they say, and say that it is not a secret that Swedish officers study and take examinations in the United States, that NATO officers wear Swedish uniforms and inspect military units on Swedish territory and are present when new techniques are tested.

The transportation of NATO weapons has been permitted through Swedish territory, they say, and the biggest maneuvers of the Swedish Army coincide remarkably both in time and tasks with the NATO exercises in Northern Europe.

"An agreement of exchange of military information has been arranged with the United States. The detailed maps of Sweden which are necessary for cruise missile navigation systems are sent across the Atlantic," claimed KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

They also say that soldiers in the Arvidsjaur are forced to sing American marching songs with words like "we will kill, destroy, execute communists, Russians, Vietnamese..."

9287
CSO: 3650/92

PAPER ATTACKS SDP FOR WANTING TO CONTINUE PARING FORCES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Defense in Time"]

[Text] The recent history of Swedish defense policy is a history of ongoing disarmament. This is obvious in the navy and the air force. The destroyers are gone, no frigates have come to replace them. The air force has been halved, and is in the process of being halved again. Just as serious, but less striking, is the weakening of the army. The number of brigades, the most qualified wartime units, has been drastically reduced, the equipment is significantly obsolete, and vacancies among the officer ranks are a matter of concern.

Last year's defense bill was a decision for disarmament. As is known, it is already clear that the resources appropriated are not sufficient to reach even the risky low level which was established then. They are not even enough to fulfill the even more modest requirements which have already been established this year by the downward adjustment of the 1982 decision.

That is a part, and a vital part, of the message which Sweden is sending abroad. To an outside world which obviously--with the studied arrogance of submarine violations speaking in a clear and frightening language--is all the more marked by tension and threat. Stating this is not to conjure up a picture of the devil, only to see the truth as it is and call things by their right names.

The defense minister explained the other day--somewhat surprisingly--in connection with the Russian submarine violations, that our "aim" is that we should be masters in our own house. If we are not, everyone must ask himself why. Clearly we are not, according to those who should know better than most.

It is obvious that this self-determined purpose requires a considerable strengthening of antisubmarine resources. The powers in Moscow are apparently very little price-conscious when it comes to the so-called political

price. Demonstrations have not brought the Russian troops out of Afghanistan. Diplomatic protests and confidential conversations have not removed the Soviet submarines from our archipelago. Nothing else seems to remain than to force them to pay a military price--which demands more expenditures than are now being made.

It would, however, be hazardous to hastily devote all attention just to the antisubmarine problem. In many quarters--all too many quarters--it is popular to "reprioritize" the defense structure to the advantage of just this function. This misses the point.

It is not just the weakness in antisubmarine forces which provokes the submarine violations. It is the planned weakening of our total military defense. To finance a modest strengthening of our antisubmarine forces by eliminating fighter squadrons or postponing important weapon purchases for the army is nothing more than a new attempt to eat the cake and still have it, a budget and dietary trick which never works.

The politicians--none named, none forgotten--who riskily ponder about "solving" the economic problems of defense by continued reduction of the goals and trimming of resources should remember that there is an entire world outside of Rosenbad, Helgelandsholmen and parliamentary reports.

In the light of what is happening in the Baltic, if the Social Democrats want to continue Swedish disarmament with the help of the communists, no one can stop them so far.

It is a demand of respectability, however, that the socialist parties must conduct this life-threatening policy by themselves.

9287

CSO: 3650/92

ECONOMIC ADVISOR ON GOVERNMENT'S SUCCESSES, PROBLEMS

Brussels DE STANDAARD in Dutch 13 Dec 83 p 3

[Report on interviews with Alfons Verplaetse, economic advisor to Prime Minister Martens, by Jan Bohets: "The Balance Sheet of the Martens V Administration Is more than Adequate"; date and place not given; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] It began with a rather proletarian meeting in January 1981. Alfons Verplaetse had gone to the prime minister's office as representative of the cadres of the National Bank to plead for a private status for the personnel of public credit institutions. The meeting ended with a lengthy exchange of ideas on the economic situation which seems to have brought a common concern to the fore: the absolute necessity for economic recovery, but in the best social manner possible.

On Christmas Day 1981, he was at 16 Wetstraat. Martens had spent half a year in the political desert and upon his return he had asked the National Bank to detail Verplaetse to his administration.

At first, Verplaetse worked there in the greatest discretion. But as you know, there is little that escapes our editors. Upon a chance meeting in the prime minister's chambers, the dumbfounded reporter asked him whether he was there to work out the devaluation. Verplaetse positively rejected such a frivolous assumption.

The remainder of the story is well known. On 21 February, Belgium implemented its first real, large devaluation since 1949, not 15 percent as the International Monetary Fund had recommended, but 8.5 percent coupled with active measures in the formation of income, which few people had deemed possible. And the operation had been minutely prepared by Verplaetse, together with, among others, chief of staff Van Ypersele (whom he has succeeded since then) and Professor Theo Peeters from Mark Eyskens' staff who, a few months earlier, had reacted with indignation to the question "of whether he was playing the same role as Leon Dupriez had in 1934-1935!"

Thus, Verplaetse found himself in a strange situation, as co-architect of a devaluation which his employer, the National Bank, was implacably opposed to and which was prepared and carried out completely without the knowledge of the bank. (Prior to that, he had worked for 27 years in the research service of the National Bank, 6 years of which as Belgian expert for the committee

of governors of central banks in Basel). This does not bother him very much: "The National Bank was opposed to any devaluation -- and rightly so -- if its success was not guaranteed by action on indexation."

The income policy, which was placed on the reel together with the devaluation, is clearly Verplaetse's work. The outlines for labor distribution through a reduction of the working time without cost increases, also originated with him, which led to a somewhat lessened popularity among business leaders and employers organizations. The following statements were recorded during several interviews held in recent weeks.

No Decline

Question: After 2 years some observers, even though they hold this coalition dear, are inclined to give the Martens V administration an "unsatisfactory." Of its four major goals -- restoration of competitive power, improvement of employment, recovery of government finances and re-motivation of the population -- only the first one has become reality.

Verplaetse: I would rather formulate those goals as follows: (1) the situation of the enterprises; (2) the balance of payments; (3) employment; (4) government finances. With regard to the first two points, we have succeeded completely. Thanks to the devaluation and the index measures, the /competitive power/ of the enterprises has been restored. The share of profits in the national income has once again gone up to the level of before the crisis. In 1983, the profit improvement is more substantial than in 1982, and it will continue next year. Partly due to the share law, the enterprises will thus be able to strengthen their financial structure.

The improvement in the /balance of payments/ is remarkable. This year, the deficit in the current account will still represent 1.7 percent of the gross national product (70 billion francs), and we are coming from a 4.5 percent deficit. Our market share in exports has gone up at least 1.5 percent and at least as much on the domestic market. An incredible number of imports has been replaced by our own products. For the first time since 1966, we will once again have a surplus on our balance of goods and services, if imports and exports are calculated on the same FOB (free on board) basis. What is bad is the fact that we have to pay 65 billion francs net interest per year to foreign countries.

The /price evolution/ has been less fortunate. Traditionally, the Belgian inflation rate was below the European average; now we are slightly above it. It should have slowed down more this year, because the increase in import prices has slowed down considerably and because the labor costs only went up 4 percent as in 1982, taking into account the pushing out of 1.5 percent of the workers. But indirect taxes and government rates went up more than last year. The 8.05 percent inflation over the first 7 months of the year include 0.90 percent BTW [Value-added Tax] and rate increases. And the non-wage incomes, among others business profits, rose rather substantially.

It is to be hoped now that this improved profitability will lead to more investments and more /jobs/. In 1982 investments were at a respectable level, but they are disappointing this year with a probable real drop of 3 percent. The decline of jobs in the private sector has gone from 90,000 in 1981 to 25,000 this year. The impact on job figures is less noticeable because employment in the public sector has dropped this year by 5,000 people, whereas in 1981 15,000 had been added, and because the active population is still increasing by 20,000 individuals annually. And Martens has managed to implement a certain distribution of the available labor without affecting the competitive power.

The success of the recovery of /government finances/ is only partial: the worsening has been stopped. The drafters of the government program did not take into account the negative consequences of the required income moderation on the government finances. Hence, it is not surprising that a better result had been hoped for. Real wages are currently 7 percent lower than they would have been without the index measures. This has had an enormous impact on the government finances and on social security. Now wage income is once again rising at the same rate as the prices.

This year the overall government deficit will be 15.5 percent of the gross national product, as against 16.2 percent in 1981 and 15.8 percent in 1981 [as published]. I know that the 1984 budget has disappointed many people because the deficit remains so high, but under these circumstances we could not further tighten the deflation policy.

Intervention

Question: And yet, it has become painfully clear now that gradual recovery doesn't work, because then the additional interest burden at most is eliminated through the rising debt. Are we getting away from a more radical reduction of expenditures?

Verplaetse: It is more than clear that, following the income reductions of private individuals to the benefit of business and industry, an additional income reduction will have to be effected to the benefit of the government, in the amount of 4 percent of the gross national product or 200 billion francs. Is that possible on a single stroke? A sustained effort over a 5 or 6 year period is very difficult, but I don't believe that it would be possible in a shorter period of time.

Question: Wouldn't intervention in the debt and in the interest burden inevitably be at the expense of savers who have bought government bonds?

Verplaetse: I have great respect for Glesjer and Vuchelen (two economists who recently mentioned the possibility of converting the national debt into bonds at only 8 percent interest for example), but there are limits to the freedom of expressing one's opinion. I regret what they said about a possible consolidation of the national debt, given the psychological impact of their statement on the capital movements. Such intervention cannot be contemplated if for no other reason than that the government must be able to continue to borrow.

But it is true: government expenditures are broken down into three major items: (1) investments; (2) interest charges; and (3) government consumption and social security. The investments cannot be shrunk, but with the interest charges and expenditures for social security we are far above the European average.

Question: What is left of your proposal to increase both indirect taxes and social security contributions by 50 billion francs and to reduce social security payments by 100 billion francs? Was it swept off the table?

Verplaetse: I think that the relative order of magnitude has not changed appreciably. Our indirect taxes and social contributions are lower, and our social payments higher than the EC average. Hence, we are stuck with a completely warped social security system. I don't think that we will be able to get out of it if we don't tackle each of those three packages, with priority given to a reduction of expenditures which must substantially and selectively come from expenditures for social security. However, because of economic conditions we could not place too much of this austerity burden on 1984. It will have to come, but later on.

Question: Will the restoration of indexing once again cost us jobs?

Verplaetse: For the time being our competitive position will not be affected, even with an inflation rate next year of 6.5 percent. If we only index, then our labor costs will not get out of hand. As far as wage increases since 1970 are concerned, 60 percent of them are due to indexing and 40 percent to social programming. If we had only applied the indexing we would have remained ultra-competitive throughout that period. But we allowed wage hikes even in periods of negative economic growth and of worsening exchange rates (export prices increasing less than import prices).

Question: You are not afraid that within the foreseeable future the government will once again have to intervene in wage development?

Verplaetse: It will depend on the inflation whether by 1986 we will still be competitive. This year it cannot be said that wage income is the reason for the inflation.

Question: Hasn't the wage spread been narrowed too tightly now?

Verplaetse: You cannot maintain the system of 1982 and 1983 forever. To work with money instead of percentages has a redistributive effect, leaving aside what happens under the table, but in the medium term it affects the economic dynamics. But as of 1985, wages will once again be free. If a catching up movement occurs then, we will be in trouble.

8463

CSO: 3614/24

EKA CALLS FOR EXPANDED AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 28 Nov 83 p 10

[Text] Speaking to the Paphos EKA [Union of Cypriot Farmers] District Congress on 26 November, EKA Secretary General Khambis Mikhailidis referred to the acute and serious problem of marketing, prices and disposal of our agricultural products and proposed a series of measures to confront the situation.

Khambis Mikhailidis noted, among other things:

1. The regional programming between the ministries of agriculture and commerce for production, marketing and disposal of our products has not existed up to now.
2. A completed trade policy on our exports does not exist.
3. A completed policy to decrease the cost of production is not being implemented.

The EKA secretary general stressed: There should be a program, and a recommendation to our farmers by the two ministries on the products they will cultivate which will have the greatest demand and good prices on foreign and domestic markets.

The government should adopt the institution of establishment and operation of councils for marketing farm and livestock products which will dispose of these products domestically and abroad.

And he continued as follows: The institution of marketing councils has operated and been applied to potatoes and carrots for 20 years now, with great success for producers and our economy. Why is the same institution not being implemented for table grapes, citrus fruits, vegetables and meats? Because government policy is influenced by a small group of tradesmen and it is not adopting the unanimous opinions of thousands of agricultural families and the agricultural organizations.

It is the unanimous opinion of our present congress, it is the opinion of the whole agricultural world, that the government should adopt the policy of establishing marketing councils so the producers themselves have a say in the disposal of their products.

Referring to the trade policy applied by the Cypriot Government, the EKA secretary general maintained: This trade policy should be readjusted. It should be expanded,

it should be extended. We want to develop our trade with all the countries for mutual benefit. We want to sell our potatoes, vegetables, grapes, wines, lemons and oranges to the countries which buy them.

There are countries which buy these products of ours, countries in which difficulties occur, and countries which can buy more. In the EEC countries difficulties arise because they themselves and their partners produce the same products we do. There are the socialist countries which buy thousands of tons of wine, thousands of tons of citrus fruits, thousands of tons of grapes.

The socialist countries are able to buy far more of our agricultural products--far more wine, far more grapes, far more oranges and lemons.

The Socialist Countries

Mr. Mikhailidis called for our commerce with the socialist countries to be expanded and suggested that these countries build developmental works in Cyprus in exchange for our own agricultural products.

Touching on the cost of producing our agricultural products, the EKA secretary general said: In Cyprus we have a high production cost. We find difficulties on the domestic and foreign market. Basic contributors to the cost are water, fertilizers, machines, spare parts and agricultural medicines. As concerns fertilizers, with the government's struggles and unequivocal stand, a control has already been placed on prices. We appreciate this. But, up to now, there has been no effective control on the prices of machines, spare parts and agricultural medicines. For many years we have been calling for control. A law was enacted in the House of Representatives in 1964, 20 years ago, but it has not been implemented. Again, the interests of the importers and tradesmen influence the government's policy. Thus, many times we have profits and superprofits in the prices of machines, spare parts and agricultural medicines, fluctuating from 100 to 200 percent. And Mr. Mikhailidis stressed: In order to reduce the cost of producing our products so as to increase the income of the agricultural world, we need an effective control on the prices of machines, spare parts and agricultural medicines.

Ending, the EKA secretary general called for every ideological and partisan difference to be put aside. What is urgent--he stressed--is the country's salvation, the survival of the farmer and all our people.

The Congress Proceedings

Our correspondent in Paphos communicated the following about the congress: The Seventh Paphos EKA Agricultural Congress took place on Saturday, 26 November, at the "Titania" movie theater. Attending the congress were 580 delegates, the AKEL and DIKO [Democratic Party] deputies from Paphos, Mavronikolas and Papadimitriou, the prefect and deputy prefect of Paphos, a representative of our city's mayor, representatives of AKEL, DIKO and PEP [Pan-Cyprian Refugee Committee], the district agricultural officer and other representatives of various government departments and organizations.

The congress proceedings opened with a short address by the president of Paphos EKA, Loizos Papadopoulos. A principal speaker was Paphos EKA District Secretary

Giannos Anastasi who said that the congress is meeting in a difficult period for Cyprus, in which serious dangers have been created for the entire Cypriot people. He also underlined the decisive role which Paphos EKA has played in studying and solving many of the area's agricultural problems. He also referred extensively to the chief problems of the farmers in our district and dwelt particularly on viticulture, the problems of stock farmers, wheat growers, tobacco farmers, and many others.

The congress sent a related memorandum to the president of the republic in which were reported the chief problems which the Paphos farmers are facing. In addition, the congress members sent a resolution to the UN secretary general in which they condemn the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot pseudo-state.

9247

CS0: 3521/119

ESTIMATES SHOW WEAKENED 1983 ECONOMIC PICTURE

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 1 Dec 83 pp 1,7

[Text] Although at this stage it is fairly difficult to make precise forecasts about how the various economic magnitudes will develop for all of 1983, one thing can be said with certainty: The total picture of the economy in 1983, despite the fact that it continues to compare favorably with what is happening internationally, is relatively worse than that of 1982.

This estimation is contained in an informational document of the Ministry of Finance related to economic developments in 1983. Included in the same document are the following targets which are aspired to with the 1984 budgets and other measures which are being promoted:

- a. Controlling the fiscal deficit, restricting the expansionist effect of the public sector's transactions on effective demand and further decreasing the inflationary pressures which the public sector is exercising on the economy.
- b. Creation by the state of the appropriate fiscal framework and economic climate which will assist in the recovery of productive investments and improvement of the competitiveness of Cypriot products.

In order to achieve the above targets, it adds, the state must continue to carry out productive investments and, in particular, construction of the appropriate infrastructure works is required. The necessities of expanding the productive structure, and restructuring and supporting private initiative require a strengthening and intensification of the investment and exporting effort, with the offering of the necessary investment and exporting incentives. A decrease in consumer expenditures, and increase in public reserves for financing the state's investments, are also required.

Developments in 1983

It is reported in the document that the economy will develop in 1983 at a rate of around 3 percent (1982; 4.8 percent), that economic development will derive principally from the expansion of the tourist flow and it is added; In 1983 it is expected that all the sectors, excepting the building and services sectors, will achieve a relatively lower growth in comparison both with previous years and with the targets of the Fourth Special Plan.

First, the agricultural sector is expected to show a drop in contrast to 1982. Second, the manufacturing sector is not developing according to expectations (target of 6.3 percent). Industrial exports are expected to decrease in gross volume and lead to an even lower rate of development in the sector (3 percent). Fourth, the building sector is expected to show a small plus rate of increase in production. And, fifth, tourism is expected to show a significant development, estimated at more than 13 percent.

1. Investments: Developments relating to investments are not considered satisfactory, even though they are expected to show a slight increase in comparison with 1982. Thus, in 1983, the volume of fixed investments is expected to be slightly greater than the 102 million pounds at 1973 constant prices which they were in 1982. But while investments in construction are expected to show a slight increase, investments in mechanical equipment are expected to remain at the same real levels of 1982 because of the drop in industrial investments. An increase is anticipated in investments in transportation equipment.

2. Consumption: Private and public consumption is expected to be significantly larger in 1983 also, though at a lower rate than the previous year (around 5 percent in real terms, compared to 8 percent in 1982). Thus, domestic reserves in 1983 are expected to finance a percentage of fixed investments lower than the 60 percent it was in 1982. This financing percentage is not considered satisfactory because the dependence on financing investments from foreign reserves is increased, which is reflected in the enlargement of the deficit in the balance on current accounts.

3. Employment-Unemployment: In 1983, the increase in employment is calculated to be on the order of 1 percent (2,000 new employment opportunities) in comparison to 1.3 percent (2,500 new employment opportunities) in 1982. As a result, the number of gainfully employed persons is estimated to amount to approximately 200,000 in 1983, compared to 198,000 in 1982. A rise in employment was noted primarily in the tertiary sectors, particularly in services and tourism. The number of unemployed is estimated to amount to 8,000 people, or 3.4 percent of the Economically Active Population [OEP], in comparison to 6,445 people (or 2.8 percent of the OEP).

4. Prices-Incomes: One sector in which satisfactory developments are being observed is prices and incomes, in which a substantial declining tendency in the rate of increase is occurring. The drop in the inflation rate continued in 1983 also. For all of 1983, the inflation rate is estimated, preliminarily, to be 5.5 percent, versus 6.4 percent in 1982. This rate compares favorably with the target set in the Fourth Special Plan.

It is expected that the lower demands by employees for salary increases will lead to a drastic reduction in the rate of increase for wages at current prices, from 17.5 percent in 1982 to 11 to 12 percent in 1983; this is translated into a real improvement in wages on the order of 5 to 6 percent in 1983, compared to nearly 10 percent in 1982.

5. Exports: The most disturbing element relating to Cyprus' foreign transactions is the absolute drop observed in national exports, which is a continuation of the decreased progress of national exports in 1982. In contrast, re-exports show a satisfactory increase. As a result, the total exports are expected to remain stationary, which is happening for the first time since 1978.

6. Imports: While the rate of increase for total imports is expected to decrease to levels slightly lower than 10 percent, compared with 18 percent in 1982, imports of consumer goods and automobiles are anticipated to show increases of 18 and 40 percent, respectively, in 1983. Although, in the case of consumer goods, the rate of increase decreased drastically, from 35 percent in 1982 to 18 percent in 1983, nevertheless, it continues to be considered undesirably high, and to create destabilizing tendencies in the balance of payments, in a period in which foreign demand is showing a decrease. At the same time, it is calculated that the dollar's rise will not allow a decrease in the cost of petroleum-product imports, which is expected to remain at about the same size as 1982, that is, 110 million pounds. Their share, however, in imports will decrease from 21 percent in 1982 to 19 percent in 1983.

As is natural, the negative developments in both exports and imports led to further enlargement of the trade balance deficit which is calculated to exceed 330 million pounds in 1983, versus 280 million pounds in 1982; that is, it shows an 18-percent increase.

7. Invisible Receipts: As a result of the significant decline in the rate of increase for the tourist flow, it is calculated that the rate of increase for invisible receipts will decrease substantially. Nevertheless, there was a satisfactory increase in the surplus in invisible receipts--16 percent in 1983, compared to an increase on the order of approximately 27 percent in 1982.

During 1983, returns from tourism are estimated to exceed 170 million pounds, versus 139 million pounds in 1982; that is, they are expected to show an increase greater than 22 percent, compared to 35 percent in the previous year. Since 1982, the returns in exchange from tourism have surpassed the returns from exports in the whole manufacturing sector and are the chief condition of foreign exchange.

As regards invisible payments, a great increase is expected to be seen in spendings by Cypriots who visit abroad as tourists (24 percent), as well as spendings for travel purposes (20 percent) which reflect the tendency for consumption.

8. Balance on Current Accounts: Despite the increased surplus in invisible receipts, the far greater enlargement of the deficit in commercial transactions is expected to result in an increase in the deficit in current accounts, from 72 million pounds in 1982, to approximately 85 million pounds in 1983, or from 7.2 percent to approximately 7.5 percent of the Gross National Product. In spite of the increase in the deficit in the balance on current accounts, the general balance of payments is expected to be in surplus this year also (around 20 million pounds, compared to 44.5 million pounds in 1982).

It is calculated that, by the end of 1983, the exchange reserves will amount to 360 to 370 million pounds and will cover approximately 7 months of imports, compared to approximately 289 million pounds at the end of 1982.

Fiscal Developments

The fiscal deficit is expected to show an increase compared to 1982, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage in the Gross National Product, thus creating

inflationary pressures. The state's financing needs are expected to be even greater because of the parallel rise in payments in capital for foreign loans. Also anticipated is an enlargement of the government sector's expansionist push on the economy, while the public sector's savings progress is expected to be negative for the third consecutive year.

1. Current Public Revenues: Preliminary estimates show that the current public revenues will increase at a somewhat slower rate than current public expenditures and, in combination with the small decrease in foreign aid, will contribute to the increase in the fiscal deficit. The increase in current revenues in 1983 (16 percent) will lag far behind the corresponding increase in 1982 (22 percent) which reflects the lower rate of development of the economy, inflation, incomes and imports.

2. Current Expenditures: Contrary to the targets of the Fourth Special Plan, the rate of increase for the state's current expenditures will increase in 1983 and is expected to reach 19 percent, versus 15 percent in 1982.

3. Investment Expenditures: A large and satisfactory increase is expected to be shown by public investment expenditures which are forecast to swell by 22 percent in 1983, in comparison with a decrease noted in 1982.

4. Fiscal Deficit-Financing: A result of the public sector's wider transactions will be the anticipated increase in the fiscal deficit, from 59.2 million pounds in 1982 to 72 million pounds in 1983. Consequently, the fiscal deficit, as a percentage in the Gross National Product, will reach 6.4 percent in 1983, from 5.9 percent in 1982. The fiscal deficit will be financed, as in previous years, with domestic and foreign loans. In 1983, the importance of foreign lending is expected to decrease, from 54 million pounds in 1982 to 27 million pounds in 1983. As a result of clear foreign lending, as well as the diversifications noted in international monetary equivalencies, it is anticipated that by the end of 1983 the public foreign debt will amount to approximately 247 million pounds, compared to 206 million pounds at the end of 1982.

5. Monetary and Credit Developments: The increase in the total liquidity, which is forecast to amount to around 14 percent in 1983, compared to 18 percent in 1982, is considered to have been sufficient for financing the increased economic activity. At the same time, it was of definite importance in holding inflation at a relatively low level.

With a goal of restricting the total liquidity to limits which are in keeping with both the pursued development and the blunting of pressures on the level of prices, the Central Bank kept the minimum allowable percentage of liquidity at 32 percent during 1983. At the same time, in order to encourage the financing of investments in priority sectors to a greater degree, the minimum allowable percentage of liquidity remained at 25 percent for banks which participate in the Special Fund for Financing Priority Sectors, and the percentage of liquidity which should be deposited in this fund at 7 percent.

MAJOR INCREASE IN EXPORTS TO ARAB COUNTRIES

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 22 Nov 83 p 5

[Passages enclosed in slantlines in boldface]

[Text] /The Arab market has functioned like a sheet anchor for the Cypriot economy and given us the foundation for developing the industrial sector. Thus the Arab countries are step by step taking the first place as our customers away from the countries in the EEC./

According to data contained in the economic bulletin of the Bank of Cyprus:

/Exports to Arab countries have expanded by 26 times within 8 years./

The share of exports to these countries has increased vertically; from about 8 percent of total exports in 1973 to 52 percent in 1981.

/The corresponding data for EEC members sank to 31 percent from 64 percent in 1973./

Let it be noted that the expansion of export trade with Arab countries is connected to a very great degree with the large increase in exports of industrial products.

Of the increase in clothing exports during 1973 to 1981, almost one-half were channeled to Arab countries (of which 85 percent were an increase in exports to Libya). In shoes the Arab countries' percentage of the total increase was about 80 percent (of which two-thirds represent increased exports to Saudi Arabia).

In the case of cement, the entire increase was channeled to Arab countries (two-thirds went to Syria), and of cardboard products 83 percent of the increase in exports.

The factors behind the increase in exports to Arab countries--according to the Bank of Cyprus bulletin--differ according to product. We can say, however, that the most basic factors are the following:

/a. The fast-paced development of the economy of many Arab countries because of the great increase in their revenues from petroleum.

b. The substantial lack of production in Arab countries of many of the industrial products which can be exported from Cyprus and the limited competition, until recently, from other countries' products.

c. The relatively limited demands of the Arab market in respect to product quality, which allowed many small Cypriot industries to answer the increased demand./

11587

CSO: 3521/100

STATISTICAL SURVEY OF MAJOR TRADE DEFICIT

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 24 Nov 83 p 3

[Text] /The Department of Statistics and Research has published the monthly report of imports and exports for September 1983. The primary characteristics of Cyprus' foreign trade during September 1983 were:/ [in boldface]

- a. Imports amounted to 54.154 million Cypriot pounds in comparison with 44.878 million in August 1983 and 50.782 million in September 1982.
- b. Of the imports in September 1983, 37.4 percent or 20.23 million Cypriot pounds were raw materials, 23.8 percent or 12.903 million were consumer goods, 22.3 percent or 12.123 million were petroleum products, 9.1 percent or 4.905 million were transportation equipment, and 7.3 percent or 3.934 million were capital goods.
- c. During September 1983, imports worth 21.907 million Cypriot pounds or 40.4 percent came from the EEC, 5.91 million or 10.9 percent from eastern countries, 6.644 million or 12.3 percent from Arab countries, and 19.692 million or 36.4 percent from other countries.
- d. Total exports during September 1983 amounted to 22.226 million Cypriot pounds in comparison with 18.032 million in August 1983 and 25.44 million in September 1982.
- e. Industrial products constituted 89.2 percent or 11.743 million Cypriot pounds of domestically produced exports during September 1983, agricultural products were 9.4 percent or 1.237 million, and ores were 1.2 percent or 155,000 Cypriot pounds.
- f. Our exports to several countries totaled 10.57 million Cypriot pounds or 47.6 percent of Cyprus' total exports during the month under review: with Lebanon at 2.759 million, Libya 2.01 million, Egypt 1.438 million, Saudi Arabia 1.278 million, Kuwait 553,000, and Jordan 473,000. The countries of the EEC absorbed products worth 4.866 million or 21.9 percent of the exports, with the UK at 2.183 million, Greece 1.013 million, and The Netherlands 645,000. The eastern countries absorbed 1.315 million or 5.9 percent of our total exports in September 1983, and the remaining countries 1.435 million or 6.5 percent.

In addition, merchandise worth 4.011 million Cypriot pounds or 18 percent was disposed of as supplies on ships and airplanes.

g. The deficit in our trade balance during September 1983 amounted to 31.928 million Cypriot pounds in comparison with 26.846 million in August 1983 and 25.342 million in September 1982.

11587

CSO: 3521/100

STATISTICS ON INCREASED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 29 Nov 83 p 5

[Text] The Department of Statistics and Research has issued the annual report, "Agricultural Statistics," for 1982. Contained in the report are detailed data about plant and livestock production, production costs, additional value, employment, investments and other data related to the broad agricultural sector.

Development of the agricultural sector in 1982 can be synopsized as follows:

- a. Agricultural production showed an increase in 1982 compared to 1981. The total value at current prices amounted to 162.1 million pounds, versus 141.5 million pounds in 1981; that is, it increased by 14.6 percent. The value of plant production was 91.6 million pounds, livestock production, 54.7 million pounds, forests, 1.1 million pounds, fishing, 2.7 million pounds, dairy products, 7.3 million pounds, raisin and darnel, 3.3 million pounds, and other items, 1.4 million pounds.
- b. The prices of agricultural products increased on an average of 11.8 percent in comparison with 1981 and the volume of production rose by 3.0 percent.
- c. The sector's contribution to the Gross National Product (AEP) at current prices rose to 96.8 million pounds, from 81.9 million in 1981; that is, there was an 18.2-percent increase. At constant prices, the sector's contribution to the AEP increased by 1.8 percent.
- d. In more detail, plant production presented the following picture: The wheat crop increased from 85,785 tons in 1981 to 90,240 in 1982, mainly because of the increase in the barley crop. An increase was also shown by the olive crop which reached 13,000 tons, up from 10,500 tons in 1981. Grapes decreased by about 6 percent, to 198,000 tons from 210,000 tons the previous year. Vegetables, aside from potatoes, showed a slight increase. The potato crop fell slightly, to 169,000 tons. But their value reached 20.8 million pounds, up from 15.0 million pounds in 1981, because of the higher prices they secured abroad. Citrus fruits increased by 9.8 percent in comparison with 1981 and amounted to 125,700 tons, versus 114,500 tons in 1981. The largest increase was noted in lemons. The other fresh fruits (apples, pears, bananas, etc.) showed an overall increase in 1982.
- e. Livestock farming continued an upward development in 1982. The total production of meat increased by 10.4 percent in quantity, and 7.5 percent in prices.

Production of pork showed an 11.9-percent increase, poultry, 9.9 percent, and goat and sheep, 3.4 percent, while for beef it remained at approximately the same level as 1981. Milk production rose 9.2 percent, mainly because of the increase in cows. Egg production decreased 5.7 percent compared to 1981.

f. Exports of agricultural products noted a 21.5-percent increase in value and reached 51.5 million pounds. They were 26.2 percent of the total value of national exports. The chief products exported were potatoes (22.5 million pounds), citrus fruits (12.7 million pounds), grapes (3.9 million pounds) and vegetables (3.3 million pounds).

g. The number of people employed in farming dropped to 43,753 in 1982, from 44,810 in 1981, and is 18.7 percent of Cyprus' economically active population.

9247

CSO: 3521/120

NEW TAXES TO COVER BUDGET DEFICIT

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 2 Dec 83 pp 1,2

[Text] New taxes, and new forms of taxation, will be imposed by the government in 1984 in its effort to reduce the constantly swelling fiscal deficit which is expected to show a new increase this year and rise to 72 million pounds, compared to 59 million pounds in 1982. The new taxes were announced on 1 December by Minister of Finance S. Vasileiou from the floor of the House of Representatives.

Mr. Vasileiou asked for personal sacrifices from every citizen for the good of the whole and our economy, and advised that the government will make readjustments in duties and taxes whenever necessary. This is in the frameworks not only of the effort to reduce the public deficit, but also of the necessary controlling, he said, of the rate of increase in private disposable income and, by extension, private consumption and imports.

Analyzing the government's economic policy for 1984, the minister of finance stressed that the government excludes any decrease in its revenues from the income tax and he made it clear that there will simply be a redistribution of burdens to the benefit of the lower-income classes.

New Forms of Taxation

Mr. Vasileiou advised that in 1984 new forms of taxation will begin to be studied with a goal of improving the total distribution of tax burdens. Also, there will be studies by all the government services which offer goods and services for sale, with a target of increasing the related prices and taxes in cases where they are lower than the cost of their production. Similar measures will be taken to cut down on expenditures and increase the incomes of semi-government organizations and local-administration authorities.

The minister then observed that our economy is basically healthy and that we should keep it so, before the symptoms turn into a chronic illness. "To achieve this," he said, "it is necessary for us to sacrifice our present standard of living as other people without occupied territory, and with far more resources than ours, have done. It is simply necessary for us all to confine our demands for an increase in our standard of living to the frameworks designated by our actual possibilities.

"These days, when Cyprus is in the front line of publicity, let us show the world our determination to not yield to the facts accomplished by the occupying force, our will to survive as a people and as a state, and the readiness of each of us to endure personal sacrifices for the good of the whole and our economy."

Stagnancy

Referring to the problems occupying our economy in recent years, Mr. Vasileiou said: "The basic problems which we have been facing in recent years are the shortage of satisfactory investments in new branches of the manufacturing sector, the stagnancy observed in exports of goods, and the great increase in our imports, particularly imports of cars and other durable consumer goods. The adverse consequences which these problems create for our economy have been offset to a great degree by the exceptionally positive developments which occurred in exports of services, particularly in tourism, with the result that our economy maintains conditions for a relative foreign monetary stability, as well as a satisfactory rate of development.

"The government," he added, "is worried about the existence of negative long-term tendencies on various economic magnitudes which are creating possible dangers for our economy. In order to avoid a gradual worsening of our economic situation," said the minister of finance, "the government is determined to proceed in taking all the necessary measures.

"The measures will aim at achieving two conflicting--at first view--pursuits: On one hand, strengthening the economy's stability and, in particular, improving the situation in the balance on current accounts; on the other, ensuring the success of the whole effort being made to deal with the structural weaknesses which our economy faces today, improving the structure and reinforcing its developmental base, and maintaining conditions for full employment of the labor force."

Revenues

Mr. Vasileiou then noted: The reasons for the slowness of investments in new branches of the manufacturing sector are, we are coming to the conclusion, that the prospects which have been presented until recently by our traditional manufactured products, and the possibilities which our export services (principally tourism) continue to offer, the lack of local energy sources, the small size of our own market and the attainment of easy profits in the import trade, have been serious restraining factors.

Our tax revenues lag far behind the international average; for this reason the government has introduced various measures to improve the mechanisms for collecting direct taxes and they are expected to have positive results on receipts, particularly from the income tax, during 1984.

Ending, the minister of finance called on the deputies to give not only their affirmative vote to the three budgets, but also their help and contribution for adoption of all the necessary corrective measures. The House set its first session to discuss the budgets on 19 December. The date for the start of debates will be finalized after the report of the Parliamentary Finance Committee on the subject has circulated.

9247

CS0: 3521/119

BRIEFS

INCREASED UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES--While vacant positions are decreasing constantly, the number of unemployed continues its upward trend. The unemployed in line at the Labor Offices at the end of June numbered 8,103, or 3.5 percent of the economically active population, compared to 6,761, or 3.0 percent, at the end of May and 6,478, or 2.8 percent, at the end of June 1982. The vacant positions reported at the Labor Offices during the period under review amounted to 883, compared to 940 in the previous month. Nevertheless, according to the Labor Statistics Bulletin, which is issued by the Department of Statistics and Research, the vacant positions published in the press and the republic's official newspaper numbered 1,416, versus 1,137 in the previous month and 1,238 in June 1982. The district labor offices placed 442 people, compared to 383 in May and 390 in June 1982. At the end of June 1983 there were 939 pending positions, versus 1,101 in the previous month and 694 in June 1982. [Text] [Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 4 Dec 83 p 9] 9247

TRADE DEVELOPMENT WITH SWITZERLAND--Minister of Commerce and Industry Andreou met 21 November 1983 with Swiss Ambassador Simonin, who was accompanied by Honorary Swiss Consul Sioukiouoglou. During the meeting the trade relations of the two countries were reviewed and opinions about increasing commercial trade further were exchanged. Particular emphasis was given to the increase of Cypriot exports to Switzerland, the prospects for industrial collaboration with the creation of joint-ventures, and the great attraction that Cyprus has for Swiss tourists. The minister stressed the trade imbalance which exists between the two countries and ways to reduce it were discussed. Minister of Commerce and Industry G. Andreou also met 21 November 1983 with Mr Ray, president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of the UK and discussed matters concerning the accounting and audit professions. The president and the administrative council members of the League of Certified Accountants/Auditors of Cyprus accompanied Mr Ray. [Text] [Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 22 Nov 83 p 3] 11587

CSO: 3521/100

PASOK CHARGED WITH ANTI-LABOR POLICIES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 11-12 Dec 83 pp 1, 3

[Text] In the 2 years of the "Change" the income of workers has declined significantly because of the government's policy, unemployment has swelled, layoffs of workers have continued, the right to strike has been curtailed, and the struggles of the workers for their just demands have run up against anti-labor laws which the government has implemented.

It was with these findings, which were framed in the speeches of a number of representatives, that the proceedings of the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] congress continued yesterday.

More specifically, independent congress delegates associated with the New Democracy Party and also representatives of the trade-union factions ESAK-S [United Antidictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating] and AEM [Anti-dictatorial Labor Front] strongly criticized the government's economic policy vis-a-vis the workers, as well as the tactics practiced by the appointed leadership of the GSEE. In their speeches, independent congress delegates in sympathy with the camp of the New Democracy Party--G. Romanias, Bamikhas, Khristoforidis, and others--responded to the long-winded and inflated activity report of the appointed GSEE administration (which essentially was of the government's choosing in its actions in the labor sector) by pointing to the misleading characterization of the congress as democratic, unified, and representative of the working class. The chief features which confirm this misleading characterization, stressed the above speakers, are the significant extent of bogus representation, the partisan confrontations, and the lack of any fraternal solidarity. The above speakers, along with speakers from union factions on the Left, stressed also that the pro-government union faction which has been heading the GSEE is responsible for the politicization of the unionist movement and for the tolerance shown toward the government's anti-labor measures--the anti-strike Article 4, Article 27 of Law 1320/82, which abolished collective bargaining, and so forth. It should be noted that the independent congress delegates from the New Democracy have not taken part and are not going to take part in the elections of officers in connection with the selection of GSEE organs.

Moreover, in connection with the congress there was also strong criticism regarding the fact that Minister of National Economy Ger. Arsenis had

clearly avoided referring to the 1984 income policy. It was being said that this fact betokens a continuation of the same harsh income policy--at least in its main points.

Furthermore, in paying belated respects to the congress yesterday--after returning hastily from his business with the EEC Social Affairs Committee in Brussels, over which he was presiding--Minister of Labor Evang. Giannopoulos referred to the "achievements" of the government's policy in the labor sector, while avoiding any reference to the anti-strike Article 4, to the abolition of collective bargaining in 1983, to the repeatedly applied anti-labor Law 3239, and so forth. Among the promises which Giannopoulos made to the congress were statements that within 5 years all the housing loans will be granted by the Workers Housing Organization (OEK) to persons who are entitled to them and who request them, and that within 10 years the finished workers' dwellings will have been turned over by the OEK, the result being, as he stated, that 150,000 unhoused workers will be provided with housing!

Meanwhile, yesterday morning many congress delegates were handed a leaflet in which criticisms are voiced in opposition to the State unionism and the trade-union bureaucracy which has been put into effect in the labor movement by PASOK. The distributors of the leaflet were removed from the premises of the congress, but this did not provoke any incidents.

12114

CSO: 3521/122

BILL CREATES STATE ORGANIZATION FOR IMPORTS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 17 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] The government is systematically and methodically furthering the process of replacing private enterprise with the State by its creation of new public enterprises. Thus, following the numerous socialization measures in industry and its control over loans to farmers by way of committees controlled by the party, the first serious and extensive penetration by the State into the domain of commerce is also taking place.

With a bill introduced yesterday into the Chamber of Deputies which is signed by the ministers of national economy, finance, and commerce, a Trade Mediation Organization is being created in the form of a corporation, the purpose of which will be to procure, import, and market any requisite product for the satisfaction of needs of the public or private sector.

Specifically, in the explanatory report which accompanies the bill the following things are stated:

"With the proposed bill, a Trade Mediation Organization is created under the form of a corporation. Its establishment constitutes the fulfillment of a commitment made in the government's platform, and it does not aim at replacing private commerce, but at securing supplies to the market in those cases where for any reason shortages develop in the supply of goods and insufficiencies arise in the fixing of prices for these products at satisfactory levels.

"Without ruling out any other commercial activity, this organization will focus chiefly on imports from abroad of basic goods, in quantities which will permit it to play a significant mediating role in the fixing of prices.

"The joint capital of the organization will be provided by the public; it will be split up into 10,000-drachma shares, which will be registered rather than transferable shares. Under certain conditions, the transfer of 49 percent of the shares to socialized agencies will be permitted. By a decision of the minister of commerce, the organization's articles of association will be drawn up and the details concerning the composition and functioning of its various organs will be settled."

12114

CSO: 3521/122

ANDALUCIA AGRARIAN REFORM COSTS, OPPOSITION

Madrid ABC in Spanish 29 Dec 83 p 47

[Excerpt] Sevilla--The Andalucian Government will have some 50 billion pesetas in 1984 to start the agrarian reform. This bill will be debated in the regional parliament during the first quarter of the year. The bill is supported by President Felipe Gonzalez. He told Rafael Escuredo, president of the Andalucian Government, this in a meeting they held last 20 December in Madrid.

The transfer to the Andalucian Government of the jurisdictions of the IRYDA [expansion unknown] and the ICONA [National Institute for the Preservation of Nature], two basic agrarian reform organisms, still has not been completed. It is expected that Felipe Gonzalez and Rafael Escuredo will meet in the coming days to resolve the differences that hinder approval of the decree-law on this transfer.

The agricultural adviser, Miguel Manaute, felt that the key aspect of the bill is the leasing of land. This will permit the government to own land without having to work it. In fact, the main argument of the Andalucian Government lies in the social function of ownership and possession of land. As Escuredo said, "it is not enough to cultivate the land; it is necessary to obtain maximum social benefit from it."

The most noted aspect of the agrarian reform bill that has aroused the most controversy is the establishment of a progressive tax for underutilized land. It will tax agricultural properties that do not achieve the rates of optimal yield established in their area.

Opposition to the Bill

Before the presentation of the bill last October in Carmona, the Andalucian countryside was embroiled in a union fight--like the Workers Commissions and the Communist Party of Andalucia--demanding an integral agrarian reform. The controversy spread throughout the Andalucian countryside with occupation of farms, cutting of highways and a march for agrarian reform.

The Andalucian rural workers never changed their position although there was a truce during contacts and consultations with the Andalucian Government. The

protests of the Andalucian rural workers not only concern the agrarian reform but their stand against the community employment system. The best known demonstration was the agrarian reform march that went through the eight Andalucian provinces and held the attention of the country for about a month.

The text of the reform bill does not satisfy everyone. Some feel it is not a true agrarian reform and others feel that it must be more precise in the financial aspect for its development.

Businessmen do not agree with the reform as presented either. They feel that the Andalucian countryside must change but they believe that the future must be based on greater mechanization to lower costs and make the crops competitive with the European market. This can help exports since the Andalucian harvests are earlier than those in the rest of Europe.

7717

CSO: 3548/154

APPROVAL OF GUARANTEED PRICES FOR AGRICULTURE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 29 Dec 83 p 17

[Text] Madrid--The Council of Ministers approved the new regulation on agricultural prices, the bills on armed forces personnel and wages and civil protection and an 8-percent increase in the interprofessional minimum wage. It also approved a decree for the protection of the rural unemployed which will replace community employment which has been "ineffective and the cause of widespread fraud," according to Minister of Labor Joaquin Almunia.

The government approved new guaranteed agricultural prices for the farmer. This year, for the first time, they were set 3 months in advance. Naturally, these guaranteed prices are not the same as the real market prices which are higher.

The government will send a bill to the Cortes to end the current wheat purchasing monopoly of Senpa. The new agricultural prices were set as follows: Wheat will increase 4.14 percent so the price per kilo will be 22.65 pesetas. Barley, rye and oats will go up 10.9 percent to 20.75, 21.60 and 19.55 pesetas per kilo, respectively. Legumes will increase 11 percent to 36 pesetas per kilo. The guaranteed price of corn will be 22.65 pesetas per kilo, an increase of 4.14 percent. Rice will increase 9.15 percent to 31 pesetas per kilo and the price of sunflower is set at 43 pesetas per kilo, an increase of 6.43 percent.

Beets will increase 6.59 percent; their price is set at 6.15 pesetas per ton. Sugar cane will increase at the same rate as beets; its price will be 4.305 pesetas.

The guaranteed price for cotton was set at 108 pesetas per kilo by the Council of Ministers with a subsidy of 5 pesetas. The minister reported that the price of wine purchased by Senpa will remain frozen. Olive oil will have a 5-percent increase and a subsidy of 12 pesetas per kilo. Its price is set at 178.5 pesetas.

Carlos Romero indicated that beef will increase 7.23 percent to 171 pesetas. Pork will have a guaranteed price of 163 pesetas per kilo, a 7.24-percent rise.

Last, milk will increase 8.17 percent. Its price per liter will be 31 pesetas.

7717

CSO: 3548/154

ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S RECENT ECONOMIC EVOLUTION

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 9-13 Dec 83

[Analysis by Suha Ortulu and Mevlut Isik: "Turkey as it Enters 1984"]

[9 Dec 83 p 6]

[Text] Introduction

Three years after the 12 September operation, which was undertaken by the Turkish Armed Forces as part of their duty to protect and to oversee the country, a new page was turned in the history of Turkish democracy with the 6 November elections.

As all of Turkey rejoices at the country's return to democracy, there is a great amount of curiosity about what the Turgut Ozal government will find itself up against and what it will be able to do in the short and long run.

Leading problems that the Ozal government will have to tackle include price increases, the state of the investments and industrial production, the years-old imbalance in the country's foreign account, efforts to reduce the inflation rate and boosting the growth rate.

Will Ozal's economic policy made up of well-known measures be able to overcome the difficulties? Will promises made at rallies be fulfilled? In brief, will Turkey be able to sail into smooth waters at the end of the coming five-year period?

Time will provide the answers to these questions. In these series of articles we will take a look at where Turkey stands as it enters 1984.

Turgut Ozal's election to the government marks the start of civil administration in Turkey as well as a new period in the economy. The economy tops the problems that will keep Ozal busy. Social segments such as workers, public servants, small businessmen and peasants--which Ozal coined as the "mainmast"--expect economic relief from Ozal--who calls the government a "shirt of fire"--in exchange for their votes.

Ozal's team of technocrats are working on the reorganization of the ministries and the government's program while trying to take an "inventory of the Turkish

economy." To do that they are studying the records of the State Planning Organization, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance and the State Statistical Institute. Meanwhile, the ministers of the Uluşu cabinet are preparing an "inventory" of the implementations of the last three years. When the reins of government change hands Uluşu will hand this inventory over to Ozal. The ministers of the Uluşu government will brief Ozal's respective ministers about their ministries. Thus the inventory prepared by the government will be compared against the inventory prepared by Ozal's team of technocrats and the resulting evaluation will be disclosed to the public.

Uluşu's View

The last press conference Bulend Uluşu held as prime minister before the public speech ban for elections took effect was in essence an inventory of the last three years. Uluşu's assessments on fundamental issues were as follows:

"We are handing over a Turkey which has found peace and tranquillity and many of whose problems have been tackled. Some of the measures that have been taken will yield results in the medium or the long run. Our gross national product which was on the decline previously rose by 4.1 percent in 1981, 4.6 percent in 1982 and 3.2 percent in 1983."

On the issue of inflation, which is the leading problem of our economy and which is described as the "economic monster" that Ozal will have to fight the hardest, Uluşu made interesting comments:

"Combatting inflation has been one of the issues we have persistently pursued in the last three years. Major successes were achieved in this area; annual price increases were reduced from more than 100 percent to 37 percent in 1981 and 25 percent in 1982. We had targeted to reduce the inflation rate to 20 percent in 1983. As of the end of August, wholesale prices had risen by 21.4 percent over their level at the end of last year."

Uluşu said that the inflation target for 1984 will be 25 percent. With his usual candor, Uluşu admitted that the export growth rate has been declining and added that this was caused by a decline in exports to Iraq and Libya and the general stagnation in the world's economy.

However, inflation rose significantly more than expected in the next two months and forecasts to the effect that the inflation rate for 1983 would reach at least 35 percent gained broader acceptance.

Kafaoglu: "We Were Forced to Increase Prices"

While airing his views on the 15-percent increase in the price of petroleum, which was announced at the end of November and which had broad repercussions on the market, Minister of Finance Adnan Baser Kafaoglu said: "We were forced to make that increase." Recalling the recent sharp rise of the dollar against all other currencies including the Turkish lira, Kafaoglu said: "The Fuel Stability Fund was running a negative course as a result of this situation. That meant that petroleum would have to be subsidized in Turkey as before, and we could not accept such an implementation which would mean a deviation from fundamental policies. We were forced to institute the price increase."

When asked, "Was the price increase necessary at this stage or were you thinking of helping the Ozal government?" the minister replied: "The fact that the Ozal government does not have to face the people with such a price increase at the outset is a psychological advantage. However, we were not contemplating to provide some easement to the Ozal government; economic conditions forced us to institute this price increase."

"No More Major Price Increases"

Noting that "the rise in the price of petroleum products has affected the cost of all products", Kafaoglu stated that measures have been taken to preclude similar sharp price increases in the future and that it will be possible in the future to reduce the effect of changes in petroleum prices on the cost of other products through the "Fund to Explore for Petroleum and to Regulate Petroleum-related Activities" that is in the process of being established.

In addition to the effect of the petroleum price hike on the prices of other products, the infusion of nearly 200 billion Turkish liras into the market on the eve of the elections, the fact that the "economic chaos" following the elections resulted in price hikes far exceeding cost increases and the continuing rise of the dollar against other currencies added to the problems Ozal will have to tackle as prime minister.

The income of public servants, workers and small businessmen--whom Ozal calls the "mainmast"--always lagged behind price increases, and they were the ones who were most affected by the abnormal price hikes of last month.

Ozal and the Mainmast

Ozal, who is familiar with the problems of the mainmast, primarily addressed that social segment in his speeches during the election campaign and made promises to them. The slogan of "getting things done" drew to the Motherland Party [MP] the votes of segments which saw the image of someone who can get things done in Ozal's person.

In his election platform, Ozal addressed the mainmast as follows:

"Farmers, workers, public servants, small businessmen and retirees are the mainmast of our society. The high inflation rates of the late 1970's have severely weakened the mainmast and have added to the imbalances of our social edifice."

In view of these facts, Ozal promised to reduce inflation, to eliminate the black market and two-tier pricing, to make better use of tax returns, to pay fair price to the farmer's produce, to increase the return on people's savings, to keep wage increases strictly above the inflation rate and to reduce unemployment "gradually" by raising the growth rate to 7 percent.

Ozal will try to keep his promises starting from the "existing economic situation." The state of the Turkish economy on the eve of 1984 is the "shirt of fire" Ozal will have to wear and determines the means at his disposal.

How will runaway price increases be stopped?

How will the industrial production bottleneck be overcome?

How will exports and foreign exchange earnings be increased in the face of competition against giants abroad?

How will the government pay its debts to farmers, contractors and savings account holders?

And how will relief be provided to the "mainmast" which has tightened its belt to the last notch and which has suffered unendurable pain?

These are Ozal's problems, known as the "shirt of fire."

[10 Dec 83 p 6]

[Text] The MP election platform statement realistically outlined the development trend of the Turkish economy:

"Significant developments in the Turkish economy since 1950 have been noted. Despite short-lived economic crises that emerged at times, the results that have been achieved are promising. Indeed, the average recorded growth rate of 6.5 percent in the years between 1963 and 1976 is a rarely encountered figure in the entire world.

"However, this positive trend turned into a crisis in the late 1970's. The 24 January decisions that began to be implemented in 1980 launched an intense effort to combat this crisis. The economic picture began to improve following the elimination of anarchy and terror in the aftermath of the 12 September 1980 operation. The program was expanded with additional measures after 24 January 1980. The initial results of the program were the reduction of inflation, the elimination of black marketeering and unjust profits and the normalization of foreign payments."

Shirt of Fire

Despite these positive developments, however, the economy was seen to be moving toward a new crisis by the end of 1983 as a result of various factors. A resurgent inflation rate, unendurable cost of living increases and the fact that the government will resume making payments on its foreign debt in 1984 even as the growth rate of exports slows down are the basic elements of the "shirt of fire" the new government will have to wear.

High Cost of Living

As the money-printing presses were run on the eve of the 6 November elections and the prices of durable goods and foodstuffs soared after the elections, the economic stagnation was replaced by a grim picture.

The inflation monster opened its mouth even bigger to snatch larger chunks from the dinner table of low-income citizens. In the beginning of 1983 it was

announced that the inflation rate was targeted to be reduced to 20 percent by 1984, and wage and salary increases were consequently limited to that level. However, that target could not be attained; the inflation rate is already estimated at 35 percent. Thus, workers and public servants whose wages and salaries rose by only around 20 percent have suffered real income losses of at least 15 percent. Even before the end of 1983, the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce disclosed that prices had risen by 36 percent as of the end of October 1983 compared to the corresponding period the previous year.

Even if Ozal raises wages and salaries by 15 percent the day he takes office he will not have increased the real income of this social segment; he will merely have kept it at the same level.

Price Hikes

Huseyin Kaya, a private sector employee and the father of three children, told TERCUMAN about price hikes:

"I do not know what to say. I have lost control. We cannot manage. My salary is not enough for bare bread, let alone keeping the kitchen stocked. Is this life? I am sick and tired of everything, and I do not think things will improve."

Merden Ali Godekli, a public servant, said: "I am getting by not on my salary but on assistance I get from my village. I do not even want to think what citizens without such extra means are doing. They are having a lot of problems; they are in a very difficult situation. I do not know what will happen if some remedy is not found."

Low-income groups who were already having a hard time to make a living were particularly shaken by the price hikes that came in the last one month. The recent petroleum price hike added an additional burden of nearly 2,000 Turkish liras to the monthly food bill of an average three-person family. The municipalities were forced to increase bus and taxi fares one after the other.

The 1983 budget is expected to run a deficit of at least 250 billion Turkish liras, while the 1984 budget deficit is estimated at between 600 billion and 1 trillion Turkish liras. This deficit will have to be closed either by cutbacks in investments or through new price hikes. New price adjustments appear to be inevitable at this stage in the economy.

Interest rates on savings have lagged behind the inflation rate and last month's price hikes, and this has led to a "run on goods." As bank deposits began to grow slower, gold price resumed their upward climb. While the automotive industry announced price hikes of 50,000 to 150,000 Turkish liras, cement began to be traded on the black market. Expectations of new price hikes on durable goods such as refrigerators and washing machines as a result of soaring inflation drove citizens to a "run" on these products. All the "typical" indications of rising inflation were thus present in the economy.

Government Debts

Among problems waiting for Ozal's attention are Turkey's foreign and domestic debts.

The Ozal government must pay \$6 billion in foreign debts in the coming three years, and \$1.999 billion of that must be paid in 1984. Ozal will try to reactivate the \$600-million loan that was frozen by the EEC for political reasons. However, foreign financing circles provide no hope for encouragement on the issue of rescheduling debts. The new government will have to settle the future of the Standby Agreement which expires in June 1984 and to embark on new bargaining with the IMF.

The Ozal government will have to increase exports in order to pay these debts and to secure new standby agreements with convenient terms. The government will also have to close the \$2.7 billion trade gap that will result from projected exports of \$6.85 billion and imports of \$9.55 billion in 1984.

Another problem that the Ozal government will have to resolve concerns domestic debts. The government's domestic debt stood at 175 billion Turkish liras as of 1 November. Of that, 83 billion Turkish liras is owed to farmers and 90 billion Turkish liras is owed to contractors.

All these problems are expected to primarily affect the "mainmast."

[11 Dec 83 p 6]

[Text] "The mainmast, that is workers, public servants, small businessmen, farmers and retirees..." This is what Ozal continually said at election rallies and in television speeches. "The mainmast is the nation's spinal column; it is the cornerstone of democracy." All that is true, but another truth is that the mainmast is yielding under strain. The most troubled segments of the society, the segments that have lost most to inflation and that have had to tighten their belts to the last notch are the workers, the public servants, the small businessmen, the farmers and the retirees.

Workers Under Strain

In 1980, when Turgut Ozal took over the reins of the economy, the average daily wage of a Social Security Organization [SSO] insured worker was 426.96 Turkish liras. That amount rose to 543.84 Turkish liras in 1981 and 691.03 Turkish liras in 1982. In 1983, the average daily wage of a SSO-insured worker stood at 829.24 Turkish liras. The rising trend in these figures may lead one to conclude that workers have been given adequate wage increases and that, even, wage hikes have not lagged behind the inflation rate. The fact is that runaway inflation took away all these gains, and the workers even lost ground. Public servants' and workers' wages and salaries were adjusted on the basis of targeted inflation rates announced at the beginning of each year, but wage and salary earners saw their real incomes shrink because the actual inflation rate exceeded the targeted rate every time.


Real wages are computed by subtracting the inflation amount from current wages. In 1963, a SSO-insured worker was paid an average daily wage of 17.91 Turkish liras. This figure rose to 829 Turkish liras in 1983, but the cost of living increased so much that real daily wages declined in purchasing power compared to 1963 and dropped to 13.58 Turkish liras in real terms, if a 40 percent inflation rate is assumed for 1983. On the eve of 1984, the real average daily wage of

the Turkish worker stands at its lowest level since 1963. Workers' real daily wages rose from 17.91 Turkish liras in 1963 to a peak of 27.04 Turkish liras in 1977 and then declined steadily--by a total of 50 percent since 1978--to their pathetic state today.

Average Daily Wage of An SSO-Insured Worker (in 1963 Turkish liras)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Current Wage</u>	<u>Real Wage</u>
1963	17.91	17.91
1964	19.50	19.46
1965	21.61	20.62
1966	23.53	20.71
1967	25.83	19.93
1968	28.22	20.51
1969	32.13	22.28
1970	35.32	22.70
1971	39.32	21.23
1972	43.88	20.53
1973	54.41	22.34
1974	68.26	22.62
1975	85.55	23.39
1976	115.30	26.84
1977	146.53	27.04
1978	207.93	23.73
1979	294.31	20.54
1980	426.96	15.34
1981	543.84	14.20
1982	691.03	13.59
1983 (estimate)	829.24	(35 percent inflation) 12.08
		(40 percent inflation) 11.65

Source: Social Security Organization



The worker was forced to work harder and to earn less as his real purchasing power declined even though the amount of money he took home seemed sizable. An average worker who had to work 44 minutes for 1 kilogram of bread in 1963 was working 1 hour and 13 minutes in 1983 for the same amount of bread (1 hour and 30 minutes if a 40 percent inflation rate is assumed). The price hikes of last month alone added 2,000 Turkish liras to the food bill of a worker's or a public servants' three-person family. The tight money policy, the only bitter medicine against inflation, has strained the employers as much as the workers, and, as a result, workers cannot be given adequate wage increases without taking the inflation rate into account. If wage increases are sought by force, labor peace would be upset, production would decline even more, and everyone would grow poorer. In 1980, 7.7 million labor days were lost to strikes until 12 September. If those days were used for production the economic crisis would perhaps be less severe.

Now, workers and public servants, who are experiencing the tragedy of not being able to make a living and getting a shrinking share of the national income, expect Ozal to reduce inflation and to raise their income level.

Small businessmen, merchants and industrialists also face a difficult situation. Bankruptcies, people going out of business and forfeited bonds are steadily rising in number as a result of shrinking demand, tight money policies and inadequate growth in exports. This situation indicates that the entire business and industry sectors--except certain export-oriented segments and the automotive industry--are in a dire spot. While workers and public servants in the middle class writhe with pain as their incomes shrink, small businessmen, medium-scale industrialists and merchants are sweating under hardships to keep up with their payments.

The number of entrepreneurs who went out of business rose from 7,968 in 1978 to over 12,000 in 1982. That is another indication that the mainmast is yielding under strain. In the first 6 months of 1983, 7,323 entrepreneurs went out of business. The number of forfeited bonds rose from 1,201,792 in 1978 to 2,232,297 in 1982. The monetary value of forfeited bonds soared from 20,391 million Turkish liras in 1978 to 242,540 million Turkish liras in 1982.

Financing problems, high interest rates and the weak demand that resulted from the tight money policy are eroding away that segment of the mainmast that includes small businessmen, merchants and industrialists. Ozal must find remedies to their problems as well without permitting inflation to rise.

The farmer, on the other hand, has complaints about agricultural floor prices that lag behind the inflation rate and the government's inability to pay the debts it owes to him.

The Mainmast's Expectations

The mainmast's problems, as they are, remain one of the important issues that will strain Ozal's government most. Representatives of this segment expressed their expectations from the new government as follows:

Speaking on behalf of the labor segment Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] leader Sevkettin Yilmaz wants above all to maintain the labor peace in a healthy

state. Yilmaz sees "unemployment" and "inflation" as the biggest calamities. Stating that the new government must banish these two "calamities", Yilmaz said: "These are the primary issues on which we have expectations."

Husamettin Tiyanan, the leader of the Turkish Small Businessmen's and Artisans' Confederation, said that the biggest problems of the segment he represents are financing and credit difficulties. Tiyanan also expressed the need for a single guiding authority to coordinate the services of small businessmen and artisans.

Gungor Kaya, the Deputy Secretary General of the Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers, focused on the need to reduce interest rates on agricultural loans and demanded from the government the reversal of the existing imbalance among regions in extending agricultural loans. Noting that the agricultural floor pricing policy must allow producers to plan for future production, Kaya said: "Agricultural produce subsidies must be governed by a single ministry."

[12 Dec 83 p 6]

[Text] Just as cities mirror a society, a warm home is the prime requirement for peace and happiness in a family. No matter what segment of the society he comes from a person cannot be productive and successful at his work if he does not have peace in his home. The home plays a major role in spreading prosperity and insuring social justice and security.

A general look at the issues of home buying and rents--which top the problems of low and middle-income segments in Turkey--reveals the existence of a severe crisis in the construction sector. This crisis, which has adversely affected the sales of building materials and which has contributed to unemployment, stems primarily from the fact that fewer homes are being built.

Current Situation

The current housing shortage and the demand that needs to be met appear to be primarily a problem of cities and large centers of settlement. It is a known fact that housing construction within municipal borders of cities is far from adequate to meet demand. According to the State Statistical Institute, housing construction in 1982 remained at 115,986 units, far below the needed 148,000 units. According to these figures there is a 28 percent shortage in housing construction.

Demand

According to the 1980 census Turkey's population stands at 44,737,000. Of that, 43.9 percent--19,645,000 people--live in cities and 56.11 percent--25,092,000 people--live in rural communities. The urban population, which has been following a rising trend since 1955, is estimated to be increasing by 0.30 percent a year. On the basis of these figures we can estimate the population that will demand housing during the period the Ozal government will seek solutions to various problems as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Urban Population</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Annual Increase</u>
1984	48,265,000	22,151,000	45.89	655,000
1985	49,272,000	22,826,000	46.33	675,000
1986	50,301,000	23,521,000	46.76	717,000
1988	52,422,000	24,977,000	47.65	739,000

Total increase in urban population: 3,481,000

Housing demand for the same period on the basis of estimates of the population that will need housing is estimated as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Housing Units</u>
1984	143,640
1985	148,026
1986	152,412
1987	157,237
1988	162,061

Total: 763,376

If the 506,292 housing units that will need to be rebuilt in the 1984-1988 period are added to this figure, the total housing demand for the next 5 years will total 1,269,668.

Causes of the Shortage

Turkey did not have a housing problem in the first years of the republican period. More exactly, a problem did exist in this area, but the measures taken did not go beyond repairing dilapidated buildings. The mechanization of farming after the 1950's drove the rural population to the cities. This growing trend eventually gave rise to shantytowns and assumed today's well-known proportions. Various factors lie at the root of this problem. One of them is the cutback in investments to slow down inflation; another is the sharp rises observed in the prices of building materials. Another factor that is seen as one of the causes of the problem is the decline in the people's purchasing power.

Meanwhile, the "Public Housing Law" that was enacted to relieve the growing housing shortage has not attained its goals.

The Rent Situation

While the stagnation in the construction sector led to a growing housing shortage, rents climbed to levels that were far beyond the reach of low-income citizens. Large rent hikes initially experienced in big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara eventually spread to other cities. While these increases led to newspaper headlines such as "apartment renting for 150,000 Turkish liras a month" to attract the authorities' attention, they also became the biggest problem of the citizen yearning for a warm home.

The Government's Approach

This issue, which has become one of the leading items on Turkey's agenda, is another problem that is awaiting the attention of the new government. The party that was elected to power stated in its election platform statement that it would place high priority on this issue in view of its special importance and that it would initiate new measures. The statement said:

"It is essential to avoid large, expensive and unpractical housing and to insure the maximum savings in housing construction. To this end the encouragement of more economical and practical housing will be emphasized.

"Financing is a fundamental issue for housing construction. We are determined to make housing loans available through all commercial banks. We see the encouragement of building savings accounts, the introduction of rational bases for housing loan amounts and repayment terms and the introduction of a subsidy system to support these bases by nonbudgetary funds as a consistent solution method. Included among our objectives is the reduction of the number and amount of taxes levied on housing sale and rent income in order to encourage our citizens to own their own homes and to make renting homes easier.

"We plan to expedite public housing construction and to provide government-procured or subsidized housing lots to give the citizens the opportunity to build their own homes.

"Rent has become a major burden for officials working in public administration and state economic enterprises. Special priority will be given to the construction of lodging quarters for these officials."

[13 Dec 83 p 6]

[Text] Another issue that the Ozal government will have to tackle is the state of the prisons. In Turkey today, there are 647 prisons of which 617 are closed, 7 are open, 18 are semi-open and 5 are juvenile correction houses. These prisons, most of which do not have adequate health facilities, are inadequate to house the 75,307 (as of the end of October 1983) inmates and convicts. These inmates, of whom 46,000 are male and 29,000 are female, do not stay in one or two-person cells as reported. It is a fact that their cells are too small even for their bunker beds. Consequently, the construction of prisons has been expedited recently. Completion of the work in this direction is another issue that awaits Ozal's attention. Another issue that awaits attention is the completion of work in connection with improving hygiene in existing prisons.

Victims of Fate

Then there are the inmates' expectations. If workers, public servants, small businessmen and farmers can have expectations from the new government why should "victims of fate" who have been confined among four walls for one reason or another not have some too? Of course they have expectations. But their wishes are very different from those of the rest. Amnesty is the only thought in the minds of these people who have lost their freedom, one of the most cherished elements of human life.

This is one issue which will not strain the Ozal government so much, but which will be the subject of a great amount of reflection. The MP leader confirmed this view when he said, "I will have to think ten times before I can give an answer on the amnesty issue." Letters arriving at MP headquarters from "victims of fate" from around the country embody the same message. These letters all begin with "pardon is an indication of greatness" and end with "we repent." Ozal says about pleas for pardon in these letters:

"This is a very sensitive issue. It is more sensitive than is believed. One needs to be extremely careful. I must think well before I open my mouth on this issue. Turkey had an experience in the past which is still very fresh in memory. Traces of that experience have not been completely erased yet. I must think ten times to be able to answer to the question on amnesty. I understand the human aspect of the issue. I have sympathy for the human aspect of the issue. However, this is an issue that requires a lot of prudence."

What can be the Bounds of Amnesty?

Ozal is very cautious about the bounds of amnesty. He says: "Unfortunately, our laws do not contain the term 'victims of fate.' The law does not say 'this person is a victim of fate for committing this crime.' Now if you start making distinctions by saying 'victims of fate' other problems will emerge. Some very undesirable results may ensue. This is a sensitive issue. I too pity people who have gone to prison as a result of an accident. We all feel the same way about the human aspect of the issue. However, this is an issue that requires extreme caution and repeated consideration before every spoken word."

On the one hand, issues that were the subject of our study, and on the other hand, broad masses embodying workers, public servants, small businessmen, farmers and inmates among four walls waiting for their seeds of hope to bloom...

That is Turkey's panorama as it enters 1984.

How will this panorama change in the coming 5 years? As we stated at the beginning of our article, time will answer that question for all of us.

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KETENCI ON TRANSITION TO NEW UNION SYSTEM

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Dec 83 p 9

["From the World of the Worker" column by Sukran Ketenci: "As We Enter the New Union System"]

[Text] The problems workers and unions face as they enter the new union system are so imposing that even when only the leading ones are considered the picture that emerges is a grim one whether one likes it or not.

Upset at the picture painted by an academician during a seminar dealing with the restrictions and the problems raised by the new laws, a union administrator reportedly said: "Professor, how are we going to carry on union activities if the picture you have just painted is true?" The academician replied: "You jumped into the sea before learning how to swim. In the old days you had life-saving buoys. Now they have taken them away. Either you will learn to swim and cross to the other bank, or you will drown." Upon that, the unionist said he was withdrawing his question.

If we want to extract some meaning from this exchange between our experienced unionist and the labor law specialist, we can say that the 1961 constitution and the laws enacted in 1963 contained provisions which protected the workers and, in particular, the unions. Fueled by a yearning for a belated union system and helped by the laws, the Turkish union movement experienced rapid growth in as little as 17 years. Employers' curbs against workers' efforts to participate in union organization were not very effective, and with the rapid growth and strengthening of the union collective bargaining became common practice.

The socioeconomic turmoil we experienced nationwide was naturally reflected in worker-employer relations, and social peace was disturbed in this area as well. Even so, we can say that the socioeconomic turmoil had the least damaging impact on worker-employer relations and that social peace was least upset in this area--a view that is supported by academicians specializing in labor and social legislation. We must primarily emphasize that terrorism and the use of arms was least encountered in worker-employer relations. The deadlocked strikes and disputes of the pre-12 September period were natural consequences of the country's unhealthy economy which was plagued by a 100 percent inflation rate. Illegal acts such as worker uprisings and work place occupations were less intense than illegal incidents in other areas and stemmed from a number of more concrete problems which the laws could not resolve for years and which were ignored by the executive and judicial branches of the government. Virtually all illegal worker acts were caused by either the fact that the union chosen by a particular worker was not always given the right to conduct collective

bargaining, or by the arbitrary worker layoffs which was the result of a complete absence of safeguard provisions for the worker.

When the new laws were being prepared, measures were sought to prevent the problems of the 17-year union law implementation. However, the approach taken was to restrict basic rights and freedoms in areas where the implementation of legal provisions led to problems in the past. As a result, we have in our hands a new legal system which substantially restricts basic union rights and freedoms and strike rights which gave muscle to unionization and collective bargaining.

Now, even if workers and unions attempt to build a more liberal union system, they will first have to fight for survival in a union system where union rights are exercised within a framework defined by Law No. 2821 on Unions and Law No. 2822 on Collective Bargaining, Strikes and Lockouts. Workers and unions are now obliged to learn to exercise their rights within the boundaries drawn by laws.

A scan of the problems workers and unions face as they enter the new union system reveals that beside difficulties arising from restrictions on basic rights and freedoms, there exist problems which stem from the fact that it is unknown how union rights will be exercised.

On the one hand, there are the workers who do not know what their rights are, who do not know how to exercise them and who have grown accustomed in the past to being content with what the unions served them; on the other hand, there are the relatively experienced but substantially corrupt union administration cadres.

Naturally, the old, experienced administrative cadres with their knowledge of ways and means came out ahead of the comparatively amateurish rank and file. Even though the union system was entirely overhauled and the laws were very substantially changed, the same cadres remained in administrative positions. This result may be regrettable from a perspective of manifesting the inexperience of the rank and file, the malfunctioning of democracy within unions and the continued presence of corrupt cadres in office. Even so, the fact that the new laws have not produced a total purge is important from a perspective of the need to be felt in the future for experience--just as long as the workers, that is the rank and file, learn the necessary lessons from the implementation of the last 17 years, the experience of the transition period and the problems they have encountered.

Unions can no longer achieve easy results and serve them to their members. Furthermore, our unionists are not yet ready to tackle difficult tasks. Provisions such as legally invalid memberships, which is what we encounter in practice, are the classical products of easy and corrupt unionism. The price for that may be paid, as always, by the workers, when it is seen at the collective bargaining stage that the union is not authorized to negotiate. To rectify that situation, the worker must stop being content with what the union serves him, he must learn his rights and what he can get and he must demand them and he must know how to control the unionist. The day the worker learns not to reward the corrupt unionist, the experienced unionist will immediately realize that the only way to keep his seat is to behave properly. Those who jump into the sea before they learn how to swim will either learn to swim and cross to the other bank, or they will drown.

IRREGULARITIES IN UNION MEMBERSHIP REGISTRATION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Dec 83 p 12

[Text] The Ministry of Labor is expected to publish lists by the end of January indicating which workers, in which branches of industry would belong to which unions. When these lists are published, it will be found out that in many workplaces it will not be possible to engage in collective bargaining. Within the present organisational framework of unions, in certain branches of industry no single union would be able to secure the required 10 percent majority. So until the publication of the new lists in July at the earliest, collective bargaining will not take place in these branches of industry.

A more likely outcome is that the union empowered to conduct bargaining in a branch of industry (by securing the 10 percent majority in that branch) and the union which has secured the authority to bargain at the workplace (having obtained a 51 percent majority in the workplace) may not be one and the same. Thus a situation may arise where the right to collective bargaining may not be used at all.

For this reason, as the lists are being prepared at the Ministry of Labor, the workers want answers to questions such as: the total number of workers in each branch of industry, and which unions have secured or are likely to secure the 10 percent majority in their branch. From what the workers are telling us, it appears that unions are not behaving correctly in this matter. In the first place, no one is in a position to give reliable, sound information on these matters. This is because in determining the total number of workers in each branch of industry, the Ministry of Labor will get its data from such sources as: forms filled by employers and existing files. In our country where small workplaces are overwhelmingly in the majority and where hiring workers without any contract is the norm, such methods of calculation would not yield accurate figures. Since the object of the exercise is deciding which unions will capture the majority in each branch of industry, simply taking note of employer forms and information provided by unions is hardly adequate (that it, employers who do fulfill their legal obligations, who do sign contracts and unions who are catering to already unionised workers).

What Is to Become of the Forged Registration of Union Members?

Once the publication of lists relating to matters such as numbers of workers in each branch of industry (based on data provided by employers and unions) are out of the way, other issues will come to the fore such as authority, protests and allegations of fraud.

The new regulations have brought a good deal of restrictions on unionisation and the right to organise with the ostensible purpose of taking measures against past practices such as misuse of union authority and forged membership. The formation of unions at the workplace level and establishing federations of unions have been disallowed. The new regulations have instituted the 10 percent majority requirement. It was thought that processing information concerning workers, workplaces, branches of industry and unions by means of computerized system would be the best safeguard against forged membership.

New Membership Registrations Irregular

The majority of registrations done after May 7 (when the new regulations took effect) are not in conformity with regulations.

As known, it is necessary to have resignations from the unions and new registrations after May 6 certified by a notary if the transaction is to have legal status. The worker has to go to the notary by his own free will and have his resignation or new registration certified. (In the case of resignation from a suspended union which had been a member of DISK a petition would suffice. However, such workers when registering with a new union would still have to notarize the document).

In actual fact, the practice (of a worker going to a notary by his own free will) is observed by only a few unions. This is confirmed by document since copies of notary transactions are sent to employers and the Ministry of Labor. Despite large numbers of new registrations at the unions and large worker turnover, particularly during the last month, the number of notary-processed (thus legal) union membership registrations reaching the Ministry of Labor are few and far between. We should also point out that according to the new regulations, the membership registrations which were processed after November 7 will not be taken into account when the Ministry of Labor makes its determinations concerning union authority during the month of January.

However, until recently, a number of unions have not been active in registering new members or in recruiting members from other unions. This may have been due to their being preoccupied with legal procedures, their worries about re-election or concern over securing control of their general meeting, etc. Now these unions are back in action organising a new membership drive. In the course of registering new members they are tampering with the date of registration which is backdated to before May 7 when the new regulations came into force. They are doing this to avoid the notary transactions which would also reveal that registrations have taken place after November 7. So they are processing forged membership cards.

Fraud Has Its Origins in Worker Oppression

During legislative discussions over the new regulations, it was pointed out that notary fees might deter workers from joining unions. However, the legislative view which maintained that this was a necessary measure to prevent fraud has won the day.

To the worker, if membership in a particular union means protection of his interests, if joining that union can be viewed as a reliable, desirable and attractive proposition, then the worker would bear the drudgery and the financial cost of going to the notary. However, if the worker does not trust that union, and if instead of a voluntary decision he is forced to join by his employer and the union, it becomes difficult for him to go to the notary of his own accord and become a member. The forging of backdated membership cards thus becomes the most convenient way and the law is trampled upon in the process.

It is sad, but what we are hearing from workers indicates that this is the prevalent practice. Complaints are frequently heard that some employers issue threats such as: "If you don't bring your union membership card you won't start work". Reports are coming that at behind-closed-doors-meetings of some employers associations certain trade unions have been singled out for support. So far there is no indication that authorities are sensitive to this matter and that measures are being taken against developments which can hardly be conducive to the anticipated, the hoped for peace in the work-place.

12466
CSO: 3554/91

CONTINUED CONTROVERSY OVER WORKER DISMISSAL PROHIBITION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Dec 83 pp 1, 7

[Text] Due to the large numbers of employers demanding to dismiss workers, it was decided to extend the worker dismissal prohibition (which was put into effect by the decision of the National Security Council after 12 September 1980) for a further period. In a report prepared by the Confederation of Turkish Employers Associations it was maintained that "a genuine peace in the workplace was attained after 12 September". The report also demanded that strikes be limited to 60 days.

The extension of the worker dismissal prohibition was induced by the prediction that there would be mass dismissals if the prohibition was suddenly terminated. In the Labor Code there is no injunction concerning the dismissal of workers, singly or en masse.

There are reports that with the National Security Council's term of duty officially coming to an end, large numbers of employers have applied to the Ministry of Labor and regional offices thinking that the prohibition would be lifted and inquired whether they would be able to dismiss workers. Dismissals being subject to permission, there is a backlog of applications filed by workplaces involving large numbers of workers. In certain cases applications have been turned down by the Ministry, in others they have been placed under review.

During the three-year period, employers are reported to have asked for permission to dismiss about 90,000 workers. It is expected that this number would rise considerably in the event prohibition is lifted.

With the suspension of trade union activity after 12 September, the Council decided to prohibit the dismissal of workers (with the exception of cases where the individual worker is at fault). Later through the decisions of the Martial Law Command Co-ordination the whole question of worker dismissals was brought under the jurisdiction of relevant martial law authorities and the Ministry of Labor, being made subject to their review and permission. More

recently (on 21 May 1982) a new arrangement was introduced by the Co-ordination authorities with regard to worker dismissal. In this it was envisioned that (excepting cases where workers are found to be at fault according to clause 17/2 of the Labor Code) matters concerning worker dismissal should be addressed to the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor, whether it involves single or mass dismissal. Employers are expected to provide justification which is submitted to a commission (at provincial levels) which includes representatives of workers, employers, relevant martial law authorities. On behalf of the Ministry of Labor, the regional inspector and director would be present. The commission either totally rejects the application, or gives permission to dismiss a lower number of workers than demanded, or accepts the demand made by the employer. The decision of the commission is subject to approval by the Ministry of Labor and the Martial Law Command.

This arrangement was brought in mainly because of the suspension of trade union activity and the absence of any reference to job security in the Labor Code. Now that trade unions are back in action again and the National Security Council has ceased to be a legal entity, it was decided to extend this arrangement for an indefinite period. During meetings conducted at various levels (the Council, the government, Ministry of Labor) the existence of a tendency to dismiss large numbers of workers has been noted. This being so, it was felt that a sudden lifting of the prohibition might produce a vacuum which could disturb the social peace. For this reason the view gained ground that the existing arrangement should continue for some time.

The Ministry of Labor officials pointed out that the worker dismissal prohibition was still in force even after the National Security Council's term ends. In any case this arrangement was upheld as a directive of Martial Law Coordination thus there is no legal vacuum either. It was also pointed out that the worker dismissal prohibition will be continued as a martial administration measure. A new Martial Law Coordination directive is being considered in this regard.

12466
CSO: 3554/91

GOVERNMENT PRESENTS BILL FOR 'COMPREHENSIVE' SEA POLICY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Dec 83 p 9

[Article by Eric Dyring: "New Lines for Swedish Sea Policy"]

[Text] Now the seas, with all their possibilities and problems, have landed on the table in the Riksdag. On Tuesday the government presented its sea resources bill for a comprehensive Swedish sea policy.

In money it amounts to 20 million kronor for the SIV [National Swedish Industrial Board]. It also includes instructions for different national authorities and businesses.

"We are taking a total approach to the questions of the sea," said Minister of Industry Thage G. Peterson. "Sweden must participate and concur in the rapidly growing ocean markets. Swedish industry has good possibilities to compete, with its knowledge and its sense of quality. Sweden must participate in utilizing the vast resources of the sea."

The bill is part of the government's efforts to renew Swedish industry and invest in new techniques. Last fall there was also a bill for micro electronics. In March the big final bill will come when the government presents a major bill on research and the industrial renewal.

Large Area

Sea resources are very extensive. This includes fish, cultivation of fish and mussels, extracting oil and minerals, protection of the environment, ocean commerce, maritime techniques, maritime law and much else.

The bill also includes Swedish policy for polar areas, cooperation between military and civilian organs in maritime matters, questions of planning, research and technical development.

The subject cuts across many ministries. In the bill there are recommendations from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education, Defense, Housing and Agriculture.

SIV will play an important role in the future in dealing with the sea and its techniques. It is proposed that SIV get 20 million kronor for industrial activity at sea. Seven of these millions are planned for fiscal year 1984-85. A new program committee with members from both business and the public sector will supervise the entire matter.

Ocean Cultivation

STU [National Board for Technical Development] is requested to invest in ocean techniques and cultivation--growing fish and mussels. That agrees with the board's own ideas.

The bill is largely based on a report by the Delegation for Coordinating Ocean Resource Activities (DSH). The delegation will continue to exist, and will have the job of continuing its charting of the area, giving counsel and information. It will receive more money for this.

National companies which are tied to the sea, mainly Swedish shipyards, are also requested to continue inputs within the field of ocean techniques and resources.

Those who expected a strengthening of Swedish ocean cultivation, which has been behind internationally, will be disappointed in the bill. It mentions a lot about the sea and its great possibilities, but it pushes the biggest questions into the future. It is hoped that the forthcoming research bill will give clearer guidance.

Developments in the area of sea resources are moving fast, and many countries are making large investments.

Now Sweden will join in that rapid technical development, and work itself into the international ocean market.

9287

CSO: 3650/94

AUTHORITIES WEIGHING TOUGHER ENFORCEMENT OF FISHING LIMITS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Dec 83 p 10

[Article by Omar Magnergard: "Foreign Fishing Thieves Will Be Punished Harder"]

[Text] Swedish authorities are considering much harder steps against foreign fishing thieves who are caught in Swedish fishing zones.

According to a proposed law in the Ministry of Agriculture, fines could be as high as 50,000-100,000 kronor. Furthermore the possibility is being studied of cutting the wires to the fishing thieves trawls.

"We have taken a soft line for long enough. Now we need much harder steps," said Ake Olsson to SVENSKA DAGBLADET. He is the chief of the operational section of the coast guard.

It is not a question of armed intervention--which the Norwegians, Icelanders and Englishmen use. Such battles and "sea warfare" are not wanted by the Swedish authorities.

There are other methods.

An important issue is that it should not be profitable to enter Swedish fishing waters, steal fish and pay the fines. Many foreigners do that today, since the consequences are usually only fines.

Fines According to Horsepower

According to the proposed law, fines will be calculated to a maximum of 100 kronor times the engine horsepower. That is doubled with repeated violations. For an ordinary trawler with a 500 horsepower engine that would mean fines of 50,000 and 100,000 kronor respectively.

Earlier this year a Danish fishing boat in Karlskrona had his equipment and his catch--a value of 70,000 kronor--declared forfeit. This was an excep-

tion. But this Danish fisherman had been in Swedish waters stealing fish 10 times.

It is recommended that even the possibilities of seizing the equipment and the catch be strengthened.

"We will simply be coming into parity with other countries in suppressing fishing thievery," said Ake Olsson.

He recently put out a memorandum for the 450 people in the coast guard who work at sea. In the memorandum Ake Olsson reminds that since 1 July this year the coast guard has the authority of the police. They will naturally arrest the law breakers immediately. But if that does not suffice they have the right to resort to "justifiable" force--for example to shove a vessel off its course.

In the southern Baltic there are about 100 encroachments per year in the Swedish fishing zone. The Danes are responsible for most of them. The reason is that in recent years they have had problems with the EC about fishing licenses.

Barely a month ago the coast guard ship TV-171 put four men aboard a trawler from Bornholm. After 5 hours the four men were finally able to leave. The captain denied encroachment in Swedish waters--although TV-171's instrument showed that the trawler was fishing three and one-half nautical miles inside the limit.

This incident is still not closed

"We will contact the Foreign Ministry as to how to proceed."

9287

CSO: 3650/94

USE OF SOVIET OIL INCREASES SULPHUR EMISSIONS FROM REFINERIES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 31 Dec 83 p 8

[Article: "Sulphur Emissions Increase--Soviets Big Oil Supplier"]

[Text] For just a few years the Soviet Union has been Sweden's largest crude oil supplier after Norway and Great Britain. That influences Sweden's environmental needs--without Soviet oil the refineries would emit much less sulphur than they do according to today's regulations.

Now we import from the Soviet Union relatively sulphur-rich, and therefore cheaper, crude oil to be blended with the more expensive and lower sulphur oil from the North Sea.

In only a few years the share of crude oil from the Soviet Union has increased from a few percent to 16 percent.

Among our crude oil suppliers, only Great Britain with 29 percent and Norway with 26 percent are larger.

Soviet oil is several percent lower in price than the crude oil from the North Sea

Saved Oil

SPK [Swedish National Price and Cartel Office] statistics also show that Swedish oil costs have actually declined somewhat. In spite of the increasing dollar exchange rate, we have saved 1-2 billion in oil costs compared with 1982.

Sweden pays a total of over 30 billion for oil per year.

Actually we purchase a total of more than 42 billion worth of oil, but a large part of it must be exported further to neighboring countries as products.

In the first place, Sweden exports heating oil. When the oil refineries produce the gasoline that Sweden needs, a certain amount of heating oil is automatically produced. And today that amount is more than this country needs.

9287

CSO: 3650/94

STUDY OF ENFORCEMENT SHOWS LARGE FIRMS ESCAPE FINES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Dec 83 p 5

[Article by Ingvar Andersson, Mats Carlbom, Bengt Lindstrom, Ingemar Lofgren and Peter Sandberg: "DN Investigating Environmental Crime--Most Cases Dropped"]

[Text] Just now 24 suspected environmental crimes are being investigated in Sweden by police and prosecutors. Most cases will probably be dropped. That is what usually happens. Under the environmental legislation, which many regard as an elastic law, they are only prosecuting the small environmental violators, not the really big ones.

"Most often it is the small individual cases who are caught," said Folke Plejmark at the Environmental Protection Office in Kalmar County to DAGENS NYHETER. "This applies, for example, to small firms which have not applied for permission before building, those are easy to convict. It does not matter if they perhaps do not conduct environment damaging activity."

Difficult to Prove

"The large cases, involving large firms, are considerably more difficult and seldom are convicted. Often the burden of proof is impossible: How certain and careful are the authorities' measurements? Did an emission happen consciously or was it an accident?"

"The result has been that the small routine violations lead to conviction, while the large environmental crimes take place without indictments," said Folke Plejmark.

Twenty-four Cases

DAGENS NYHETER has recently asked the country's county prosecutors, district prosecutors and county councils how many environmental crimes are under investigation or will appear in court soon. The authorities themselves have no overview of how many cases are going on, since there is no central listing.

Investigation disclosed that just now there are 24 cases of suspected violations of the environmental laws.

"Environmental cases are often set aside by the prosecutors since we do not have enough people," said county prosecutor Brynolf Wendt in Halland County to DAGENS NYHETER. "We give priority to murders and cases with short statute of limitation times.

"Besides we know that the punishment for environmental crime plays a secondary role. Administrative sanctions are more effective. If the supervisory authorities threaten to stop the activity, that is much more effective than if a judge passes out fines," said Brynolf Wendt.

Most suspected environmental violations which are reported are sooner or later dropped, either by the police or by the prosecutor.

Time Consuming

Many prosecutors believe that in spite of having the entire environmental legislation behind them, they have a hard time proving that an environmental crime has taken place, and if so, who is responsible.

"Environmental cases are very time consuming. They are usually very complicated, with very difficult technical details," said the prosecutor in Varmland, Folke Ljungberg, to DAGENS NYHETER. "It is not like judging a speeding case. We must rely on experts, we prosecutors can not be expected to know everything."

Stig Jansson is county prosecutor in Sodermanlands County. For a long time he has been investigating whether SSAB in Oxelosund has discharged too much cyanide in the Baltic, and thereby exceeded the permission of the concession authorities. Probably the case will be dropped soon.

"The big problem is that we must be able to hold physical persons responsible. When it is a big firm such as SSAB, for example, it is very difficult to search out a responsible physical person among all the local and division managers," said Stig Jansson.

Small Firm Accused--But Not SKF [Swedish Ball Bearing Company]

In Goteborg a laundry firm, Tvattman, is threatened with prosecution for having discharged 10-15 tons of trichloroethylene into the environment.

A large firm, SKF, which discharges 220 tons of the same substance in the same city was not prosecuted.

At the end of 1982 it was "discovered" that SKF discharged 220 tons of trichloroethylene from its factory in Gamlestaden. The discharge was never verified by the concession authority.

Trichloroethylene, often abbreviated "tri," is an organic solvent which, among other things, dissolves grease and which can damage the central nervous systems of people who inhale it.

The SKF discharge was investigated to determine whether it was a violation, but it was concluded that it was not. The background of that is troublesome. In 1970 SKF announced that a new unit would discharge 170 tons of tri.

At that time there was no requirement for the discharge to be verified, but the county government wrote that a verification program should be worked out. That did not happen, and when the discharge was again "discovered" it had grown to 220 tons, and moved to another part of the factory.

Had it been anything other than a manufacturing industry involved, the changes would have been verified.

There was also, beginning in 1972, a decision that a grease removal installation with a discharge of over 25 tons must be verified by the concession authority. But every tri washing machine discharges about five tons, and expansion has taken place gradually.

There was no prosecution, but SKF was required to verify its entire activity before the concession authority. This becomes effective in 1984.

On the other hand, county government has brought the discharge from Tvattman in Angered--10 to 15 tons per year--up for prosecution.

While SKF washes ball bearings, Tvattman washes overalls from the manufacturing industry in perchloroethylene (related to tri).

Tvattman received a dispensation in 1979 to operate the laundry. In the dispensation it says that it shall have a 15-meter-high stack, that the emission shall be a maximum of 700 kg/year, and that the waste is to be handled as environmentally dangerous waste.

The stack is 3 meters high, the emission is 10-15 tons, and the waste goes to ordinary trash burning.

"The problem is really not whether it is a large or a small firm. The problem is that the conditions for the large firms are often so complicated that it is difficult to prove that the firm is in violation," said the county government in Goteborg.

Lengthy Legislation

There are three important laws in the environmental protection area:

1. The environmental protection law
2. The nature conservancy law
3. The law concerning substances dangerous to health and the environment.

The legislation is so lengthy that it includes all common emissions in the environment--smoke from stacks, automobile exhaust, trash dumps, garbage, excessive fertilization of land, landscape changes, gravel pits, etc.

But the legislation is also filled with exceptions.

The most important exception is naturally when different authorities give permission for environment damaging activities. This can occur with health authorities, county councils or concession authorities.

The punishment aspects of the legislation were sharpened in 1981 after the BT chemical scandal. Now an environment violator can go to prison for 2 years. At the same time the statute of limitations was lengthened to 5 years.

The possibilities for the courts to convict anyone of environmental crime are, however, greatly limited:

1. It must be proved that the violation was committed negligently or deliberately.
2. Petty violations are not punished.
3. An action which is damaging to the environment is not criminal if it is generally accepted. (This exempts, for example, automobile exhaust).
4. If environmental damage is defensible under the circumstances it is not punished.
5. Environmentally dangerous actions can take place if necessary due to strong community interests.

"It is remarkable that anyone is ever accused of environmental crime, there are so many exceptions in the legislation," said a jurist at the Nature Conservancy Board to DAGENS NYHETER. "It is quite clear that society considers that it is much more serious if someone steals from his workplace than if the same workplace emits pollution which can damage the environment.

"Environmental crime is not taken seriously in Sweden."

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CSO: 3650/94

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16 FEB. 1984
